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 Abstract 
 
 The aim of the current thesis was to conduct experimental analyses of the 
emotional impact of cognitive defusion techniques on positive and negative thoughts 
about the self. Part I of the thesis investigated the impact of defusion on explicit self-
report measures. Experiment 1 examined the emotional impact of a brief defusion 
technique on positive and negative self-statements. In this case, defusion was 
manipulated through the use of pro- or anti-defusion instructions and prefixing the 
statements with defused or non-defused phrases (e.g. “I am having the thought that I 
am a bad person”). The results indicated that the defusion-related instructions had 
little or no impact on the explicit ratings, but the defusion prefix decreased statement 
discomfort while increasing statement believability and willingness. Indeed, this 
effect occurred only for negative statements, but positive statements remained 
unchanged on all measures. In Experiment 2, participants’ personalised self-
statements were targeted for more direct intervention that involved defusion, thought 
control or placebo. In each case, the impact of instructions versus exercise was also 
assessed. In these findings, there was some superiority of defusion exercise over 
instructions, although defusion was generally associated again with decreased 
discomfort. However, willingness did not change and the believability of the 
statements now decreased. Thought Control overall decreased discomfort but had no 
impact on believability or willingness. No changes were associated with Placebo.  
 Part II of the current thesis attempted to examine the utility of defusion in the 
context of both explicit and implicit measures. Experiments 3 through 6 employed the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) to determine the most suitable 
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types of self-relevant stimuli that could be targeted by the implicit measure while 
being susceptible to a defusion intervention. Participants’ responses to positive and 
negative words were compared in the context of I AM versus I AM NOT (Experiment 
3); I AM versus OTHERS ARE (Experiment 4); and I AM versus I SHOULD BE 
(Experiment 5). The results indicated strong positive implicit self-regard across all 
three contexts, although I AM versus I SHOULD BE showed the weakest levels of 
implicit positive self-regard, relative to the other two experiments. Experiment 6 
replaced the target words with whole statements (e.g. ‘I am so alone that it hurts’) to 
determine if this would be associated with lower levels of implicit self-regard and 
indeed it was. 
  Experiment 7 provided a preliminary exploration of the susceptibility of the 
Statement-IRAP to defusion with groups of individuals with different levels of 
experience with defusion. Undergraduates (with no experience with defusion) were 
compared with a group of therapists (with considerable defusion experience). 
Although both groups reported strong implicit positive self-regard, those with more 
defusion experience were associated with stronger implicit outcomes. Experiment 8 
investigated the impact of a defusion intervention or Placebo on implicit self-regard in 
individuals with no prior history of defusion. The data indicated that defusion 
increased implicit positive self-regard more than Placebo. The results presented here 
offer one of the first comprehensive experimental analyses of the impact of defusion 
on both explicit and implicit measures. Overall, the findings highlight the positive 
emotional benefits of defusion, relative to other more traditional coping strategies.  
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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
When faced with troublesome or unpleasant thoughts or feelings, many 
individuals coerce themselves with instructions such as “Just don’t think about it” or 
“Concentrate on what’s positive”. But, despite the apparent intuitive sense in using 
strategies like suppression or distraction, few people really believe they can rid 
themselves of negative thoughts and feelings or can avoid them by simply thinking of 
something else. Even if such a strategy worked occasionally or in the short term, it 
seems unlikely that it is an effective way to manage psychological and emotional 
content. Indeed, there is a growing body of psychological evidence on experiential 
avoidance that suggests that this is the case. Specifically, recent clinical and 
experimental research suggests that: (1) experiential avoidance correlates with 
psychopathology; (2) avoidant strategies are unproductive and possibly counter-
productive; (3) experiential acceptance, by contrast, is correlated with psychological 
health; and (4) cognitive defusion strategies are thought to play a crucial role in 
generating acceptance.  
In line with this broad base of empirical evidence, the current thesis proposes 
three key arguments. First, experiential avoidance is correlated with poor mental 
health and as such does not appear to be a useful strategy for dealing with 
psychological problems. Second, acceptance (as an alternative to avoidance) is 
correlated with psychological well-being and reductions in psychopathology and thus 
appears to be a more effective strategy for dealing with psychological problems. 
Third, acceptance, whilst a commonly used term, has been only broadly defined and 
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the key active ingredients that mediate its outcomes have yet to be clarified. The 
thesis argues that cognitive and emotional defusion is one such ingredient that has not 
been clearly defined, but which does appear to be central to the positive effects of 
acceptance. In the sections that follow, the thesis presents these three core arguments 
and offers a review of the empirical evidence that supports these tenets. 
 
Experiential Avoidance 
Experiential avoidance is said to occur when an individual is unwilling or 
unable to make psychological contact with private events (i.e. thoughts, feelings and 
emotions), particularly those that are negative and/or painful (Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 1999). Avoidance is usually associated with attempts to change or eliminate 
these private events and the situations that cause them (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996) and some common examples of avoidance that serve this 
purpose include: substance abuse, daydreaming, distraction and thought suppression. 
Naturally, most individuals are more likely to engage in experiential 
avoidance with negative experiences that make them think or feel uncomfortable, 
compromised, worthless, futile, etc. than with positive experiences. Who wouldn’t 
rather feel happy than sad? But this does not imply that being sad is a bad idea or that 
ignoring or removing thoughts and feelings of sadness will automatically make you 
feel happy. Indeed, there is growing empirical evidence that convincing yourself that 
you are not sad will not only not make you happy, but is more likely to exacerbate the 
sad feelings that you are experiencing (e.g. Purdon, 1999).  
The basic idea behind this hypothesis is relatively simple and easily illustrated 
by a common example. Consider instructing a female friend as follows: “Do not think 
of cotton wool, think of anything else you like, but do not think of cotton wool”. Of 
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course, her most likely reaction will be to automatically think of cotton wool and even 
if she managed to think of something else, she first has to think about cotton wool to 
then construct something that is not that. In other words, in order to successfully avoid 
a particular thought, your friend must generate a verbal rule that contains the to-be-
avoided thought (e.g. “I must not think of cotton wool”). Furthermore, even if she 
tries to check that the target thought has been avoided, then she has to remember the 
rule and again the rule contains the to-be-avoided thought. So, when she remembers 
the rule, she ends up back where she started with the thought that she was trying to 
avoid in the first place.   
Experiential avoidance appears to correlate with various forms of human 
psychopathology in both clinical and experimental contexts including: depression 
(Tull, & Gratz, 2008); Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD – Orsillo, & Batten, 
2005); and substance abuse (Sanchez-Craig, 1984). The potential role of experiential 
avoidance has also been highlighted in anxiety disorders (Salters-Pedneault, Tull, & 
Roemer, 2004), including the development and maintenance of Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD – Shafran, & Rachman, 2004), agrophobia (Craske, 
Miller, Rotunda, & Barlow, 1990) and panic disorder (Tull, & Roemer, 2007). 
A relationship has also been identified between the trauma associated with 
childhood sexual abuse and self-reported experiential avoidance (Marx, & Sloan, 
2002). Specifically, avoiding trauma-related emotions is predictive of greater distress 
and severity of symptoms amongst individuals who have experienced a traumatic 
event (Gilboa-Schechtman, & Foa, 2001). A recent series of studies by Plumb, Orsillo 
and Luterek (2004) were concerned with the correlation between experiential 
avoidance and the psychological distress associated with traumatic events. In the first 
study of undergraduates, the researchers recorded a positive correlation between 
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propensity towards avoidance and level of psychological distress generated by a 
stressful life event (e.g. illness of a close family member). In the second study, they 
reported that the extent to which avoidance was employed as a strategy for coping 
with the trauma was a better predictor of subsequent distress than the severity of the 
traumatic event itself. Indeed, a subsequent study with war veterans confirmed a 
correlation between the use of experiential avoidance as a coping strategy for combat-
related trauma and levels of depression and PTSD. 
Evidence highlighting the negative impact of experiential avoidance also 
comes from research conducted in experimental contexts. For example, Karekla, 
Forsyth and Kelly (2004) investigated the impact of a carbon dioxide (CO2) challenge 
on a non-clinical sample of individuals rated as more or less inclined towards 
experiential avoidance or acceptance (as measured by the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire: AAQ; Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004). The results of the study indicated 
that those participants more pre-disposed towards avoidance than acceptance 
experienced more fear and panic-related symptoms and reported that they felt less in 
control than those more pre-disposed towards acceptance.   
Other researchers have investigated the role of experiential avoidance with 
regard to sexual, physical and emotional abuse in a sample of inner-city substance 
users (Gratz, Bornovalova, Delany-Brumsey, Nick, & Lejuez, 2007). These 
researchers used both self-report and behavioural measures of avoidance -- the latter 
was designed to induce psychological and emotional distress using a modified version 
of the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT - originally developed by 
Gronwall, 1977). The results indicated that those individuals who had experienced 
moderate-to-severe sexual, physical and emotional abuse reported higher levels of 
experiential avoidance (as measured by willingness to persist on the PASAT), 
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compared to those reporting none-to-low abuse. Perhaps more importantly, other 
researchers have reported that experiential avoidance not only correlates with 
psychopathology, but also mediates the relationship between some forms of 
psychopathology and maladaptive coping styles. For example, the mediational role of 
avoidance has been highlighted in the context of anxiety severity (Kashdan, Barrios, 
Forsyth, & Steger, 2006), the relationship between observable anxiety reactions and 
depression (Tull, & Gratz, 2008), as well as the relationship between negative mood 
and PTSD in sexually assaulted women (Rosenthal, Cheavens, Lynch, & Follette, 
2006).  
Although avoidance behaviours (e.g. distraction, relaxation, substance abuse, 
or thought suppression) may be associated with the short-term alleviation of painful 
private events, evidence exists from the experimental, epidemiological and clinical 
literatures that avoidance behaviours are not associated with long-term, maintained 
psychological well-being (e.g. Hayes, Strosahl et al., 1999; Purdon, 1999). For 
example, although survivors of childhood sexual abuse rate avoidant coping strategies 
as the most effective in the short-term (Leitenberg, Greenwald, & Cado, 1992), these 
strategies remain associated with poor psychological functioning (Hayes et al., 1996). 
Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that avoiding feared stimuli may 
paradoxically result in an increase of fear associated with the stimuli (Karekla et al., 
2004), because avoidance may interfere with the physiological habituation to feared 
stimuli, thereby maintaining threatening meanings and interfering with new learning 
(Borkovec, & Hu, 1990). Indeed, engaging in avoidance can have a deleterious impact 
on long-term goals and valued behaviours (Wicksell, Renöfält, Olsson, Bond, & 
Melin, 2008). Taken together, therefore, experiential avoidance not only correlates 
with negative mental health outcomes and poor long-term psychological functioning, 
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but may also mediate these outcomes when it comprises an individual’s coping 
strategy.  
 
Thought Suppression as an Example of Avoidance  
Experiential avoidance can consist of any behaviour aimed at reducing, 
eliminating, or changing the form of private experiences and the situations that give 
rise to them (Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). A number of topographies appear to 
characterise avoidance, although thought suppression is one of the most common 
(Zettle, 2007). 
The limitations of using suppression to remove unwanted psychological 
content are well established (e.g. Wenzlaff, & Wegner, 2000). Specifically, attempts 
to suppress thoughts and feelings can result in a delayed increase in their occurrence, 
as well as an increase in their behavioural impact (Cioffi, & Holloway, 1993; Clark, 
Ball, & Pape, 1991). For example, in the classic ‘white bear’ experiment, Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter and White (1987) demonstrated that individuals who were explicitly 
instructed to suppress thoughts about a ‘white bear’ reported a paradoxical increase in 
these thoughts (both during, and immediately after, the suppression period – known as 
the ‘rebound effect’) compared to those who had not received suppression 
instructions. Hence, suppression in this context was counterproductive because it 
actually increased contact with the unwanted content. Furthermore, similar effects 
have also been obtained with clinically relevant negative thoughts and moods (e.g. 
Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1998). 
Several researchers have attempted to investigate potentially broader 
correlations between thought suppression and a number of psychological disorders, 
including Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and OCD (Wenzlaff, & Wegner, 
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2000); PTSD (Ehlers, & Steil, 1995) and depression (Watkins, & Moulds, 2007). 
Beevers and Meyer (2004), for example, reported that high dispositional thought 
suppression (i.e. a strong propensity to suppress) combined with high life stress in a 
large sample of undergraduate students was associated with higher levels of 
depression. More disturbingly, other researchers have reported similar correlations 
between self-injurious thoughts and self-injurious behaviours amongst adolescents 
and young adults (Najmi, Wegner, & Nock, 2007). Specifically, in this study thought 
suppression appeared to mediate the relationship between emotional reactivity and the 
frequency of self-injury and suicidal ideation. Furthermore, adolescents who were 
more likely to suppress unwanted thoughts indicated that their self-injury functioned 
as escape from unwanted feelings, rather than attempts to communicate these feelings 
to others.   
The negative effects of thought suppression have also been manipulated in 
experimental contexts (e.g. Wegner, Schreiber, Knutson, & McMahon, 1991). 
Research investigating physiological reactions (e.g. skin conductance levels) has 
highlighted negative effects associated with thought suppression strategies (Wegner, 
& Zanakos, 1994). For example, Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown and Hofmann (2006) 
investigated the effect of emotional suppression on self-report and physiological 
measures in a clinical sample of participants diagnosed with anxiety or mood 
disorders. The experiment simply involved instructing participants to apply a 
suppression-based coping strategy while watching an emotion-provoking film. The 
findings indicated that rather than diminishing distress during the film, suppression 
was associated with increased physiological arousal during the film, as well as 
persistent negative affect even after the film was over. 
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The mechanisms through which thought suppression works remain unclear. 
Although Wegner (1994) proposed the ‘ironic processes theory’ which suggests two 
possible processes through which mental control works: (a) an operating process that 
searches for thoughts consistent with the desired state and (b) a monitoring process 
that searches for thoughts that are not consistent with the desired state, nevertheless, 
the precise conditions that best facilitate thought suppression have yet to be identified. 
Indeed, thought suppression efforts are not always associated with a paradoxical 
increase in thought frequency (see Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001 for a meta-
analysis review). Some researchers have suggested that the effects of thought 
suppression may be influenced by the following variables: the context; the nature of 
the population (clinical or non-clinical); the nature of the to-be-suppressed thought 
(neutral or emotional -- see Purdon, 1999); mood (Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993; 
Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Klein, 1991); mental load (Wegner, & Erber, 1992); and 
motivation to suppress (Salkovskis, & Campbell, 1994). Furthermore, the ‘rebound 
effect’ depends upon the context in which the suppression occurred, because when an 
individual returns to this context the likelihood of re-experiencing the thought is high 
and the level of experiencing of the thought may be even higher than before (Roemer, 
& Borkovec, 1994; Wegner et al., 1991).  
  It also remains unclear whether suppression strategies simply fail to remove 
unwanted thoughts or whether they actually increase the rate or salience of the 
thoughts. For example, Purdon, Rowa and Antony (2005) investigated the impact of 
thought suppression on distressing intrusive thoughts reported by individuals with a 
primary diagnosis of OCD. The findings indicated that the frequency of unwanted 
thoughts did not actually increase for those participants instructed to suppress them. 
However, failure to successfully suppress the thoughts was associated with additional 
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distress about thought occurrences as well as a more negative mood state. Indeed, the 
researchers argued that because suppression efforts frequently fail, individuals 
become sensitised to their inability to control their thoughts and thus negative affect is 
created or exacerbated. In any case, the long-term negative impact of suppression 
efforts may not emerge until after the short-term utility of such strategies has passed.  
Taken together, the negative outcomes for thought/emotion suppression 
strategies in both experimental and clinical contexts resemble, in no small way, the 
outcomes associated with experiential avoidance. Although the precise relationship 
between experiential avoidance and suppression is not well articulated in the 
literature, there appears to be considerable reason to believe that suppression very 
often functions as escape responding that promises relief from uncomfortable 
psychological content, but is in fact more likely to exacerbate it.   
 
Acceptance as an Alternative Coping Strategy 
The so called ‘third-wave’ of behavioural and cognitive therapies include 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999); 
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993); Integrative Behavioural Couples 
Therapy (IBCT; Cordova, Jacobson, & Christensen, 1998); Mindfulness-based 
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002); Functional Analytic 
Psychotherapy (FAP; Kohlenberg, & Tsai, 1991); as well as meta-cognitive 
approaches (Wells, 2000). Evidence across these approaches suggests that in 
promoting acceptance, rather than avoidance, of negative psychological content, 
positive outcomes for individual mental health are more likely.   
According to ACT, avoidance is a natural outcome of our everyday verbal 
processes (Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999) that over time results in a narrow pattern of 
 10
behavioural responding. Despite the apparent intuitiveness and short-term benefits of 
avoidance strategies, ACT researchers have argued that these behaviours prevent 
individuals from engaging in more effective responses that produce life satisfaction 
(Hayes et al., 1996; Wicksell et al., 2008). Indeed, evidence from the clinical 
literature suggests that avoidance can complicate exposure-based strategies (Feldner, 
Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003). Thus, clinicians and researchers have begun to 
investigate the utility of interventions aimed at decreasing experiential avoidance.  
In ACT, therapists explicitly target experiential avoidance and suppression 
strategies as clinically relevant behaviour and attempt to orient clients towards 
acceptance as a more effective alternative in dealing with a whole range of 
psychological problems. Indeed, from an ACT perspective, a great many 
psychological problems may be summarised as manifestations of the generic 
condition of Experiential Avoidance Disorder (EAD: Luciano, & Hayes, 2001; 
Luciano, Rodríguez, & Gutiérrez, 2004) that can be described as an ineffective, over-
generalised pattern of verbally regulated avoidance. In the language of ACT, clients 
are encouraged to accept, rather than avoid, their psychological content because the 
latter simply does not work. This switch in strategy then opens up the possibility that 
doing ‘something different’ per se (i.e. moving towards acceptance) will generate a 
broader and more flexible repertoire of responding that will increase the possibility 
for behavioural change.   
There is considerable reason to believe that acceptance, in and of itself, is 
correlated with positive outcomes in terms of dealing effectively with psychological 
content. For example, in the context of pain, acceptance is associated with lower pain-
related avoidance, anxiety, depression, disability and pain intensity, as well as a 
greater likelihood of, and faster, return to work (McCracken, 1998; McCracken, & 
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Eccleston, 2003). Acceptance has also been associated with a lower probability of 
having a psychiatric disorder (Donaldson-Feilder, & Bond, 2004). Furthermore, 
higher levels of acceptance have been associated with lower levels of depression (e.g. 
Polusny, Rosenthal, Aban, & Follette, 2004) and anxiety (e.g. Stewart, Zvolensky, & 
Eifert, 2002).   
In a non-clinical application of ACT, Bond and Bunce (2000) investigated the 
impact of an ACT protocol on coping with stress in workplace environments and 
reported significant improvements in participants’ mental and general health over a 
three-month period. Furthermore, the researchers reported that the positive outcomes 
were mediated by the acceptance of undesirable thoughts and feelings, and not by 
efforts to control the occurrence of such thoughts. Marcks and Woods (2005) also 
demonstrated the positive effects of acceptance within an experimental context when 
they compared an acceptance versus suppression strategy for coping with personal 
intrusive thoughts in a non-clinical sample of undergraduate students. Participants’ 
single most upsetting intrusive thought was identified using the Revised Obsessive 
Instructions Inventory (ROII; Purdon, & Clark, 1994). Study 1 investigated the 
relationship between naturally occurring coping strategies and intrusive thoughts. A 
higher disposition towards acceptance was associated with fewer obsessional 
symptoms, lower levels of depression and anxiety, and lower discomfort with respect 
to the intrusive thought compared to participants who naturally suppress these 
thoughts. In Study 2, the same students were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: acceptance, suppression, or monitor-only. As expected, explicit 
instructions to accept intrusive thoughts was associated with a decrease in the 
discomfort associated with the thoughts, but not in their frequency.   
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As a fuller treatment regime, ACT has proven equally effective in clinical 
contexts involving depression (Zettle, & Hayes, 1986); chronic pain (Dahl, Wilson, & 
Nillson, 2004; McCracken, Mackichan, & Eccleston, 2007); substance abuse (Hayes, 
Wilson, et al., 2004); stress (e.g. Bond, & Bunce, 2000); psychotic symptoms (Bach, 
& Hayes, 2002); trichotillomania (Woods, Wetterneck, & Flessner, 2006); and maths 
anxiety (Zettle, 2003). ACT interventions have also proven to be effective in the 
decrease of long-term disability associated with drug refractory epileptic seizures 
(Lundgren, Dahl, Melin, & Kies, 2006), smoking cessation (Gifford et al., 2004) and 
improving diabetes self-management (Gregg, Callaghan, Hayes, & Glenn-Lawson, 
2007). 
For example, in the treatment of trichotillomania, Woods et al. (2006) 
compared the impact of ACT/plus habit reversal training with a waitlist control group. 
Participants in the intervention condition reported a significant decrease in hair 
pulling that coincided with reductions in experiential avoidance, anxiety and 
depression. Furthermore, these gains were generally maintained at a three-month 
follow up. The positive results reported for ACT in the treatment of in-patients with 
psychotic symptoms are particularly impressive. Specifically, Gaudiano and Herbert 
(2006) compared ACT/plus enhanced treatment as usual (ACT/ETAU) with ETAU 
alone. The former group showed greater overall symptom improvement, including 
lower distress for hallucinations and lower re-hospitalisation rates following a four-
month period. Taken together, these and the other cited studies suggest the utility of 
acceptance-based strategies, especially when contained within an ACT treatment 
program, for reducing symptoms associated with psychopathology. Although the 
experimental and process-based evidence suggests that at least some of the 
improvements are mediated through acceptance, the processes that underpin 
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acceptance remain unclear. In the sections below, the thesis presents the argument that 
the concept known as cognitive defusion forms a core feature of the acceptance of 
psychological content.    
 
Cognitive Defusion versus Cognitive Fusion  
 Cognitive defusion strategies are a critical feature of ACT and are designed to 
facilitate acceptance, particularly of negative psychological content. Defusion 
strategies encourage clients to change the context or perspective from which their 
negative thoughts are observed, rather than changing the form or frequency of the 
thoughts directly. In this way, defusion strategies are unlike avoidance strategies, and 
resemble much more the type of approach behaviour encouraged in traditional 
exposure therapies. Defusion is designed to help individuals see private events for 
what they are (e.g. seeing a thought as just a thought), rather than as something that 
must be avoided. Thus, in some ways, defusion strategies resemble techniques used in 
cognitive-based and mindfulness-based therapies. For example, cognitive therapists 
use distancing strategies that involve ‘stepping back’ from dysfunctional thoughts in 
an attempt to see them as thoughts, rather than as facts (e.g. Beck, 1970; Kross, 
Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). Furthermore, therapists working from within the 
mindfulness framework try to establish a decentered perspective that facilitates 
metacognitive awareness (Teasdale et al., 2000) and encourages present moment 
awareness of external and internal stimuli (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). 
According to ACT, defusion is particularly important in dealing with painful 
or traumatic events because it creates a safe and workable perspective from which the 
psychological content can be observed as separate from the observer. For example, in 
ACT, the phrase “you are more than what your thoughts say you are” is often 
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employed. Put simply, just as the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, a whole 
human being is greater than all of the thoughts and feelings s/he may have. Indeed, in 
cases where psychological content is particularly traumatic, it is frequently necessary 
to create a dissociation between the thinker and the thoughts before acceptance of the 
thoughts can be achieved. In order to do so, ACT therapists often rely on the use of 
metaphors. For example, ‘The House and the Furniture’ metaphor is commonly used 
by ACT therapists to highlight the distinction between individuals and their thoughts:   
It’s as if you are a house, filled with furniture. The furniture is not, and can never 
be the house. Furniture is the content of the house and the house merely holds or 
contains it. It provides the context in which the furniture can be furniture. Whether 
the furniture is thought to be good or bad, says nothing about the value of the 
house. You are the house but not the furniture. Your thoughts and feelings are the 
furniture. Just as the furniture is not the house, your thoughts and feelings are not 
you. They are simply experiences you have that are like pieces of furniture.  
 
Once a sense of separation between thinkers and thoughts has been created, ACT 
therapists attempt to weaken these associations further by explicitly employing 
cognitive defusion techniques.  
The concept of cognitive fusion is used to describe situations in which an 
individual’s overt behaviours are under the direct control of private internal events 
(Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). From an ACT perspective, negative thoughts in and of 
themselves are not problematic, but difficulties arise when thoughts are believed to be 
true indicators of the self (i.e. when clients are fused). In this sense, fusion is similar 
to the idea of ‘thought-action’ fusion (TAF: Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996) 
first proposed within the context of clinical obsessions. According to this perspective, 
TAF is based on the incorrect assumption that: (1) thoughts can directly influence 
external events and (2) experiencing negative intrusive thoughts is morally equivalent 
to engaging in that behaviour. Research has reported a small to moderate relationship 
between TAF and OCD (Rassin, Merkelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 2001); anxiety 
 15
disorders (Rassin, Diepstraten, Merkelbach, & Muris, 2001); and depression 
(Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003). 
 From an ACT perspective, fusion also becomes problematic when actions are 
appraised as evidence of reality, thus giving indirect, but equal, credence to the 
thoughts that generated the actions in the first place. Hence, when individuals identify 
themselves as co-ordinated with their own behaviour (e.g. ‘I am what I do’), then 
indirectly they are also co-ordinated with the psychological content that directed it. As 
a result, the self may become fused with thoughts and an individual might come to 
believe that ‘I am what I think’. Naturally, the psychological and emotional outcomes 
associated with this type of thinking can be devastating (e.g. “I think I can’t cope with 
my children, therefore I must be a terrible mother”). Indeed from an ACT perspective, 
cognitive fusion is considered to play a causal role in avoidance behaviours and as 
such warrants direct clinical intervention (Orsillo, Roemer, Block Lerner, & Tull, 
2004).  
Although there is some clinical evidence to suggest the utility of defusion and 
similar strategies in promoting psychological well-being, there remains no clear 
evidence of how these strategies work in the context of therapy. Specifically, although 
there are a number of theories that have attempted to explain how defusion strategies 
work, the detail and supporting evidence remain exploratory (for a review see 
Blackledge, 2007).  
 
Fusion as a Language Process 
The concept of cognitive fusion, as defined by ACT, is not inconsistent with 
the modern theory of language and cognition known as Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). According to RFT, human language 
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is inherently relational and incorporates relations of difference, co-ordination, 
opposition, comparison, perspective-taking and so on. From an RFT perspective, the 
fact that any stimulus can become related to another stimulus accounts for the highly 
arbitrary and generative nature of human language. For example, we can use language 
to discuss either previous events that we have already experienced or future events of 
which we have no direct experience.   
A critical feature of the RFT account of verbal relations involves the 
transformation of stimulus functions, in which functions associated with one stimulus 
are readily transferred or transformed to another stimulus when the two are related 
(even arbitrarily). These transformations may be the process that underlies cognitive 
and emotional fusion. Consider the following scenario: 
Imagine a married woman with children who does not work and who begins to have rushing 
thoughts one day while doing the grocery shopping (e.g. “I don’t see why I have to do all the menial 
family tasks like shopping.  I could do more with my life than this”). Even though the woman may 
have had these thoughts before, they somehow on this occasion feel particularly salient (e.g. perhaps 
she had tense words with her husband the night before on an unrelated matter). When the woman 
returns home, she begins to feel troubled by her thoughts and starts to feel tension across her chest.  
When she thinks through where the thoughts are coming from, she begins to piece together perhaps 
unrelated events, including: tense words with her husband the night before; the fact that he had been 
away with friends without her several weekends ago; and his recent stress at work which has meant that 
he has had little interactions with the children. As these recollections coincide, the woman begins to 
feel even more tense and new thoughts such as “Perhaps my husband is having an affair” or “Perhaps I 
don’t love him anymore” also occur. Naturally, these latter thoughts strike the woman as more serious 
and thus she becomes more tense and increasingly concerned that “Perhaps I really don’t love him 
anymore. What will I do?” Now consider when the husband returns home from work that evening and 
the woman finds it difficult to address him because she feels guilty about the thoughts she had that day 
regarding their relationship. So, she remains somewhat aloof and the husband, stressed out from 
another day at work, retorts about the woman’s mood and the fact that he feels it is misplaced because 
all she had to do all day was the shopping. Under these circumstances, the woman might feel deeply 
hurt by this statement particularly because it resonates with her own feelings of futility in the grocery 
store. Rather than retort, however, because she is afraid to give away clues to what she is really 
thinking, the woman thinks “Someone who loved me would not say that I was useless” and so the cycle 
of marital uncertainty and distress deepens. 
 
In the example above, there are many loose connections or relations between 
thoughts, feelings, actions and other events in the world. For example, it just 
happened that the woman felt pangs of tension in the grocery store, if she had been in 
the post office, this may not have happened. What is most important is that in her 
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mind the woman connected the feelings with the grocery store and began to try to 
make sense of the connection between these two stimuli. These derived relations then 
generated new connections with new meanings that then gave even more meaning to 
the original relations. From an RFT perspective, this added meaning is unavoidable by 
virtue of the fact that the events are related. In short, once the relations happen, 
meaning in one event automatically changes meaning in another. So, very quickly, the 
initially arbitrary relations now appear to have great meaning and convince the 
unsuspecting believer that related thoughts are true (e.g. “if I have so many thoughts 
and if they make me feel tense, they must be true”). Perhaps more distressingly, the 
relations and meanings are now interpreted as saying something important about who 
the woman is (“I don’t love my husband anymore and he probably doesn’t love me”). 
As a result, the thoughts may become even more strongly connected to overt action. 
For example, imagine that the woman then discusses this matter with an unmarried 
friend who confirms that the marriage comprised of a poor match and that it was the 
case that the relationship should end. 
For RFT, there are important and unavoidable relationships among 
thoughts/feelings, overt action and the self that appear to underpin cognitive and 
emotional fusion. Consider the relationship between thoughts and feelings. If you 
have one thought and you feel bad and you have a second thought that participates in 
a relation of co-ordination with the first thought, then the aversive functions of the 
first thought (feeling bad) immediately transfer to the second thought and now it also 
makes you feel bad. In our evolutionary history, it makes sense for humans to avoid 
aversive events. For example, if we feel too hot or too cold, or hungry etc., we work 
quickly to get the situation resolved – and this is likely to benefit the organism in the 
short and long terms. But applying the same strategy to verbal threats (that have no 
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actual basis in reality) is a type of over-generalisation that makes much less 
evolutionary sense. Furthermore, as highlighted in the former section on avoidance, 
attempts to use such strategies do not work for psychological content anyway. But, if 
you then engage in experiential avoidance (e.g. suppression) to remove feeling bad 
and the thoughts that go with it, especially when it appears to work in the short term, 
then you are likely to use the same strategy to remove related thoughts that also make 
you feel uncomfortable. Hence, the relationship between internal content and action is 
strengthened, even if it doesn’t work particularly well. For RFT and ACT therefore, a 
critical problem in psychopathology is the fusion amongst thoughts, action and the 
self, and our attempts to avoid these relationships and events in futile efforts to make 
them go away.  
According to RFT and ACT, fusion is a natural feature of verbally 
sophisticated language abilities and is almost unavoidable. Indeed, the high 
prevalence of psychological problems in the general population supports this view. 
For example, almost half of all Americans (46.4%) will meet the criteria for a 
psychological disorder sometime during their lives as identified by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) with onset 
usually appearing during childhood or adolescence (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & 
Walters, 2005). However, not all of our negative thoughts start us out on a cycle of 
critical uncertainty, in part because: they are not associated with salient emotions; 
they have only limited connections with actions; and when we express them openly to 
others they are less likely to be suppressed. Acceptance, therefore, is an important 
prophylactic against fusion because when we accept the arbitrary connections 
between our thoughts and emotional states, they are less likely to control our 
behaviour. Defusion strategies are thought to work by highlighting the common 
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process of verbally relating events to other events (e.g. relating thoughts to the self-
concept) and thereby disrupting the existing problematic verbal relationships (see 
Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). Put simply, as soon as we face our thoughts and 
feelings and see them for what they are, we realise that they are meaningless unless 
we try to attach some meaning to them.   
 
Examples of Defusion Exercises 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy incorporates a range of cognitive 
defusion exercises, including cognitive distancing and word repetition, to target 
problematic areas of fusion. All defusion techniques are focused initially on altering 
clients’ perspectives with regard to their thoughts and feelings, from a position in 
which they are them (fusion) to a position in which they have them (defusion) – 
remember the metaphor of the house and the furniture.  
When this small distance has been placed between the thoughts and the thinker 
(but not from the perspective of pretending that they are not related), then acceptance 
of even traumatic content becomes more likely. In order to begin to establish this new 
perspective, ACT therapists encourage clients to see all thoughts as thoughts and all 
feelings as feelings (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, clients are often encouraged to 
prefix descriptions of thoughts with the phrase: “I am having the thought that…”. So, 
if a client is struggling with the recurrent thought: “I am a useless human being”, she 
will be encouraged to rephrase this statement as: “I am having the thought that I am a 
useless human being”. This transforms the fused functions of the thought in a way 
that alters the relation between the thought and the self from one of co-ordination to 
one of distinction. For example, previously the client was interpreting the relationship 
between the house and the furniture as the same, and not appreciating that one 
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actually contains the other. So, the therapist tries to alter the relationship from one 
that is co-ordinated to one that is most likely hierarchical. Hence, from this new 
perspective the client may derive “I am actually bigger than my thoughts, they need 
not be everything that directs my actions”.   
More extensive experiential exercises are also employed in ACT to highlight 
how easily our internal content (often labelled as our ‘mind’) gets the upper hand over 
our actions in a relentless series of directions. For example, clients frequently report 
racing and unco-ordinated thinking and ACT therapists use exercises such as ‘taking 
your mind for a walk’ to indicate the relentless continuity of the mind’s instructions 
and evaluations (Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). Specifically, this exercise requires the 
client to walk around the room with the therapist following behind and pretending to 
be the client’s mind thinking aloud. As the therapist says all the thoughts aloud, the 
client is instructed to simply listen to the ‘mind’ and to continue to do what she was 
doing (e.g. continue walking around the room, even if the ‘mind’ tells you to sit 
down). Other such exercises include imagining that thoughts are like leaves floating 
down a stream (Hayes et al., 2001) or soldiers marching in a parade (Hayes, Strosahl, 
et al., 1999) – all designed to establish a broader sense of self, within which private 
events have less importance. Cognitive defusion techniques, therefore, are inherently 
acceptance-based and thus depart from traditional therapeutic methods that encourage 
clients to change the form or frequency of their thoughts, eliminate them altogether, 
or replace them with more likeable content.  
Word repetition exercises are also employed by ACT therapists to facilitate 
defusion. Such exercises are based on Titchener’s (1916) rapid word repetition 
technique, also known as semantic satiation. Semantic satiation has been defined as a 
repetition induced loss or reduction in the meaning associated with words, which in 
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turn is thought to reduce access to related semantic information (Cohene, Smith, & 
Klein, 1978; Smith, 1984). Thus, it is possible that even a familiar word can become 
meaningless through weakening the associative context of that word. Although 
Titchener’s (1916) repetition technique was originally designed to investigate 
illusions of recognition and memory with neutral stimuli, the technique has been 
adapted for therapeutic purposes. For example, Benson and Klipper (1976) 
highlighted the benefits of using single word mantras to focus one’s attention, for the 
purpose of relaxation. Indeed, single word mantra techniques have been successfully 
applied within clinical contexts. For example, in a sample of patients with heart 
disease, the frequency of premature ventricular contractions was reduced following 
training in the relaxation response using single-word mantras (Benson, Alexander, & 
Feldman, 1975). 
From an ACT perspective, word repetition exercises are useful for facilitating 
defusion because the meanings and functions of the word reduce when the word 
becomes a sound (Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). For example, clients may initially 
explore all the properties associated with the word “milk” (e.g. cold, creamy, frothy, 
etc.) followed by a short period of rapidly repeating the word “milk” aloud until it 
loses all meaning. The therapist then uses this experience to emphasise that the 
client’s negative content is purely verbal and not a reflection of reality. Thus, from an 
ACT perspective, repetition exercises are not employed to reduce the distress 
associated with psychological content, nor are they an attempt to remove the client’s 
unwanted content. Indeed, research has indicated that the effects of semantic satiation 
are temporary and are seen to wear-off after time (e.g. Espositio, & Phelton, 1971). 
Rather, the person makes contact with only the direct functions of the word (i.e. sees 
the word as simply a word), thus the derived relational functions of the word are, at 
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least temporarily, not available. The function of the word/thought changes without 
changing the form of the thought, or reducing its frequency. It is believed that this 
switch in strategy allows the person to see thoughts for what they are, rather than as 
something that must control behaviour, thereby increasing the behavioural options 
available to the individual.    
 
Empirical Evidence of Cognitive Defusion 
Although cognitive defusion strategies are frequently used within an ACT-
based clinical context, the empirical evidence to support their efficacy is relatively 
limited. To date, only a number of research studies have attempted to investigate the 
processes of cognitive defusion. Indirect evidence of defusion exists in the form of 
ACT-based clinical outcome trials (e.g. Bach, & Hayes, 2002) and clinical analogue 
studies (e.g. Gutierrez, Luciano, Rodriguez, & Fink, 2004). For example, chronic pain 
analogue studies involving the Cold Presser Task have indicated that acceptance-
based interventions that rely heavily on defusion increase participants’ pain tolerance 
(Hayes, Bisset et al., 1999; Takahashi, Muto, Tada, & Sugiyama, 2002).   
Bach and Hayes (2002) investigated the impact of a brief acceptance 
intervention on the rate of rehospitalisation of psychotic in-patients. In this study, 
treatment as usual (TAU) was compared to TAU plus an ACT intervention that relied 
heavily on cognitive defusion (e.g. clients engaged in the take your mind for a walk 
exercise). The results indicated that participants assigned to the ACT condition 
showed a 50% reduction in the rate of rehospitalisation compared to TAU alone 
during a 120-day follow-up. The researchers attributed this to an increase in levels of 
acceptance and a decrease in levels of believability of psychotic symptoms. In other 
words, the therapy was not explicitly trying to decrease the number of psychotic 
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thoughts, but was trying to reduce the verbal hold these had over the individual and 
his/her actions. Of course however, reducing the extent to which thoughts are believed 
will almost by definition reduce the distress associated with the thoughts in the first 
place. The research, not surprisingly, also recorded a decrease in distress associated 
with ACT, even though distress was not targeted directly.   
Taken together, these studies suggest that ACT interventions that rely heavily 
on defusion result in a decrease in levels of believability and/or discomfort associated 
with psychological content. However, in this type of research, defusion exercises were 
presented as one aspect of an overall ACT package, thus there remains limited 
evidence for the utility of defusion as an isolated component.  
More direct evidence for defusion was generated by the first empirical 
investigation of defusion strategies when Titchener’s (1916) word repetition exercise 
was used in the context of negatively evaluated self-referential content (Masuda, 
Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). Specifically, undergraduate students were asked to 
generate two self-relevant negative thoughts that they found particularly disturbing 
(e.g. “I am too fat”) and then to restate each thought in a single word (e.g. “fat”). 
Participants then rated the levels of discomfort and believability associated with each 
word. In Experiment 1, the researchers compared the defusion strategy (i.e. defusion 
rationale combined with the ‘milk, milk, milk’ word repetition strategy) with a 
distraction technique (i.e. reading an unrelated article about Japan). In Experiment 2 
the same defusion strategy was compared with a thought control strategy (e.g. 
participants could use a variety of strategies including positive imagery, breathing 
exercises, or positive self-talk). Both experiments employed an alternating treatment 
design, with four participants. One of the two self-generated negative thoughts was 
randomly assigned to each treatment condition. In both experiments, participants were 
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exposed to three presentations of each intervention in a random sequence, but with no 
more than two consecutive exposures to any one strategy. The results from both 
experiments indicated that the defusion rationale produced the largest reductions in 
the believability of the negative self-relevant words, as well as in the levels of 
discomfort produced by the words. 
 
The Current Thesis 
Although research has begun to investigate cognitive defusion as an isolated 
component and results suggest that defusion is a psychologically active construct 
(Masuda et al., 2004), there remains limited knowledge about the processes through 
which it works. The focus of the current thesis, therefore, was to determine the 
conditions under which defusion works best and to understand the underlying 
processes associated with it. To this extent, Part I of the present research investigated 
the self-reported emotional impact of cognitive defusion. Experiment 1 had three 
main aims: (1) to investigate the impact of an alternative defusion strategy to that 
employed by Masuda et al. to determine if similar effects would be obtained across 
the various defusion exercises; (2) to investigate the impact of simple defusion-related 
instructions; and (3) to investigate the impact of defusion on positive, as well as 
negative, self-statements. Similar to the results obtained by Masuda et al., the 
defusion strategy in this first study also resulted in a decrease in the emotional impact 
of the negative self-statements. However, the defusion-related instructions had no 
impact on the overall ratings. Possible shortcomings in the first study included the 
possibility that both the instructions and the intervention were too brief, and that the 
impact of defusion may have been greater if personally relevant psychological 
content was targeted.  
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Experiment 2 attempted to address these issues by: (1) investigating the 
impact of defusion on personally relevant negative thoughts; and (2) systematically 
examining the relative utility of defusion instructions versus defusion exercises. In 
addition, Experiment 2 compared defusion to other strategies (e.g. thought control). 
With these modifications in place, defusion was again associated with a decrease in 
the emotional impact of negative self-referents. Furthermore, a slight superiority of 
defusion exercises over defusion instructions was recorded. Defusion also proved to 
be superior to the other coping strategies targeted.  
One issue that was consistent across both Experiments 1 and 2 was the use of 
explicit measures to assess participants’ reactions to their psychological content. 
Although these tools are commonly employed in clinical research and practice, it may 
be reasonably argued that the self-report measures used to assess the impact of 
defusion are susceptible to the same generic weaknesses that potentially influence all 
explicit methodologies. Part II of the current thesis, therefore, investigated the use of 
alternative measures of believability, distress, etc. that can be used as indices of the 
impact of cognitive defusion strategies. Specifically, Experiments 3 to 8 (presented in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6) utilised the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure, an implicit 
measure of cognition to measure defusion-related change (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2006). Further details of using implicit measures of cognition as an alternative to 
explicit measures will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 Experiments 3 through 6 were designed to determine which self-relevant 
stimuli presented in different contexts would potentially be most relevant for use with 
a defusion manipulation. Results from these experiments suggested that an IRAP 
presenting positive and negative self-statements in the context of I AM and I 
SHOULD BE stimuli would be most susceptible to a defusion manipulation. Based on 
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these results, Experiment 7 (Chapter 5) was designed as an exploratory experiment to 
determine the potential susceptibility of implicit measures to cognitive defusion. 
Specifically, the experiment compared two groups of individuals that differed with 
regard to their experience with cognitive defusion. The ACT Group (thought to have 
considerable experience with defusion) reported stronger implicit positive self-regard 
than the Non-ACT Group (considered to have no experience with defusion). Neither 
group produced strong reactions to how they felt they should be. Finally, Experiment 
8 investigated the impact of defusion on implicit self-regard in individuals with no 
experience with defusion. Specifically, the experiment compared Pre- and Post-
Intervention responses to Defusion or Placebo conditions. Results indicated that 
defusion was associated with a larger increase in implicit positive self-regard and a 
smaller increase in implicit attitudes that participants should be positive relative to 
placebo. The seventh and final chapter summarises and discusses the findings from all 
eight experiments and suggests directions for future research in this area.   
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Chapter 2 
Experiment 1 
An Experimental Test of a Cognitive Defusion Exercise: 
Coping with Positive and Negative Self-Statements 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Only one published study has investigated the specific impact of cognitive 
defusion on negative psychological content (Masuda et al., 2004). The results of this 
research were consistent with predictions made by ACT and RFT and indicated that 
defusion decreased the emotional impact of negative self-relevant thoughts in terms 
of baseline levels of discomfort and believability associated with the thoughts. In 
order to manipulate defusion, the researchers employed Titchener’s (1916) rapid 
word repetition technique (e.g. milk, milk, milk), originally designed to reduce the 
semantic functions of words and commonly used in ACT as a defusion technique. 
Word repetition exercises are only one of a number of defusion exercises 
designed to create cognitive distance between individuals and their psychological 
content. Hence, it remained possible that the results reported by Masuda et al. (2004) 
were specific to word repetition, rather than to defusion in general. Put simply, 
different outcomes may be associated with different types of defusion exercises. With 
this in mind and the fact that there is limited existing evidence of the utility of 
defusion, Experiment 1 employed an alternative defusion strategy. 
Rather than using word repetition, the current study employed an alternative 
defusion technique often employed by ACT therapists. Specifically within ACT, the 
 prefix phrase ‘I am having the thought that’ is used to create defusion of problematic 
psychological content. Similar to word repetition, the defusion prefix is used to 
highlight that the subsequent statement is simply a thought and not a fact. 
 
The Current Study 
Experiment 1 was designed to test the emotional impact of the defusion prefix 
(‘I am having the thought that’) on a set of generic self-statements. The study had 
three main aims: (1) to determine if the results reported by Masuda et al. (2004) were 
specific to word repetition techniques or were outcomes that could be attributed to a 
range of defusion techniques; and (2) to systematically compare the utility of defusion 
instructions versus a defusion exercise. In ACT in general, defusion is delivered by 
means of experiential exercises, rather than by instruction and the results of the 
Masuda study indicated that defusion instructions alone were of limited utility. 
Nonetheless, it remained possible that positive defusion outcomes may be more easily 
achieved by simply instructing participants on defusion, rather than employing 
defusion exercises. (3) The current study also attempted to determine the relative 
impact of defusion on positive versus negative self-statements. In this way, the 
positive statements functioned as a type of experimental control to determine whether 
defusion affects all, or only specific, types of psychological content. 
The current study involved the presentation of a series of self-statements on a 
computer screen. In one condition (referred to as Normal presentation) the self-
statements appeared in their original form (e.g. “I am a bad person”).  In the Defused 
presentation, the statements were altered by attaching the defusion prefix “I am 
having the thought that” (e.g. “I am having the thought that I am a bad person”). 
However, because the defusion prefix changed the length of the statement and might 
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 also be seen as creating an unusual verbalisation, a third condition (Abnormal 
presentation) was created in which the self-statements were prefixed again, but with a 
phrase that matched the defusion statement in length and that was equally unusual 
(i.e. “I have a wooden chair and I am a bad person”). This acted as an experimental 
control by providing a comparison statement of similar length that was also unusual, 
but did not possess the same level of defusion as the defusion prefix. We predicted 
that the Defused presentation would have a greater impact on the emotional ratings 
associated with the target self-statements than the other two types of presentation.   
 In order to control for demand compliance effects (e.g. Fernandez, & Turk, 
1994; Kanter, Kohlenberg, & Loftus, 2004), participants in the current study were 
also divided according to the types of explicit instructions they received regarding the 
utility of the defusion technique. Each instruction stated that previous research had 
shown that the defusion prefix: (1) increased (referred to as Pro-Defusion Group); (2) 
decreased (Anti-Defusion Group); or (3) had no effect upon (Neutral Group) the 
emotional impact of self-statements. We hypothesised that the defusion prefix 
(considered here as a defusion exercise) would out-perform defusion instructions in 
terms of the emotional impact of the self-statements.  
Traditionally, within a therapeutic context, cognitive defusion exercises have 
been employed as coping strategies for negative thoughts and feelings. Thus, we 
made no clear predictions about the impact of defusion on the positive self-
statements. These statements were simply included as an experimental control to 
determine if the emotional impact of defusion was dependent upon psychologically 
engaging with negative thoughts and feelings, or simply reflected the process of 
distancing oneself from one’s thoughts in general. Overall, the inclusion of the 
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 positive self-statements would allow a fuller understanding of the manner in which 
defusion works. 
The dependent variables employed in the current study involved measuring 
participants’ reactions to the self-statements, using three self-report Likert-type rating 
scales that assessed associated levels of discomfort, believability and willingness 
(Hayes, Bisset et al., 1999; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; Masuda et al., 
2004). We hypothesised that the Defused presentation would differentially impact the 
explicit ratings of the negative statements, relative to the Normal and Abnormal 
presentations. Specifically, we hypothesised that the negative statements in the 
Defused presentation would likely decrease believability to see or say the statements, 
but would increase willingness, relative to Normal and Abnormal presentations. The 
believability prediction was consistent with ACT, in which changing one’s 
perspective with regard to one’s psychological content by indicating that the person is 
greater than the sum of the content, reduces the believability of the content (Hayes, 
Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). In other words, if I know that the thought “I 
am a horrible person” is only a thought, then I will be aware that the thought can say 
nothing about who I am as a real person. As a result, the thought will be less 
believable. Put simply, the believability of thoughts results from their potential to be 
viewed as having more meaning than they need have (i.e. by saying something about 
who you are as a person). When this potential is reduced in the context of particular 
psychological content, then that content, by definition, will be less believable. In the 
research by Masuda et al. (2004), believability of the psychological content that was 
targeted was reduced as a result of the defusion exercise. 
We also hypothesised that the defusion prefix would increase participants’ 
willingness to make psychological contact with the negative statements. This 
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 willingness prediction was also consistent with ACT and simply asserted that if you 
are defused from psychological content such that it says nothing about who you are, 
then there is no need for you to be unwilling to have it. In other words, if the content 
has no power, then you need not be afraid of what it can do to you. Although, 
willingness had not been targeted directly by Masuda et al. (2004), other sources of 
empirical evidence indicated that acceptance-based strategies increase willingness 
(Levitt et al., 2004).  
In the current research, we initially made no clear predictions regarding the 
impact of defusion on psychological discomfort. From an ACT perspective, 
discomfort is not targeted directly because one can still engage in valued action when 
levels of discomfort are high. Furthermore, because individuals generally have little 
or no control over their emotional states, ACT encourages clients not to focus upon 
them as a potential source of behaviour change. According to this view then, 
discomfort may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. Specifically, one might 
argue that increasing acceptance of content might increase discomfort because one is 
more willing to make experiential contact with it. Alternatively, one might predict 
that discomfort would decrease when one realises that thoughts associated with 
emotion are only thoughts, and as such have limited control or impact on who you 
really are. Interestingly, Masuda et al. (2004) reported that their defusion technique 
resulted in decreased discomfort. Taken together then, we had no clear initial 
prediction about what would happen to participants’ levels of discomfort as a result of 
the defusion technique.  
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 METHOD 
 
Participants 
Sixty participants (31 female, 29 male) aged between 18 and 57 years old 
comprised the final sample (mode = 21). All were undergraduate students, recruited 
through Faculty announcements in the Department of Psychology at the National 
University of Ireland Maynooth (NUIM). None had prior exposure to similar 
experimental procedures. Twenty participants were each assigned to three groups that 
differed only in terms of the defusion-relevant instructions provided to them (Pro-
Defusion, Anti-Defusion and Neutral). No incentives were offered in return for 
participation. In addition to the 60 participants who completed the experiment, four 
participants indicated that they did not understand the defusion-related instructions 
provided at the beginning of the study, thus were not included in the final data set.  
 
Setting 
 Experiment 1 was conducted in an experimental room that was in a quiet 
location and generally free from distraction. All participants completed each aspect of 
the study independently. The experimenter remained seated outside the room at all 
times. All participants were seated on a standard plastic office swivel chair (rather 
than a wooden chair), because of the wording of the Abnormal presentation (see 
below).  
 
Apparatus and Materials 
Psychological Measures. Each participant first completed three self-report 
questionnaires. These comprised of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-
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 35; Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004 -- Appendix A), the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996 -- Appendix B) and the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI Form Y-2; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983 -- 
Appendix C). The assignment of participants to one of the three experimental groups 
did not depend upon their questionnaire scores. The measures were simply included to 
control for any variability across groups that might account for any differences 
obtained during subsequent experimental phases. 
The AAQ-35 is a self-report measure of an individual’s general level of 
emotional avoidance. Individuals are asked to rate the truth of each of 35 statements 
as it applies to themselves, on a scale of 1 (never true) to 7 (always true). The scales 
contain 17 negatively reversed items. Total scores range from 37 to 245, with low 
scores indicating high avoidance and low acceptance, and high scores indicating low 
avoidance and high acceptance. Although the AAQ-35 is a relatively new measure, 
initial research on similar versions of the measure indicate good psychometric 
properties, with good evidence of convergent, criterion-related and construct validity 
(see Bond, & Bunce, 2003; Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004).   
The BDI-II consists of 21 groups of four statements (all scored from 0-3). 
Individuals are asked to select one statement from each group that best describes how 
they have been feeling during the previous two weeks. The BDI-II is scored according 
to four categories: 0-13: Minimal Depression; 14-19: Mild; 20-28: Moderate; and 29-
63: Severe. The BDI-II is a widely used measure of depression and has good, well-
established psychometric properties. The scales indicate good internal consistency 
(Cronbach coefficient alpha = .93 for college students) and correlate well with several 
clinical assessment ratings of depression (Beck et al., 1996). 
The STAI Form Y-2 is used to assess levels of trait anxiety in both clinical and 
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 non-clinical populations. It comprises of 20 self-statements that ask individuals to rate 
how they feel in general, on a scale of 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). The 
scales contain nine negatively reversed items. Total scores range from 20 (indicating 
low levels of general anxiety) to 80 (indicating high levels of general anxiety -- mean 
score for college-aged males = 38.3, SD = 9.2 and females: M = 40.40, SD = 10.15). 
The STAI Form Y-2 is a valid measure of anxiety indicating good test-retest 
reliability for a sample of college students (.73 to .86) and high internal consistency 
(Cronbach coefficient alpha is .90). The STAI Form Y-2 is also reliable and correlates 
with other established anxiety measures (see Spielberger et al., 1983).  
Self-statements. The automated procedure employed in Experiment 1involved 
the presentation of a series of single-sentence self-statements, half of which were 
referred to as positive (e.g. “I am whole”) and half referred to as negative (e.g.  “I am 
stupid”). In order to generate two fitting sets of statements that would be readily 
categorised by participants in this way, a number of ACT therapists were asked to 
generate a list of statements that resemble the types of self-content with which clients 
typically struggle. The resulting list comprised of 40 statements (20 positive and 20 
negative), which was subsequently presented to 32 independent raters (none recruited 
as experimental participants). These were asked to rate how positive or negative each 
statement was on a Likert scale of 1-21, where 1 was extremely negative and 21 was 
extremely positive. The mean ratings for all 40 statements are presented in Appendix 
D. The 10 self-statements rated as the most positive and the 10 rated as the most 
negative were selected for presentation in the experiment. The mean ratings for the 10 
positive statements ranged from 18.66 (“I love life”) to 16.37 (“I am whole”). The 
mean ratings for the 10 negative statements ranged from 1.45 for “I am a failure” to 
3.23 for “No-one will ever love me”.  
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 Automated Procedure. The automated procedure was always conducted on a 
PC laptop with a Pentium III processor and a 12” LCD screen. All stimulus 
presentations and participant responses were recorded by a Visual Basic (VB) 
program (Version 6). A standard computer mouse was also used to enable participants 
to interact directly with the program.  
Adherence Measures. At the end of the automated procedure, participants 
were asked to complete two 7-point Likert scales in paper-and-pen format. These 
were employed as adherence measures and asked participants: (1) “To what extent did 
you read the statements and ratings and answer them honestly?” (referred to as the 
Honesty Scale) and (2) “To what extent, do you think your ratings have been affected 
by the instructions you received at the beginning of the study?” (referred to as Control 
by defusion-related instructions). Each rating scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(entirely).   
 
Experimental Overview 
 This study used a 3x3x2 mixed-between-within participants design, with   
instructions (regarding the impact of defusion as a coping strategy) as the between 
participant variable (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion and Neutral), and visual 
presentation format of the self-statements (Normal, Defused and Abnormal) plus   
statement type (positive and negative) as within-participant variables.  
 In Phase 1, participants simply completed the AAQ-35, the BDI-II and the 
STAI-Y2. In Phase 2, they were randomly assigned to one of three groups that were 
differentiated in terms of the instructions they received regarding defusion (Pro-
Defusion, Anti-Defusion and Neutral). Specifically, participants in the Pro-Defusion 
Group received instructions that indicated that defusion decreases the emotional 
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 impact of self-statements. Participants in the Anti-Defusion Group were instructed 
that defusion increases the emotional impact of self-statements. And participants in 
the Neutral Group were informed that defusion has no effect on the emotional impact 
of self-statements.  
In Phase 3, all participants were exposed to the same automated procedure that 
involved the presentation of the positive and negative self-statements. Each statement 
was presented in three different presentation formats (Normal, Defused and 
Abnormal) to determine the potential impact of the defusion prefix relative to the 
other presentations. In the Normal presentation format, each self-statement appeared 
without a prefix (e.g. “I am a bad person”). In Defused presentation, each statement 
was prefixed with “I am having the thought that” (e.g. “I am having the thought that I 
am a bad person”). In Abnormal presentation, each statement was prefixed with “I 
have a wooden chair and” (e.g. “I have a wooden chair and I am a bad person”). 
Immediately after each statement, participants rated their levels of discomfort, 
believability and willingness regarding the statement. Phase 4 simply comprised the 
adherence measures.  
 
Ethical Issues 
The current study raised a number of ethical considerations, in light of the fact 
that potentially negative psychological consequences could result, particularly from 
exposure to the negative self-statements. In order to conduct the study within all of 
the appropriate ethical guidelines (The Psychological Society of Ireland, 2003), a 
series of precautionary measures was taken with all participants. First, each 
participant was briefed as to the nature of the study prior to agreement to participate. 
If, at this point, participants agreed to proceed, they were requested to sign a consent 
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 form (Appendix E) that was then counter-signed by the experimenter. All participants 
were informed at this point that they were not required to proceed; that they could 
withdraw from the study at any point; and that they would not be contacted again.  
Second, prior to the three psychological measures, participants were informed 
that the three questionnaires contained questions that they might find personal and/or 
distressing. In order to address potential anxieties concerning questionnaires, it was 
emphasised that: (a) participants could avoid answering any question; (b) there were 
no right or wrong answers to the questions; and (c) that the questionnaires served 
merely to enable the experimenter to note individual differences that might influence 
performances during the experimental procedure. At this point, participants were also 
informed that they would be provided with their own overall scores (without 
interpretation) on the questionnaires, but not the results of other participants.    
Third, participants were informed that as part of the experimental procedure 
they would be exposed to a number of positive and negative self-statements, some of 
which they may find distressing. Fourth, participants were informed that, in 
accordance with guidelines, all data would be kept on file at the Psychology 
Department in NUIM for approximately 5 years. Furthermore, they were assured that 
all aspects of their participation in the study would remain completely confidential 
(i.e. their data would not be identified by name in the final report and all data would 
be coded with an individual identification code number). Data would only be 
disclosed to the thesis supervisor in the event of exceptional circumstances (e.g. in the 
event of a participant becoming distressed or expressing a wish to see the supervisor). 
Fifth, after their participation in the study, all participants were debriefed on the 
nature and purpose of the study. Specifically, the concept of cognitive defusion was 
explained to them and the reasons for the use of the Abnormal self-statements as well 
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 as the different conditions were outlined. Sixth, all participants were made aware that 
if any psychological issues arose directly from the study, they could contact the thesis 
supervisor (whose name was provided) and further arrangements, where appropriate, 
could be made free of charge as a forum for the discussion of these issues with a 
Chartered Psychologist. At no point during the experiment did any participant 
withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind.  
 
Procedure 
Phase 1: Psychological Measures. During Phase 1, participants completed the 
AAQ-35, the BDI-II and the STAI-Y2, presented in written booklet format in this 
order. The assignment of participants to experimental conditions was randomised and 
did not depend upon their scores on the questionnaires. The three measures were 
simply included as a means of determining any differences between the three 
experimental groups that might influence their performance during the experiment. 
For example, participants who scored high in acceptance (i.e. low in avoidance) on 
the AAQ-35 might respond more readily to defusion than those who scored low in 
acceptance (high in avoidance). Furthermore, the latter may have been less willing to 
engage with the negative self-statements and this might have considerably 
undermined their full participation in the study.  
Phase 2: Presentation of Therapeutic Rationales. Each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental groups (Pro-Defusion, Anti-
Defusion and Neutral) prior to completing Phase 1. Each group was presented with 
similar instructions, but with minor differences for each group (although the overall 
length of the instruction sets was almost identical). 
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 Participants in the Pro-Defusion Group were provided with a set of 
instructions designed to encourage them towards a defusion rationale. The 
instructions were printed on a sheet of A4 paper and remained available to 
participants for the duration of the experiment. These were as follows: 
In the current experiment, we are interested in the emotional impact of 
unusual self-statements. The scientific literature in this area shows that if 
you rephrase a self-statement like “I am an awful person” into “I am having 
the thought that I am an awful person”, then the emotional impact of the 
statement is reduced.   
 
In other words, thinking or saying words like “I am having the thought that 
I am an awful person” is easier to deal with than simply thinking or saying 
“I am an awful person”. 
 
 
Immediately after reading the instructions, participants were provided with a 
brief adherence measure in written format, designed to determine whether or not they 
had fully understood the instructions. During this measure, participants were 
presented with the following instructions:  
Just to check that you understand the previous paragraph, please answer the 
following question and tick ONE of the choices below. 
 
The statement “I am having the thought that I am an awful person” should 
INCREASE/DECREASE/NOT AFFECT your emotional reaction to the 
statement “I am an awful person”. 
 
Participants were simply required to tick the choice they felt to be most appropriate to 
the instructions they had received. In the case of the Pro-Defusion Group, therefore, 
the correct answer involved indicating that the prefix “I am having the thought that” 
would decrease one’s emotional reaction to the statement as normally presented.  
Participants in the Anti-Defusion Group were provided with an almost 
identical set of instructions, except that they were encouraged away from (rather than 
towards) a defusion strategy. These instructions were as follows:  
In the current experiment, we are interested in the emotional impact of 
unusual self-statements. The scientific literature in this area shows that if 
you rephrase a self-statement like “I am an awful person” into “I am having 
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 the thought that I am an awful person”, then the emotional impact of the 
self-statement is increased.   
 
In other words, thinking or saying words like “I am having the thought that 
I am an awful person” is harder to deal with than simply thinking or saying 
“I am an awful person”. 
 
Immediately after reading the instructions, participants in the Anti-Defusion group 
were also required to complete a brief adherence measure to determine whether or not 
they had fully understood the instructions. In the case of the Anti-Defusion Group, the 
correct answer involved indicating that the prefix “I am having the thought that” 
would increase one’s emotional reaction to the statement normally presented. 
The instructions provided to the Neutral Group informed participants that a 
defusion prefix would have no effect on one’s emotional reaction to the self-
statement. That is, they were neither encouraged towards, nor away from, a defusion 
strategy. In this way, the Neutral group was employed as a type of experimental 
control condition and participants were instructed as follows:  
In the current experiment, we are interested in the emotional impact of 
unusual self-statements. The scientific literature in this area shows that if 
you rephrase a self-statement like “I am an awful person” into “I am having 
the thought that I am an awful person”, then the emotional impact of the 
statement does not change.   
 
In other words, thinking or saying words like “I am having the thought that 
I am an awful person” is no different than simply thinking or saying “I am 
an awful person”. 
 
 
Participants in the Neutral group were also required to complete a brief adherence 
measure in which the correct answer involved indicating that the prefix “I am having 
the thought that” would not effect one’s emotional reaction to the statement normally 
presented. Having successfully completed Phase 2 of the experiment, all participants 
were invited to ask any questions regarding any aspect of the instructions they had 
received thus far. 
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 Phase 3: Automated Presentation and Ratings of Self-Statements. Irrespective 
of the experimental group to which participants had been assigned, all were exposed 
to an identical automated procedure that contained 60 individual presentations of self-
statements (i.e. three different exposures to each of the 10 positive statements and 
three different exposures to each of the 10 negative statements). The three types of 
exposure to each of the self-statements were designed in an attempt to manipulate 
explicitly the level of defusion created for each participant by each statement as it 
appeared on screen. (This second defusion manipulation was in addition to the 
manipulation of defusion via the experimental instructions presented in Phase 2). 
Each of the three exposures to each statement was referred to as Normal, Defused and 
Abnormal, and simply reflected the format in which the statement was presented. All 
60 automated trials were randomised by the program for each participant. Exposure to 
the automated procedure lasted approximately 40-50mins.  
During the Normal presentation format, each self-statement appeared in its 
original form. That is, for example, the self-statement “I am a bad person” appeared 
on screen in exactly this form. Statements presented in the Defused presentation 
format were formed by placing the prefix “I am having the thought that” in front of 
each statement. Thus, for example, the self-statement “I am a bad person” appeared 
on screen as “I am having the thought that I am a bad person” when presented in the 
Defused format. During the Abnormal presentation format, each self-statement was 
modified by adding the unusual prefix “I have a wooden chair and” in front of the 
statement (e.g. “I have a wooden chair and I am a bad person”). This modification 
acted as a type of experimental control for the difference in length between the 
Normal and Defused self-statements. That is, the Abnormal statements were the same 
length as the Defused statements, but contained no defusion content. Potential 
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 differences, therefore, in ratings for the Normal and Defused self-statements that 
resulted from word length should yield no differences between the Abnormal and 
Defused statements.  
Prior to the commencement of the experimental trials, participants were 
exposed to two automated practice trials that were identical in format to the 
experimental trials, but did not contain any of the target statements. The program 
commenced with an introductory screen that consisted of a blue background and a 
grey button box in the centre that said: “Click Here When You Are Ready to Start the 
Practice Trials”. All interactions with the program involved using the mouse to move 
and click the cursor on-screen. When participants were ready to continue, they simply 
clicked the button box and a grey instruction screen appeared automatically. At the 
top of this was the instruction: “Read the following statement carefully and think 
about it”. This remained on-screen for 3s., after which a self-statement appeared 
automatically in the centre of the screen for 6s. This was followed by a rating screen 
that contained three individual rating scales (that represented discomfort, believability 
and willingness – see below), each ranging from 0-100, presented against a grey 
background. When participants had completed all three rating scales, they were 
instructed to click on the green button box at the bottom centre of the screen. When 
they placed the cursor on the box and clicked, the instruction screen appeared again 
and a second statement and rating screen followed. When the second practice ratings 
were provided, the automated procedure began in earnest. This marked the end of the 
practice session. Immediately after this, the automated procedure commenced with the 
introductory screen.   
The automated procedure contained a series of instructions throughout that 
allowed participants to proceed correctly through all aspects of the program in the 
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 absence of the experimenter. All of these instructions appeared in black letters and 
were clearly visible to participants. The automated procedure consisted of a total of 
242 screens: an introductory screen; 60 instruction screens that preceded each of the 
60 self-statements; 60 intermediate screens that followed each of the 60 rating 
screens; and an end screen that marked the end of the program.  
The introductory screen that preceded the experimental trials consisted of a 
blue background, with a grey button box in the centre that said: “Click Here When 
You Are Ready to Start the Experiment”. When participants were ready to continue, 
they simply located the cursor on the button box and clicked. The first instruction 
screen then appeared automatically. This consisted of a grey background, at the top of 
which was written the instruction: “Read the following statement carefully and think 
about it”. This instruction remained on-screen for 3s. Each of the 60 self-statement 
screens was preceded by an identical instruction screen. After 3s., one of the self-
statements appeared automatically in the centre of the screen against a grey 
background. The statement remained there for 6s. An example of a negative self-
statement in the Abnormal presentation format is illustrated in Figure 1. Participants 
were not required to make any response in the presence of the self-statement. 
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Figure 1. An example of a negative self-statement in Abnormal presentation format in Experiment 1. 
 
 Each self-statement screen was followed by a rating screen that contained 
three individual rating scales, ranging from 0-100, and presented against a grey 
background (see Figure 2). At the top centre of the screen was the generic instruction: 
“Please Use the Sliding Scales to Answer Each of the Following Questions”. 
Immediately below, there were three indented rating boxes in which participants were 
required to provide ratings of discomfort, believability and willingness for the 
previous self-statement.   
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Figure 2. The experimental rating screen that followed the presentation of each automated self-
statement in Experiment 1. 
 
  
 The Discomfort rating scale appeared at the top with the following instruction: 
“Rate the extent to which you felt comfortable or uncomfortable reading and thinking 
about the previous statement”. The sliding scale below was marked “0 = Extremely 
Comfortable” on the left and “100 = Extremely Uncomfortable” on the right. To 
provide a rating, participants could place the cursor on the slider, hold the left mouse 
button down, and drag the cursor to the appropriate point on the scale. Alternatively, 
they could click directly on the rating point with the cursor, until the slider moved. 
The initial slider value for each scale was set at -1 in order to force participants to 
move the cursor for each of the three scales before proceeding to the next screen.  
 The Believability scale appeared immediately below and contained the 
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 instruction: “Rate the extent to which you found the previous statement believable”. 
In this case, the extreme ends were marked with “0 = Extremely Believable” on the 
left and “100 = Extremely Unbelievable” on the right. The Willingness scale was at 
the bottom and the instruction was: “Rate the extent to which you were willing to read 
and think about the previous statement”. In this case, ratings ranged from “0 = 
Extremely Willing” to “100 = Extremely Unwilling”.  
 At the bottom of each rating screen was a green button box with the following 
instructions: “Click Here When You Have Answered All of The Questions”. When 
participants clicked on the box, an intermediate screen appeared immediately. This 
screen consisted of a grey background, with a grey button box in the centre, on which 
it was written “Click Here to Continue”. These screens allowed participants to 
proceed through the experimental trials at their own pace. When participants clicked 
the grey box, another self-statement screen appeared immediately. This sequence of 
screens continued until all 60 statements had been presented and rated. 
 When participants had completed the final rating screen, an ‘end screen’ 
appeared immediately. This consisted of a blue background, with three pale blue 
dialogue boxes located one above the other in the centre of the screen. The box at the 
top contained the following: “This is the end of this part of the experiment”. The box 
in the middle of the screen contained the words: “Thank you for your participation”. 
Finally, the box at the bottom of the screen contained the words: “Please Report to 
the Experimenter”. The end screen marked the end of the automated procedure. At 
this point, participants were required to seek the attention of the experimenter who 
was seated outside of the room.  
   Phase 4: Adherence Measures. Immediately after the presentation of the 60 
self-statements, participants were required to complete the two adherence questions. 
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 These were presented on a piece of A4 paper and comprised of two rating scales, 
referred to for current purposes as (1) the Honesty Scale and (2) Control by defusion-
related instructions. At the end of Phase 4, participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Each aspect of the study was conducted in a single session and each individual took 
approximately 90mins. to complete.     
 
RESULTS 
 
Psychological Measures 
The mean ratings (and standard deviations) for each of the psychological 
measures (AAQ-35, BDI-II and STAI-Y2) for each group of participants are 
presented in Table1. The results from the BDI-II and the STAI-Y2 indicated that 
participants fell within the normal range for depression and anxiety respectively. 
Results from the AAQ-35 indicated that participants overall reported high levels of 
acceptance/low levels of avoidance. In each case, the measures were broadly similar 
across the three instructional groups. Indeed, three separate one-way between 
groups analyses of variance (ANOVA’s), one for each of the psychological 
measures, revealed no significant differences across groups (AAQ-35: [p = .67]; 
BDI-II: [p = .25]; STAI-Y2: [p = .84]). Subsequent differences, therefore, in 
response to any aspect of the experiment could not readily be attributed to pre-
experimental variations across the groups on any of these measures.   
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 Table 1 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Psychological Measures for Each Instruction 
Group in Experiment 1 
 
 
Norms Pro-Defusion Anti-Defusion Neutral 
 
AAQ-35 - 160.95 (17.37) 158.25 (12.54) 163.25 (21.81) 
BDI-II < 13 7.25 (4.87) 6.10 (5.77) 8.90 (5.26) 
STAI-Y2 40.40 (10.15) 36.45 (8.42) 37.25 (11.15) 38.40 (11.31) 
Note. ‘-’ indicates that no normative data is available. 
 
 
Adherence Measures 
High ratings were obtained on the Honesty Scale (maximum score = 7) across 
all three groups (Pro-Defusion: M = 6.20, SD = .61; Anti-Defusion: M = 5.95, SD = 
.99; and Neutral: M = 5.90, SD = .85), indicating that participants on the whole 
responded honestly to the self-statements. A one-way between groups ANOVA 
revealed that there were no significant differences between groups [F (2, 57) = .74, p 
= .48] in this regard.  
In contrast, the mean ratings on the Control by defusion-related instructions 
Scale (maximum = 7) appeared to be relatively low for each of the three groups (Pro-
Defusion: M = 3.40, SD = 1.90; Anti-Defusion: M = 2.95, SD = 1.98; and Neutral: M 
= 3.90, SD = 2.07), indicating that ratings were not affected by the defusion-related 
instructions at the beginning of the study. Perhaps more importantly however, a one-
way between groups ANOVA revealed no significant difference between the groups 
[F (2, 57) = 1.14, p = .33]. Thus, although participants were not greatly influenced by 
the defusion-related instructions, all three groups were equal in this regard.  
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 Self-Report Measures 
For the purposes of analysis, the positive and negative self-statements were 
divided according to the three presentation formats: Normal, Abnormal and Defused. 
The three ratings (discomfort, believability and willingness) for each of the three 
formats, summed across the ten trials for each format, ranged from 0 to 1000 (e.g. for 
discomfort ratings of the negative statements in normal format; 10 statements, each of 
which were rated on a scale of 0 to 100, providing a possible total score of 0 to 1000). 
The data obtained for the positive and negative self-statements were analysed 
separately and are presented in separate sections below.  
 
Negative Self-Statements   
The mean overall scores for the negative self-statements were calculated for 
each of the three rating scales (Discomfort, Believability and Willingness), for each of 
the three groups (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion and Neutral). These scores were then 
separated into the three presentation formats (Normal, Abnormal and Defused -- see 
Table 2). 
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 Table 2 
 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Discomfort, Believability and Willingness of the 
Three Presentation Formats for the Three Groups for Negative Self-Statements for 
Experiment 1 
Presentation Format Pro-Defusion Group Anti-Defusion Group Neutral Group 
Discomfort ratings 
     Normal  326.80 (293.18) 465.65 (322.41) 390.95 (268.59) 
     Abnormal 284.70 (261.68) 421.50 (275.46) 412.75 (293.69) 
     Defused 219.90 (220.62) 393.70 (297.62) 323.05 (232.14) 
 
Believability ratings 
    Normal  849.25 (99.66) 709.50 (264.92) 837.10 (132.21) 
    Abnormal 835.05 (145.51) 706.35 (259.01) 817.25 (149.89) 
    Defused 630.80 (199.70) 625.90 (270.13) 726.00 (127.79) 
 
Willingness ratings 
     Normal  347.85 (336.91) 453.40 (314.58) 481.80 (266.26) 
     Abnormal 346.95 (325.22) 433.65 (255.67) 505.75 (286.82) 
     Defused 245.30 (259.04) 369.65 (281.98) 400.25 (262.42) 
Note. Lower scores indicate lower discomfort, greater believability and greater willingness. 
 
The descriptive statistics overall presented positive outcomes for both the Pro-
Defusion instructions and the Defused presentation format. Specifically, within each 
instruction group, the Defused presentation format produced lowest levels of 
discomfort and highest levels of willingness for the negative self-statements, relative 
to Normal and Abnormal presentations. Furthermore, across group comparisons 
indicated that the Pro-Defusion instructions were also associated with the lowest 
levels of discomfort and interestingly the Anti-Defusion instructions were associated 
with greatest discomfort. Similarly, the Pro-Defusion instructions produced greatest 
willingness (with Neutral instructions generating lowest willingness). Contrary to 
predictions however, the Defused format was associated with highest levels of 
believability, although the Pro-Defusion instructions did not yield the highest 
believability ratings compared to the other groups. The statistical analyses conducted 
for each of the three types of ratings are discussed separately below. 
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 Discomfort Ratings. A 3x3 mixed-between-within repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted on the discomfort ratings with instruction group (Pro-Defusion, Anti-
Defusion and Neutral) as the between participant variable and presentation format 
(Normal, Abnormal and Defused) as the within participant variable. A significant 
main effect was identified for presentation format (F (2, 57) = 19.05, p < .0001, p2  = 
.25), but not for group (p = .21) and the interaction was also non-significant (p = .17). 
Post-hoc (Scheffe) tests revealed a significant difference between Defused and 
Normal presentations (p < .0001), and between Defused and Abnormal (p = .0001), 
but not between Normal and Abnormal presentations. In short, defusion significantly 
decreased discomfort relative to the other two presentation formats and this effect was 
not significantly modulated by the defusion-related instructions. The fact that the 
Defused format differed significantly from both Normal and Abnormal, but the latter 
did not differ from one another suggested that the effect of the Defused format on 
discomfort could not be accounted for in terms of the length or unusual nature of the 
defused statements.  
Believability Ratings. The 3x3 ANOVA on the believability data also revealed 
a significant main effect for presentation format (F (2, 57) = 44.30, p < .0001, p2  = 
.43), but not for group (p = .12). In this case however, the interaction was significant 
(F (4, 114) = 4.18, p = .003, p2  = .12). In order to examine this effect, three separate 
one-way repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted, one for each group. The Pro-
Defusion instruction group showed a significant effect for presentation format (F (2, 
19) = 24.19, p < .0001, p2  = .56) and Sheffe post-hoc tests indicated that the Defused 
format differed significantly from both Normal and Abnormal presentations (p < 
.0001 and p < .0001, respectively), with no significant difference between the latter (p 
= .92). The same pattern was recorded with the Anti-Defusion group, who also 
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 showed a significant effect for format (F (2, 19) = 6.33, p = .004, p2  = .25), with 
Defused again significantly different from both Normal and Abnormal (p = .0125 and 
p = .0168, respectively), and no significant difference between the latter (p = .99). The 
case was the same for the Neutral group, for whom format was also significant (F (2, 
19) = 16.98, p < .0001, p2  = .47), and Defused was significantly different from both 
Normal and Abnormal (p < .0001, p = .0003, respectively), but with no significant 
difference between the latter (p = .62). Contrary to predictions therefore, the Defused 
presentation format significantly increased believability relative to the Normal and 
Abnormal presentations for each of the three groups. 
Willingness Ratings. Another 3x3 ANOVA was conducted on the willingness 
ratings. Similar to the discomfort measure, a significant main effect was recorded for 
presentation format (F (2, 57) = 20.91, p < .0001, p2  = .26), but not for group (p = 
.23), and again the interaction was non-significant (p = .74). Scheffe post-hoc tests 
revealed the same pattern as discomfort (Defused vs. Normal = p < .0001; Defused vs. 
Abnormal = p < .0001; Normal vs. Abnormal ns). In effect, defusion significantly 
increased willingness relative to the other two presentation formats, with no 
modulation by the defusion-related instructions, and no difference between the 
Normal and Abnormal statements. The fact that the Defused format differed 
significantly from both Normal and Abnormal, but the latter did not differ from one 
another suggested that the effect of the Defused format on willingness could not be 
accounted for in terms of the length or unusual nature of the defused statements. 
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 Positive Self-Statements 
The mean overall scores for the positive self-statements were calculated for 
each of the three rating scales (Discomfort, Believability and Willingness), for each of 
the three groups (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion and Neutral). These scores were then 
separated into the three presentation formats (Normal, Abnormal and Defused -- see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Discomfort, Believability and Willingness 
Ratings of the Three Presentation Formats for the Three Groups for Positive Self-
Statements in Experiment 1 
Presentation Format Pro-Defusion Group Anti-Defusion Group Neutral Group 
Discomfort ratings 
     Normal  112.55 (101.09) 141.40 (126.61) 158.25 (153.05) 
     Abnormal 122.15 (117.04) 189.90 (155.74) 220.55 (173.78) 
     Defused 119.40 (137.72) 195.50 (147.08) 166.95 (142.43) 
 
Believability ratings 
    Normal  196.80 (140.65) 196.30 (143.53) 227.75 (156.34) 
    Abnormal 249.35 (191.89) 301.75 (190.77) 278.60 (125.09) 
    Defused 218.95 (204.13) 246.50 (149.09) 258.40 (156.77) 
 
Willingness ratings 
     Normal  125.05 (118.75) 172.25 (144.99) 216.95 (175.51) 
     Abnormal 162.15 (178.62) 227.95 (184.08) 285.10 (198.43) 
     Defused 135.15 (157.85) 190.85 (154.00) 219.25 (158.75) 
Note.  Lower scores indicate lower discomfort, greater believability and greater willingness. 
 
In general, the pattern of ratings associated with the positive self-statements 
differed considerably from those recorded with the negative statements. Specifically 
within each group, the Normal presentation format was associated with greatest 
willingness, greatest believability and lowest discomfort. In contrast, the across group 
comparisons indicated that the Pro-Defusion instructions were associated with lowest 
discomfort and greatest willingness. The pattern of responses on believability was 
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 generally unsystematic across groups, although there was some indication that Pro-
Defusion was associated with greatest believability. 
Discomfort Ratings. A 3x3 mixed-between-within repeated measures 
ANOVA, with instruction group as the between participant variable and presentation 
format as the within participant variable, revealed a significant main effect for format 
[F (2, 57) = 6.64, p = .002, p2  =  .10], but not for group (p = .25). The interaction 
was non-significant (p = .07). Post-hoc (Scheffe) tests indicated a significant 
difference only between the Normal and Abnormal statements (p = .002), while 
Defused did not differ significantly from either -- Normal (p = .12) and Abnormal (p 
= .31). Unlike the negative statements therefore, the Defused presentation format had 
little impact on the discomfort ratings obtained with the positive statements. Once 
again, the defusion-related instructions also had little or no effect on levels of 
discomfort. 
Believability Ratings. The 3x3 ANOVA conducted on the positive 
believability ratings also revealed a significant main effect for presentation format [F 
(2, 57) = 9.79, p =.0001, p2  = .15), but not for group (p = .76), and the interaction 
was non-significant (p = .62). Similar to the discomfort ratings, post-hoc (Scheffe) 
tests revealed a significant difference between Normal and Abnormal formats only (p 
= .0001), but not between Defused and Normal (p = .10), or between Defused and 
Abnormal (p = .09). In short, the Defused presentation format and the defusion-
related instructions had little impact on the believability ratings of the positive 
statements. 
Willingness Ratings. The 3x3 ANOVA for willingness also revealed a 
significant effect for presentation format [F (2, 57) = 9.54, p = .0001, p2  = .14], but 
not for group (p = .13). Again, the interaction effect was non-significant (p = .76). 
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 Interestingly, post-hoc (Scheffe) tests revealed a significant difference between the 
Normal and Abnormal statements (p = .0004) and between Defused and Abnormal (p 
= .005), but Normal and Defused did not differ from one another (p = .73). Thus, 
participants were more willing to experience the positive statements as Normal or 
Defused than as Abnormal. Once again, the defusion-related instructions had little 
impact.  
In summary, a different pattern of responding was observed for the negative 
versus positive self-statements. For the negative statements, the Defused presentation 
format produced significantly lowest levels of discomfort, highest willingness and 
highest believability relative the Normal and Abnormal presentations. In contrast, this 
type of presentation had relatively little impact on the emotional ratings associated 
with the positive statements. Overall, the three different types of defusion-related 
instructions had little or no impact on the emotional ratings obtained with either 
negative or positive statements presented in any of the three presentation formats.    
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results obtained for Experiment 1 were consistent with those reported by 
Masuda et al. (2004) in terms of the types of differences in the emotional impact of 
negative self-statements reported by participants when presented with statements 
involving defusion, compared to those not-defused. In both studies, defusion 
involving negative self-statements was associated with decreases in discomfort. 
Across the two studies however, a key difference emerged in the believability ratings. 
In the original work, defusion was associated with decreased believability, and 
although the same prediction was made here, the current research actually indicated 
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 that defusion was associated with an increase in believability.   
The current study offered a number of additional advantages over the original 
work that potentially shed light on explanations of both data sets. (1) The current 
study investigated the impact of defusion on willingness to experience the negative 
statements, and as expected defusion was associated with increased willingness. (2)  
This work was the first to examine the impact of defusion using the defusion prefix 
(“I am having the thought that”), rather than a word repetition technique. (3) This 
work systematically compared the impact of defusion on positive versus negative self-
statements and indicated that defusion had relatively little impact on the emotional 
ratings associated with the former. (4) Finally, the current study offered a more 
systematic manipulation of defusion in terms of the relative impact of defusion 
instructions versus a defusion exercise. Consistent with the original research, the 
current work also found that defusion-related instructions were considerably less 
influential than a more direct defusion manipulation.     
Overall, the research presented here provides empirical evidence of the utility 
of cognitive defusion in reducing the emotional impact of negative self-statements, 
while encouraging willingness to experience them. Although there were points of 
overlap with the only existing published study in this area (e.g. discomfort ratings and 
the utility of a defusion experience versus instructions), there were also points of 
inconsistency (e.g. the believability ratings). Taken together, this pattern raised a 
number of important questions for future research in this area.  
First, participants here were exposed to generic self-statements, whereas 
personalised statements had been employed previously. Thus, it was difficult to 
determine what impact this difference may have had on the two sets of findings. 
Second, the defusion-related instructions and defusion exercises were brief, and one 
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might even argue that the manipulation of the presentation formats of the statements 
employed here cannot adequately be called ‘an intervention’. Hence, it might be 
argued that different outcomes would be obtained with a more substantive defusion-
based exercise. Such an intervention would also be more in line with the types of 
defusion techniques commonly employed in therapeutic settings. Third, although the 
original research by Masuda et al. (2004) examined the comparison between defusion 
and distraction-based and thought control strategies, no such comparison was 
attempted here. The next phase of the current research program was designed to 
address these issues directly. Specifically, Experiment 2 attempted to: (1) investigate 
the impact of defusion on personally relevant thoughts; (2) present participants with a 
more complete therapeutic defusion-based rationale and exercise; and (3) compare the 
impact of defusion with alternative coping strategies. These manipulations allowed 
for a more direct comparison with the Masuda et al. study.     
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Chapter 3 
Experiment 2 
Cognitive Defusion and Personally Relevant Negative 
Thoughts: Exploring the Relative Impact of Therapeutic 
Instructions and Experiential Exercise 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Experiment 1 investigated the emotional impact of defusion instructions and a 
defusion exercise on positive and negative self-statements. The results obtained were 
largely consistent with existing empirical evidence in spite of a number of 
methodological differences between this and the only previously published study 
(Masuda et al., 2004). First, both studies had attempted to compare the relative impact of 
defusion when delivered via instruction versus experiential exercise and the results from 
both generally indicated superiority of exercise over instruction in this regard. However, 
while the defusion instructions presented by Masuda et al. to participants were relatively 
lengthy and detailed, those provided in Experiment 1 were extremely brief. Furthermore, 
the latter could not easily be called a clinical analogue because it is unlikely that 
therapists working within an ACT framework would provide such brief instructions to 
clients in introducing defusion, even when they are to be followed by experiential 
exercises. 
 In the original research, Masuda et al. described a condition in which participants 
were presented with defusion instructions and were then simply instructed to apply 
this strategy to their negative thoughts, with no opportunity to practice defusion with a 
thought. Although this appears to offer a condition in which instructions were presented 
in the absence of experiential exercise, one cannot determine what participants actually 
did with the information they received. For example, some participants may have 
successfully understood the implications of the rationale and applied defusion 
appropriately to their negative thought, others may not. Furthermore, at no point did the 
researchers investigate the impact of the defusion exercise alone. In Experiment 1 of the 
current research, all participants received both defusion-related instructions and exercise. 
As a result, it might be argued that neither study addressed the relative impact of defusion 
instructions versus exercise.  
A related issue emerges with the thought control strategy employed by Masuda et 
al. (2004). The researchers provided participants with a number of different strategies that 
they might use (e.g. positive self-talk, positive imagery, or breathing training), hence it is 
difficult to determine which strategy was actually used and which is most effective. 
Second, a key difference between the studies concerned the use of personally relevant 
self-statements employed by Masuda, but not in Experiment 1. Although both studies 
yielded similarly positive outcomes for defusion, it remains difficult to determine the role 
played by the use of personal statements. In any case, it is reasonable to argue that using 
personal statements offers a better clinical analogue of what happens in natural 
therapeutic settings, thus this is an important issue to examine experimentally.  
 63
 Experiment 2 attempted to address these issues in a number of ways. First, we 
investigated the impact of defusion on participants’ personally relevant negative 
thoughts. Second, we systematically examined the relative utility of defusion instructions 
versus defusion exercises. Third, we compared defusion with other coping strategies, 
including Thought Control and Placebo. Fourth, we specifically targeted one type of 
Thought Control strategy which all participants were trained to use. In this way, 
Experiment 2 offered a more direct comparison with the Masuda et al. (2004) study.      
Experiment 2 also incorporated a number of additional features designed to 
extend both the original research by Masuda et al. (2004) and Experiment 1. Specifically, 
rather that using a single participant alternating treatment design employed by Masuda, 
the current study adopted an independent groups design to permit greater generalisation 
of the findings. To control for possibly confounding effects of demand compliance (e.g. 
Field, & Lawson, 2003), all experimental aspects of the research were conducted in the 
absence of the experimenter, with all instructions presented in written format. Finally, all 
‘interventions’ employed in Experiment 2 were considerably more substantive than those 
employed previously.   
 
The Current Study 
In Experiment 2, a sample of non-clinical undergraduates was randomly assigned 
across nine experimental conditions. Each condition consisted of the presentation of one 
of three therapeutic rationales (Defusion, Thought Control, or Placebo) paired with one of 
three experiential exercises (Defusion, Thought Control, or Placebo). Thus, a condition 
may have consisted of matched components, where both components comprised the same 
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 therapeutic strategy (e.g. a defusion rationale plus a defusion exercise), or both contained 
no strategy (a placebo rationale combined with a placebo exercise). A condition may also 
have consisted of mismatched components, where one component offered one strategy, 
while the other component offered the alternative strategy (e.g. a defusion rationale 
paired with a thought control exercise). Finally, some conditions were also referred to as 
unmatched, where one component involving a strategy was accompanied by a placebo 
component (e.g. a defusion rationale paired with a placebo exercise). Participants were 
required to generate a negative self-relevant thought (e.g. “I am a failure”) and rate this 
thought in terms of the discomfort, believability and willingness it induced prior to, and 
immediately after, the presentation of the therapeutic rationale and exercise.  
Consistent with both Experiment 1 and Masuda et al. (2004), we hypothesised 
that participants presented with defusion components would demonstrate decreases in the 
discomfort. Consistent with the work presented by Masuda et al., we also hypothesised 
that defusion would decrease believability. Finally, in line with the research presented in 
Experiment 1, we hypothesised that defusion would increase willingness (Masuda et al. 
did not investigate willingness). We also anticipated that participants presented with two 
defusion components (i.e. both the Defusion rationale and Defusion exercise) would 
produce even greater improvements. Furthermore, we expected that the Defusion exercise 
would likely prove to be of greater impact than the Defusion rationale. 
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 METHOD 
 
Participants 
One hundred and forty-four undergraduates (72 male) aged between 18 and 22 
years (M = 20.6 years) were recruited for Experiment 2 through Faculty announcements 
at NUIM. None had prior exposure to similar experimental procedures. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of nine conditions, each of which was balanced for gender (8 
males and 8 females per condition). No incentives were offered in return for 
participation. In addition to the 144 participants who completed the experiment, three 
failed to complete all three psychological measures and a further two failed to complete 
the experiential exercises correctly. The data from these five participants, therefore, are 
not included in the final data set.   
 
Setting 
The study was conducted in an experimental cubicle located in the Psychology 
Department at NUIM. The room was generally free from noise and other potential 
distractions. After the presentation of a brief verbal outline of the procedure, participants 
were instructed on the use a stopwatch and audio tape recorder, located on the 
experimental table. Each participant was then left alone in the room and completed all 
aspects of the experiment individually. The experimenter remained seated outside the 
room during this time.  
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 Apparatus and Materials  
 Participants were presented with a stopwatch to accurately measure the duration 
of engaging with the experimental exercises (see below). Participants were also provided 
with a tape-recorder, as an experimental control to ensure all participants successfully 
completed all aspects of the experiment (see below).  In addition to the stopwatch and 
tape recorder, participants were presented with two written booklets. The first contained a 
series of psychological assessments and the second contained the basic instructions for 
completing the experimental sequence. 
Psychological Measures. All participants completed three self-report 
psychological measures. The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-49) is 
designed to measure an individual’s level of experiential avoidance (Hayes, Strosahl, et 
al., 2004, see Appendix F). The Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21) is 
designed to measure current levels of depression, anxiety and stress (Lovibond, & 
Lovibond, 1995, see Appendix G). The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(BIDR) is designed to assess an individual’s levels of self-deception and impression 
management (Paulhus, 1988, see Appendix H). The assignment of participants to one of 
the nine experimental conditions did not depend upon their questionnaire scores. The 
measures were simply included to control for any variability across conditions that might 
account for any differences obtained during subsequent experimental phases. 
The AAQ-49 is a self-report measure of an individual’s general levels of 
emotional avoidance and is similar to the AAQ 35-item version employed in Experiment 
1. Individuals are asked to rate the truth of each of 49 statements as it applies to 
themselves, on a scale of 1 (never true) to 7 (always true). The scales contain 27 
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 negatively reversed items. Total scores range from 49 to 343, with low scores indicating 
high avoidance and low acceptance, and high scores indicating low avoidance and high 
acceptance. At the time of the running of Experiment 2, the AAQ-49 suggested superior 
psychometric properties with respect to the AAQ-35 (see Bond, & Bunce, 2003; Hayes, 
Strosahl, et al., 2004). 
The DASS-21 is a 21-item inventory that provides a measure of current levels of 
depression, anxiety and stress. It consists of three sub-scales (Depression, Anxiety and 
Stress), each of which contains seven questions. Individuals are asked to rate how much 
each statement applies to themselves over the past week, on a scale of 0 (did not apply to 
me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time). Total scores for each sub-
scale are added together and then doubled (in order to make mean scores comparable 
with those obtained for the longer 42-item version). Thus total scores for each sub-scale 
range from 0 (lowest score) to 42 (very severe). The normal level for each of the sub-
scales are: Depression < 9; Anxiety < 7; and Stress < 14. The scales possess good 
psychometric properties with good reliability (alpha values for each of the three sub-
scales are: Depression 0.81; Anxiety 0.73; and Stress 0.81) and high internal consistency.   
The BIDR is used to measure levels of self-deceptive positivity (i.e. providing 
self-reports that are honest but positively biased) and impression management (i.e. 
deliberately presenting oneself in a positive light to an audience). The measure consists of 
two sub-scales -- self-deception and impression management. Scores for each sub-scale 
range from 0 to 20, with higher scores indicating high levels of self-deception and higher 
levels of impression management, respectively. The median scores for the self-deception 
scale are 7.5 (SD = 3.2) for males and 6.8 (SD = 3.1) for females. The corresponding 
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 scores for the impression management scale are 4.3 (SD = 3.2) and 4.9 (SD = 3.2) for 
males and females, respectively. The scales possess good psychometric properties with 
high levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability, as well as good concurrent 
validity with other measures of social desirability.   
Therapeutic scripts. The scripts employed in the current study were based on 
those originally used by Masuda et al. (2004), but with some modifications to facilitate 
experimental improvements, as outlined previously (see below for specific details of the 
scripts used in the current study).   
 
Experimental Overview 
The current study was a double-blind, independent groups design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of nine experimental conditions, across which Defusion, 
Thought Control and Placebo rationales and exercises were systematically manipulated -- 
see Table 4.  
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 Table 4 
An Outline of the Nine Experimental Conditions employed in Experiment 2 
Condition Rationale Exercise 
 
Matched Conditions   
Defusion/Defusion  Defusion Defusion 
Thought Control/Thought Control  Thought Control Thought Control 
Placebo/Placebo Placebo Placebo 
 
Mismatched Conditions  
  
Defusion/Thought Control Defusion Thought Control 
Thought Control/Defusion  Thought Control Defusion 
 
Unmatched Conditions 
  
Defusion/Placebo Defusion Placebo 
Thought Control/Placebo Thought Control Placebo 
Placebo/Defusion  Placebo Exercise 
Placebo/Thought Control Placebo Thought Control 
  
The three matched conditions presented participants with two matched 
components. That is, participants were either presented with: both a defusion rationale 
paired with a defusion exercise (Defusion/Defusion); a thought control rationale paired 
with a thought control exercise (Thought Control/Thought Control); or a placebo 
rationale paired with a placebo exercise (Placebo/Placebo). There were two mismatched 
conditions. Participants in these conditions were presented with two mismatched 
components. That is, participants were presented with a defusion rationale paired with a 
thought control exercise (Defusion/Thought Control), or they were presented with a 
thought control exercise paired with a defusion rationale (Thought Control/Defusion).     
The remaining four conditions were unmatched. In two of these conditions, 
participants were presented with a single defusion or thought control rationale which was 
then paired with a placebo component. Specifically, participants were presented with 
either a defusion rationale paired with a placebo exercise (Defusion/Placebo), or a 
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 thought control rationale paired with a placebo exercise (Thought Control/Defusion). The 
remaining two conditions comprised of a defusion or thought control exercise paired with 
a placebo rationale. Specifically, participants were presented with either a placebo 
rationale paired a defusion exercise (Placebo/Defusion), or a placebo rationale paired 
with a thought control exercise (Placebo/Thought Control). 
Each of the nine conditions contained the same seven experimental phases across 
which rationales and exercises were manipulated. Phase 1 involved completing the AAQ-
49, the DASS-21 and the BIDR. In Phase 2, participants generated a personally relevant 
negative statement (e.g. “I am really stupid”), which they were then asked to re-phrase as 
a single word (e.g. “stupid”). In Phase 3, participants provided Pre-Intervention 
discomfort, believability and willingness ratings regarding the negative self-relevant 
thought. The therapeutic rationales were presented in Phase 4. Both the Defusion and 
Thought Control rationales were presented to participants as enabling them to cope with 
thoughts and feelings that accompanied the negative self-referential word. In contrast, the 
Placebo rationale simply involved a short reading about animal communication. The 
therapeutic exercises were presented in Phase 5 and may or may not have been consistent 
with the rationale presented in Phase 4 (depending upon whether the condition was 
matched, mismatched, or unmatched). Participants were instructed to apply the Defusion 
or Thought Control exercise to the negative word. In contrast, the Placebo exercise 
simply involved reading about the Gobi desert (Webster, 2002). In Phase 6, participants 
provided a second series of post-intervention ratings of discomfort, believability and 
willingness regarding the negative self-relevant thought. Phase 7 contained a series of 
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 short adherence measures designed to determine if participants’ reactions to the negative 
self-referent had been influenced by the rationales and exercises presented to them.  
 
Ethical Issues 
 In order to conduct the study according to all of the appropriate ethical guidelines 
as identified by The Psychological Society of Ireland (2003), a series of precautionary 
measures were explicitly employed in Experiment 2. These were largely consistent with 
those employed in Experiment 1, with only minor changes of emphasis necessary to 
facilitate the use of personally relevant statements. Specifically, a greater emphasis here 
was placed upon informing participants of the possibility of psychological issues arising 
directly from the study. Again, they were emphatically instructed that in the event that 
this occurred they could contact the thesis supervisor (name provided) and further 
arrangements, where appropriate, could be made free of charge as a forum for the 
discussion of these issues with a Chartered Psychologist. At no point during the 
experiment did any participant withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or 
distress of any kind.  
 
Procedure  
Phase 1: Psychological Measures. During Phase 1, participants were presented 
with the first information booklet containing the three psychological measures. The 
AAQ-49, the DASS-21 and the BIDR were always presented in this order. Participants 
were instructed to proceed through the booklet as quickly as possible and to avoid 
spending too much time on each answer. Written instructions at the end of the booklet 
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 then guided participants to Booklet 2 and requested that they set the tape recorder to 
record. 
Phase 2: Generating a Negative Self-Relevant Thought. At the beginning of this 
phase of the experiment participants received the following written instructions: 
               I would like to begin by asking you to think of one particular thought about you 
that regularly enters your mind and that you find very uncomfortable to think 
about. The thought can be anything. For example, you may have the thought “I am 
not as good as people think”. The thought just has to be about you and you have to 
find it very uncomfortable. 
 
Once a relevant thought had been generated, participants were required to write it down 
on a space provided in the booklet, while simultaneously speaking the words aloud for 
the purposes of the tape recorder. Participants were then instructed to re-state the thought 
as a single word. For example, if a participant had the thought “I am stupid”, this could 
be restated as the single word “stupid”. Once again, participants wrote down the word 
and spoke it aloud. At the end of Phase 2 (and all subsequent experimental phases), 
participants were asked to provide a verbal summary aloud of what they had been 
instructed to do during the phase.  
Phase 3: Pre-Intervention Ratings of the Negative Self-Relevant Thought. 
Immediately after Phase 2, participants were asked to rate their levels of discomfort, 
believability and willingness associated with the negative self-relevant thought they had 
generated on three separate 11-point Likert scales. Specifically, for discomfort 
participants were asked: “How uncomfortable is the thought right now?” A discomfort 
rating simply involved circling the number that best reflected the level of discomfort 
associated with the thought at that particular moment from “0 = Not at all uncomfortable” 
to “100 = Very uncomfortable” (increasing in 10-point increments). For believability, 
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 participants were asked to: “Imagine that thought occurred to you right now and, if it 
occurred, how believable (true) would it be?” and to rate the believability from “0 = Not 
at all believable” to “100 = Very believable”. Similarly for willingness, participants were 
asked to: “Imagine that thought occurred to you right now and, if it occurred, how 
willing would you be to think about that thought?” and rated willingness from “0 = Not 
at all willing” to “100 = Very willing”.   
Phase 4: Presentation of the Therapeutic Rationale. Irrespective of the condition 
to which they had been assigned, all participants received the same initial information 
about the positive and negative features associated with human language, as follows:   
As a species, language (including thoughts and words) gives us both the blessing and 
the curse of knowledge at the same time. That is, the power of language has pros and 
cons. There is a light side and a dark side. On the positive side, we can influence the 
environment and create a comfortable life. Just look around in this room – lights, 
chairs, central heating and the clothes you are wearing… Without language and our 
thoughts (e.g. logical thinking), these would not be here. On the dark side, however, 
we are the only species that worries. And in the most extreme, we are the only 
species that commits suicide. (It has been suggested that Norwegian lemmings 
engage in an activity that looks similar to suicide, however, even when a lemming 
falls into water it will try to climb back out and save itself -- humans do not). 
 
Immediately thereafter, participants were differentiated by condition.  
Participants in the three conditions that comprised a Defusion rationale were 
instructed as follows: 
The dark side becomes dominant when we believe our thoughts are literally what 
they say they are, especially thoughts about ourselves that could be evaluative and 
judgmental. For example, consider the thought “I am no good”. We tend to think of 
our thoughts as if they are real. It’s as if you must be what your thoughts say you are. 
For example, you must be no good. But is this really true? Are you really what your 
thoughts say you are? 
 
What if I told you that thoughts are simply what they are? That is, that thoughts are 
just thoughts, rather than what they say they are. Based on this way of thinking then, 
maybe you are not the person your thoughts tell you that you are.   
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 In contrast, participants in the three conditions that comprised a Thought Control 
rationale were instructed as follows: 
The dark side becomes dominant when we have negative thoughts about ourselves 
that are evaluative and judgmental. For example, consider the thought “I am no 
good”. Is this really true? Now consider the thought “I am really good”. This thought 
is also evaluative and judgmental, but it is a positive thought.   
 
What if I said to you that positive thoughts can be used to take away negative 
thoughts. That is, when you have the thought “I am a bad person”, you could 
immediately think instead “I am a good person”. Based on this way of thinking then, 
maybe you can replace your negative thoughts about yourself with more positive 
ones. 
 
Participants assigned to the three conditions that comprised a Placebo rationale 
did not receive instructions for coping with the negative self-referents, but were instead 
instructed as follows: 
Animals operate at a comparatively simple level of interaction and rely heavily on 
non-verbal gestures to communicate basic needs, for example, food, shelter and signs 
of danger. Researchers agree that although the language used by humans and more 
primitive animals have similar features, the two forms are not identical.   
 
Chimpanzees have become the point of reference by which humans compare 
themselves to all other animals. However, even though chimps share 98.4% of the 
human genetic code, they are unable to acquire levels of language above those seen 
in a young child. Chimps can be easily taught up to 120 signs based on American 
Sign Language, however, unlike humans, they remain unable to generate or produce 
complex grammatically coherent sentences.  
  
Participants were never made aware of the differences among the experimental 
conditions nor of the specific condition to which they had been assigned. 
Phase 5: Experiential Exercise and its Application to the Negative Self-Relevant 
Thought. At the beginning of Phase 5, all participants were provided with the following 
brief instructions: 
Because it might be a little difficult to understand this, in the next part of the study 
we will do a little exercise. Okay, the next exercise may seem silly.    
 
 75
 At this point, participants were once again divided by condition. Participants presented 
with the Defusion exercise were instructed as follows:  
You will be asked to say a word and then you have to think about what comes to 
mind.  Now say the word “MILK” out loud. 
 
Okay, now say aloud what comes to mind when you say the word “MILK”? 
 
Now say aloud what sort of other things show up when you say “MILK”? 
 
Can you taste it? 
 
Can you feel what it feels like to drink a glass of milk? 
 
Cold, creamy, coats your mouth – right?  
 
Immediately afterwards, these participants were presented with the following 
information: 
What came across your mind were things about actual milk and your experience 
with it. All that happened is that you made a strange sound “MILK” and lots of 
things showed up. Notice that there isn’t any milk in this room, none at all, but milk 
was in the room psychologically. You were seeing it, tasting it, and even feeling it. 
And yet, only the word was actually here.  
 
Now, let’s see if you can do an exercise with MILK. It might be a little silly and you 
might feel embarrassed doing it. What you are asked to do is to say the word 
“MILK” out loud over and over again, and as rapidly as possible and then notice 
what happens. Please now set the timer and say the word “MILK” over and over, 
aloud and as rapidly as possible for approximately 25 seconds.  
 
After completing the repetition exercise with MILK, participants were asked to “Say 
aloud what came to mind when you kept repeating the word MILK”. After stating their 
reactions aloud, participants were then provided with the following instructions:  
 
Did you notice what happened to the milk you thought about before? The creamy 
stuff goes away. When you said it the first time, it was as if the milk was actually 
here in the room, but all that really happened was that you just said the word. The 
first time you said it, it was psychologically meaningful and it was almost real. But 
when you said it again and again, did you begin to lose that meaning? Was it as if the 
words just became a sound, almost like a bird squawking? 
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 After considering the information, participants presented with the Defusion 
exercise were asked to provide a summary aloud of what they had just been told and what 
they did. After the summary, the participants were then required to repeat the Defusion 
exercise with the negative self-relevant thought generated in a previous phase using the 
following instructions:   
What I would now like to suggest to you is that the MILK exercise may be applied to 
our personal thoughts about ourselves. Isn’t it true that thoughts are just thoughts, 
rather than an actual description of you? Thoughts are just smoke, there isn’t 
anything solid in them.  These thoughts are just like the thoughts you had about 
MILK. 
 
Now your next task is to remember the uncomfortable thought about yourself that 
you started out with and that you restated as a single word. Could you now say the 
word aloud and over and over again as rapidly as possible, just like you did with 
“MILK”. Please now set the timer and say your word over and over, aloud and as 
rapidly as possible for approximately 25 seconds. 
 
For example, during the second phase of the experiment a participant may have 
experienced the thought “I am a stupid person”, which was subsequently re-phrased as 
the single word “stupid”. In this case, the participant was required to rapidly repeat this 
word aloud (e.g. “stupid, stupid, stupid…”) for 25secs. At the end of this exercise, 
participants were once again asked to provide a summary aloud of what they had just 
done.    
 In order to present participants with a Thought Control exercise that was formally 
similar to the Defusion exercise, but that involved a thought control strategy rather than 
defusion, the MILK exercise was replaced by a black/white exercise in which participants 
were required to replace the word black with the word white (and positive words 
associated with it) every time black came to mind. Participants presented with the 
Thought Control exercise were instructed as follows:  
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 You will be asked to say a negative word and then you have to say the positive word 
that is its opposite.   
 
Now say the word “BLACK” out loud.   
 
Okay, now say aloud what comes to mind when you say the word “BLACK”?  
 
Now say aloud what sorts of other things show up when you say “BLACK”?  
 
Can you see it? 
 
Can you feel what black feels like? 
 
Dark, thick, hard to see through -- right?  
 
Okay. What came across your mind were things about black. 
 
Okay. Now say aloud the word “WHITE” and notice what sorts of things come to 
mind when you say the word white. 
 
Can you see it?  
 
Can you feel it? 
 
Bright, shiny, clean -- right? 
  
 
Immediately after these instructions, participants were presented with the following: 
Now, once again say aloud the word ‘BLACK’ but before you start to think about 
any of the things that go with it, immediately say the word ‘WHITE’ and try to think 
of all the things that go with it instead of ‘BLACK’. Please now set the timer for 25 
seconds and during this time say the word ‘BLACK’ aloud first. Then the minute 
you start to think of what goes with ‘BLACK’, say the word ‘WHITE’ and say aloud 
all of the things that go with the word ‘WHITE’ instead. Say ‘BLACK’ as often as it 
pops into your mind but then say ‘WHITE’ and try to imagine all the things that go 
with white rather than black. 
  
Once again, participants were asked to provide a summary aloud of what they had just 
been told and what they did.   
Similar to previous conditions, participants presented with the Thought Control 
exercise were then asked to apply the same strategy to the negative self-relevant thought 
generated previously:   
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 What I would now like to suggest to you is that the BLACK exercise may be applied 
to our personal thoughts about ourselves. Isn’t it true that positive thoughts make you 
feel more comfortable than negative thoughts and are much nicer to have in your 
mind? These thoughts are just like the thoughts you had about BLACK and WHITE. 
 
Now your next task is to remember the uncomfortable thought about yourself that 
you started out with and that you restated as a single word. Now, say aloud the word 
but before you start to think about any of the things that go with it, immediately say 
an opposite or more positive word and try to think of all the things that go with the 
positive word instead of the negative one. Please now set the timer for 25 seconds 
and during this time say the negative word aloud first as often as it pops into your 
mind. Then the minute you start to think of what goes with this, say aloud the 
opposite positive word and all of the things that go with that word instead. 
 
For example, a participant may have generated the thought “I am a stupid person”, which 
was subsequently re-phrased as “stupid”. In this case, the participant was required to state 
the word “stupid” aloud as often as it came to mind and to replace the negative word 
“stupid” with more positive words (e.g. “smart, intelligent, funny…”) for 25secs. Once 
again, participants were asked to speak aloud a summary of what they had just done.  
The Placebo exercise controlled primarily for time spent during the Defusion and 
Thought Control exercises and thus involved participants simply reading an extract from 
an article in the National Geographic about the Gobi Desert (Webster, 2002). The word 
length of this article was matched as closely as possible to the total number of words 
presented during the Defusion and Thought Control exercises. At the end of the Placebo 
exercise, participants were again asked to speak aloud a summary of what they had just 
done.  
Phase 6: Post-Intervention Rating of the Negative Self-Relevant Thought. This 
phase was identical to Phase 3 and required participants to provide (post-rationale and 
exercise) ratings of discomfort, believability and willingness with regard to the negative 
self-relevant thought. Again, participants were required to provide a verbal summary of 
what they did at the end of this phase of the experiment. 
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 Phase 7: Adherence Measures. The final phase of the experiment consisted of 
three 11-point Likert style rating scales that ranged from 0 to 100 (increasing in 10-point 
increments). The Honesty Scale asked participants: “To what extent did you rate the 
levels of comfort, believability and willingness honestly?” (“0 = not at all honest” and 
“100 = very honest”). The Difficulty Scale asked participants: “Can you tell me how 
difficult you found it to follow the instructions that were provided for this exercise?” (“0 
= not at all difficult” and “100 = very difficult”). The Daily Use Scale presented the 
following: “The exercise you have just completed attempted to help you to cope with 
uncomfortable thoughts. How often do you typically use this approach as a way of coping 
on a day-to-day basis?” (“0 = never” and “100 = always”). The Daily Use Scale was not 
included in conditions that presented a Placebo exercise as no coping exercise was 
presented in this context. For each of the three scales, participants were required to circle 
the number that best reflected their level of honesty, the perceived difficulty of 
instructions and their daily use of the coping strategy with which they had been provided. 
The completion of Phase 7 marked the end of Experiment 2. 
The experiment was completed in a single session and each participant took 
approximately 35-40mins. to complete the study. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Psychological Measures 
 The means and standard deviations for each psychological measure for each 
condition are presented in Table 5. In general, scores fell within the normal range for 
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 each scale. A series of one-way between groups ANOVAs revealed no significant main 
effect for condition on any measure (AAQ-49: p = .82; DASS subscales: Depression: p = 
.64; Anxiety: p = .39; Stress: p = .20, BIDR subscales: Self-Deception: p = .81 and 
Impression Management: p = .92). Hence, potential differences in subsequent 
performances could not be attributed to pre-experimental psychological differences 
between the groups. 
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 Table 5 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Psychological Measures for Each Condition in 
Experiment 2 
 
 
 
AAQ-49 Depression Anxiety Stress Self-Deception Impression 
Management 
Norms - < 9 < 7 < 14 7.50 (3.20) 4.30 (3.20) 
Defusion/ 
Defusion 
 
 
 
218.81 (27.60) 8.88 (7.30) 8.25 (7.00) 14.38 (8.71) 4.81 (2.97) 4.88 (3.32) 
Defusion / 
Placebo 
 
 
 
222.94 (25.90) 7.06 (8.24) 7.88 (8.47) 14.50 (9.19) 5.94 (3.11) 5.56 (2.87) 
Defusion/ 
Thought 
Control 
 
 
218.44 (28.85) 10.13 (10.16) 7.13 (9.35) 15.63 (12.12) 5.19 (3.02) 5.00 (3.50) 
Thought 
Control/ 
Thought 
Control 
 
220.69 (25.25) 7.88 (9.08) 7.50 (6.35) 13.50 (7.57) 4.38 (3.10) 5.38 (3.40) 
Thought 
Control/ 
Placebo 
 
 
223.19 (34.97) 5.88 (6.34) 8.25 (10.17) 12.38 (8.65) 4.94 (3.04) 6.44 (4.00) 
Thought 
Control/ 
Defusion 
 
 
220.44 (37.53) 8.38 (9.39) 5.38 (4.78) 12.13 (8.53) 5.69 (3.98) 5.81 (3.85) 
Placebo/ 
Defusion 
 
 
 
224.13 (27.34) 9.88 (7.21) 5.00 (4.73) 13.31 (7.01) 4.25 (2.86) 5.19 (2.81) 
Placebo/ 
Thought 
Control 
 
 
231.37 (27.71) 5.44 (4.35) 3.50 (5.49) 8.31 (6.45) 4.38 (3.22) 5.88 (3.18) 
Placebo/ 
Placebo 
 
 
 
234.13 (29.87) 6.56 (5.26) 4.44 (3.67) 8.81 (6.40) 5.44 (3.92) 4.81 (3.58) 
Note. ‘-’ indicates that no normative data is available. 
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 Discomfort Ratings 
 The mean discomfort ratings at Pre- and Post-Intervention for each condition are 
presented in Table 6. The majority of participants’ scores ranged between 50 and 60 on 
the scale, where 100 represented maximum discomfort. In all cases, except 
Placebo/Placebo, discomfort decreased from Pre- to Post-Intervention.  
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 Table 6 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Discomfort, Believability and Willingness Ratings 
at Pre- and Post-Intervention in Experiment 2 
Condition  
 
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention 
Discomfort Ratings   
Defusion/Defusion 67.50 (20.49) 43.75 (24.19) 
Defusion/Placebo 55.63 (28.74) 35.63 (28.98) 
Defusion/Thought Control 64.38 (21.28) 49.38 (24.07) 
Thought Control/Thought Control 58.13 (27.38) 45.63 (25.55) 
Thought Control/Placebo 56.88 (26.76) 48.13 (27.86) 
Thought Control/Defusion 56.25 (29.41) 43.75 (30.52) 
Placebo/Defusion 58.13 (23.73) 31.25 (24.46) 
Placebo/Thought Control 51.25 (28.02) 48.13 (24.28) 
Placebo/ Placebo 53.75 (24.19) 53.75 (26.55) 
 
Believability Ratings 
  
Defusion/Defusion 75.00 (15.06) 53.75 (24.18) 
Defusion/Placebo 61.25 (23.06) 59.38 (20.16) 
Defusion/Thought Control 64.38 (23.08) 50.63 (25.94) 
Thought Control/Thought Control 69.38 (28.86) 55.00 (23.66) 
Thought Control/Placebo 60.63 (24.62) 55.00 (23.38) 
Thought Control/Defusion 56.25 (24.73) 40.00 (27.80) 
Placebo/Defusion 75.63 (19.99)  51.88 (28.34) 
Placebo/Thought Control 68.75 (26.55) 56.25 (26.55) 
Placebo/Placebo 70.00 (20.98) 64.38 (27.32) 
 
Willingness Ratings 
  
Defusion/Defusion 58.75 (34.42) 60.63 (25.68) 
Defusion/Placebo 53.75 (30.74) 47.50 (22.36) 
Defusion/Thought Control 63.13 (19.57) 50.00 (27.81) 
Thought Control/Thought Control 58.13 (27.62) 55.00 (29.21) 
Thought Control/Placebo 48.75 (30.08) 51.88 (29.49) 
Thought Control/Defusion 55.00 (23.38) 50.00 (31.83) 
Placebo/Defusion 56.25 (26.80) 60.00 (29.21) 
Placebo/Thought Control 58.13 (22.28) 56.25 (23.91) 
Placebo/Placebo 60.63 (31.93) 56.25 (31.38) 
 
A 9x2 mixed-between-within ANOVA was conducted on the discomfort ratings 
with condition as the between participant variable and time (Pre- and Post-Intervention) 
as the within participant variable. Time proved to be significant [F (1, 135) = 61.84, p < 
.001, p2 = .31], but condition did not (p = .87). However, the interaction effect was also 
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 significant [F (8, 135) = 2.98, p = .004, p2  = .15]. To further investigate this, nine 
separate paired-samples t-tests were conducted (one per condition), within a more 
stringent significance level (p = .01) to compensate for the one-tailed prediction of the 
hypotheses and the multiple comparisons within the dataset. Only four conditions 
demonstrated a significant decrease in discomfort with large effect sizes: 
Placebo/Defusion [t (15) = 5.70, p < .001, 2 = .68]; Defusion/Placebo [t (15) = 4.57, p < 
.001, 2 = .58]; Defusion/Defusion [t (15) = 4.34, p = .001, 2 = .56]; and Thought 
Control/Thought Control [t (15) = 3.02, p = .009, 2 = .38] -- all remaining ps > .01. 
Defusion, therefore, as matched and unmatched components, significantly decreased 
discomfort, but Thought Control did so only when matched. The lack of effect for 
Placebo/Placebo (p = 1.0) suggested that the observed differences could not be attributed 
to the passing of time per se.    
 
Believability Ratings 
The mean believability ratings suggested an overall decrease in levels of 
believability from Pre- to Post-Intervention (see Table 6). The majority of participants’ 
scores ranged between 50 and 70 on the scale, where 100 represented maximum 
believability. The 9x2 ANOVA revealed that time was significant [F (1, 135) = 65.55, p 
< .001, p2 = .33], but condition was not (p = .46). The interaction effect was also 
significant [F (8, 135) = 2.39, p = .02, p2 = .13]. A series of paired-samples t-tests 
indicated significant decreases in believability with large effect sizes for four conditions: 
Placebo/Defusion [t (15) = 4.41, p = .001, 2 = .56]; Defusion/Defusion [t (15) = 3.94, p 
= .001, 2 = .51]; Defusion/Thought Control [t (15) = 2.96, p = .01, 2 = .37]; and 
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 Thought Control/Defusion [t (15) = 2.93, p = .01, 2 = .36] -- all remaining ps > .01. 
Defusion, therefore, presented as matched, mismatched and as an unmatched exercise 
was associated with significant decreases in believability. Unlike the discomfort ratings, 
Thought Control was only associated with decreased believability when paired with 
Defusion. Again, Placebo/Placebo (p = .13) had no effect.  
 
Willingness Ratings 
The willingness ratings overall showed a pattern of little and unsystematic change 
(see Table 6). The majority of participants’ scores ranged between 50 and 60 on the scale, 
where 100 represented maximum willingness. A further 9x2 ANOVA revealed that 
neither time nor condition produced significant main effects, nor did they interact (all ps 
> .19).  
 
Adherence Measures  
Honesty Ratings. High ratings were generally obtained on the Honesty Scale (for 
the nine conditions overall: M = 87.54, SD = 14.64, where 100 represents maximum 
honesty), and a one-way between groups ANOVA indicated no significant difference 
across conditions (p = .41). In other words, participants were generally honest in 
reporting their reactions to their negative thoughts and all groups did so with equal 
honesty.  
Difficulty Ratings. In general, participants did not appear to experience difficulty 
following the instructions (nine conditions: M = 29.58, SD = 26.65, where 100 represents 
maximum difficulty). However, a one-way between groups ANOVA revealed a 
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 significant main effect for condition [F (8, 135) = 3.05, p = .004, p2 = .15]. Post-hoc 
tests indicated that Thought Control/Thought Control generated significantly higher 
difficulty ratings (M = 50.63, SD = 28.63) than: Defusion/Defusion (M = 18.13, SD = 
25.62, p = .01); Defusion/Placebo (M = 18.75, SD = 22.77, p = .01); Placebo/Placebo (M 
= 20.63, SD = 24.07, p = .03); and Placebo/Defusion (M = 21.25, SD = 22.17, p = .03). In 
spite of these differences, combinations between thought control in unmatched and 
mismatched conditions did not significantly differ from conditions that did not contain a 
thought control element, thus, it remains possible that the increased difficulty associated 
with Thought Control/Thought Control resulted from the participants in this group, rather 
than from the instruction per se.    
Daily Use Ratings. Overall, participants (excluding those in Placebo exercises) 
did not appear to use the instructions as a daily coping strategy (six conditions: M = 
21.56, SD = 26.49, where 100 represents always using this coping strategy). Interestingly 
again, a one-way between groups ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
condition [F (5, 90) = 4.43, p = .001, p2 = .20.]. Post-hoc tests indicated that participants 
in Thought Control/Thought Control were significantly more familiar with the target 
strategy (M = 36.87, SD = 31.14) than both Defusion/Defusion (M = 10.0, SD = 12.11, 
p=.03) and Placebo/Defusion (M = 8.13, SD = 14.71, p=.02). Participants in 
Placebo/Thought Control were also significantly more familiar with their strategy (M = 
35.0, SD = 25.82) than Placebo/Defusion (M = 8.13, SD = 14.71, p = .03). Participants, 
therefore, were generally more familiar with the use of thought control as a daily coping 
strategy than with defusion. However, daily use ratings of the strategies presented here 
were relatively low across all six conditions.  
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 DISCUSSION 
 
The results for Experiment 2 showed some similarities with the outcomes 
reported in Experiment 1 and in the research by Masuda et al. (2004). Specifically, all 
three studies revealed that defusion was associated with significant decreases in the 
discomfort of negative self-referential thoughts. In comparisons between defusion, 
thought control and placebo, as well as between instructions and exercises, the current 
data indicated that the greatest decreases in discomfort were observed when defusion was 
presented as a matched component (i.e. defusion rationale plus exercise) and as an 
unmatched component (i.e. defusion rationale or exercise alone). Overall, Placebo was 
not associated with decreased discomfort, neither was Thought Control on the whole, 
with the exception of the matched condition containing both a thought control rationale 
and exercise. 
Defusion also decreased levels of believability associated with the negative self-
referent when presented as both rationale and exercise and in almost any combination of 
components. In this regard, the findings were consistent with Masuda et al.’s (2004) 
research, but not Experiment 1. In contrast, Thought Control only significantly decreased 
believability when presented with defusion, but not as an unmatched or matched 
component. We recorded no changes in believability for Placebo. To our surprise, 
Defusion had little or no impact on participants’ willingness to experience their negative 
self-referents. This was inconsistent with Experiment 1, where willingness increased. 
Masuda et al. did not include measures of willingness, so it was impossible to make 
comparisons in this regard.  
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 Summary of Experiments 1 and 2 
 Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the impact of defusion on self-reported changes 
in discomfort, believability and willingness; attempted to determine the relative utility of 
defusion exercises versus defusion instructions; and compared defusion with alternative 
strategies for dealing with negative self-relevant content. Taken together, the results from 
both studies indicated that defusion exercises significantly decreased the emotional 
impact of negative self-referents, with reduced effects recorded for defusion instructions.  
Experiments 1 and 2 offered a number of advantages over previously published 
research. For example, Masuda et al. (2004) did not investigate the impact of defusion on 
willingness and did not use an experimental design that enabled them to determine the 
relative impact of defusion exercise versus instruction. In addition, each study here 
incorporated a range of control measures designed to reduce the effect of experimental 
demand. For example, unlike Masuda et al. where the experimenter delivered the 
interventions, the experimenter in the current experimental work had minimum contact 
with participants, with the interventions delivered in an automated format. Furthermore, 
the experiments presented here also provided a more in-depth look at the impact of 
defusion on different types of psychological content, as well as providing some insight 
into the impact of defusion relative to a specific thought control exercise. Taken together 
therefore, Experiments 1 and 2 appear to make a sound contribution to the very limited 
existing research database on defusion. 
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The Forthcoming Research 
In spite of its potential contribution to the field, a number of unexpected findings 
and conflicting evidence across studies raised additional questions about defusion and 
how it might be investigated. For example, willingness increased in Experiment 1 but not 
in Experiment 2. In Masuda et al. (2004), defusion instructions alone had no impact on 
the emotional ratings, but in Experiment 2 here defusion instructions decreased 
discomfort. A further disparity arose regarding the impact of thought control instructions, 
with Masuda reporting a significant decrease in believability but Experiment 2 reporting 
no such effect. Furthermore, in both the Masuda study and in Experiment 2, defusion was 
associated with decreases in believability but in Experiment 1 here, defusion was 
associated with increased believability.  
Although there were likely a number of specific variables that contributed to these 
differences (e.g. demand characteristics), it was equally possible that more generic issues 
pertaining to the self-report measures themselves were an important variable. And 
indeed, numerous researchers have argued against reliance on direct self-report measures 
in psychological research, particularly when complex human verbal behaviour is being 
investigated. In Part II of the doctoral research, we began to investigate this possibility by 
examining the relationship between implicit measures and defusion.   
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Chapter 4 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 
 
Developing an Implicit Measure of Reactions to Positive and 
Negative Self-Relevant Words using the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introspective and self-report measures (e.g. questionnaires, interviews, etc.) 
have traditionally been the centrepiece of clinical research and date as far back as 
Titchener’s work in the early 1900’s. The basic assumption is that at some level all 
individuals have direct and accurate insight into their inner experiences, sensations or 
thoughts and report these accurately and honestly (Gaillard, Vandenberghe, 
Destrebecqz, & Cleeremans, 2006). But, there are a number of long-standing generic 
concerns with these types of assessment tools that are summarised below.  
 
(1) Individuals lack insight into their own private events 
Empirical evidence has highlighted discrepancies between individuals’ 
introspective accounts of their behaviour and actual behaviour (Nisbett, & Wilson, 
1977; Pronin, & Krugler, 2007). In the behavioural tradition, for example, Skinner 
argued that the discrepancy resulted from the fact that it is inherently difficult for the 
verbal community to shape how individuals report their inner experiences and 
 strongly cautioned against the assumption of a causal role of mental events on overt 
behaviour. In attempts to circumvent these difficulties, behavioural researchers 
commonly limited experimental response options to yes/no dichotomous responding 
and simple button presses (Gaillard et al., 2006; Nahmias, 2002). 
The concept of experiential avoidance suggests that individuals high in 
avoidance would have difficulty accessing and describing their own private events, 
particularly those perceived by the individual as problematic or uncomfortable (Plumb 
et al., 2004). This may be particularly relevant in attempts to measure defusion, where 
the targets of defusion are the very experiences that one has chosen to avoid. To 
overcome these difficulties, clinical researchers have argued for the inclusion of both 
explicit and behavioural measures in the assessment of psychological avoidance 
(Gratz et al., 2007; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2004).   
 
2) Individuals may be influenced by the demand characteristics of an experiment 
Experimental demand characteristics potentially influence all research 
interactions with participants, but may be particularly influential on explicit 
methodologies where individuals interact with, or are required to answer, questions 
directly. For example, pain researchers have reported that male participants report 
lower subjective levels of pain in the presence of a female versus male experimenter 
despite no such differences recorded on heart rate or skin conductance measures 
(Aslaksen, Myrbakk, Høifødt, & Flaten, 2007). 
When presented with a series of measures across a number of experimental 
phases (e.g. Pre- and Post-Intervention), researchers have also reported attempts by 
participants to unwittingly appear consistent in their responses across time (Field, & 
Lawson, 2003). For example, at post-intervention assessments participants may be 
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 able to recall some of their previous responses and try to produce responses of a 
similar nature. On the contrary, it is equally possible that changes in measures across 
time reflect the fact that participants have simply forgotten what they were asked 
previously.  
 
3) Individuals may try to conceal the true nature of their psychological events 
Self-presentation bias is perhaps the most notable weakness of self-report 
methodologies and potentially affects a range of experimental procedures (Greenwald 
et al., 2002). For example, participants may simply try to determine the aim of an 
experiment and thus respond in a manner that is consistent with what think they are 
supposed to do, rather that responding on the basis of what they actually experience. 
Indeed, the ‘Hello-Goodbye’ effect is considered to be particularly problematic in 
clinical settings, when self-report is used to assess patients before and after treatment 
(de Jong, Passman, Kindt, & van den Hout, 2001). 
 In what is perhaps a more explicit form of concealment, self-presentation bias 
reflects attempts to hide an individual’s true private events from the public domain 
(de Jong, 2002; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Teachman, Gregg, & 
Woody, 2001). This appears to arise from evaluation apprehension (e.g. Rosenberg, 
1969) or impression management (e.g. Leary, & Kowalski, 1990), both of which are 
particularly relevant in the context of emotionally sensitive material. For example, in 
studies investigating explicit ratings of the self, many respondents fail to admit to 
having any negative feelings about themselves at all (Paulhaus, 1991) -- a feature of 
human nature which seems highly unlikely even from those with strong positive self-
regard. 
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 Implicit Methodologies and Cognitions 
A number of methodologies have been specifically designed to circumvent the 
weaknesses associated with explicit measures. These include: affective priming 
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986); the emotional Stroop Task (Williams, 
Mathews, & McCleod, 1996); the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT: Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2001); the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST: de Houwer, 2003); the 
Name Letter Preference Task (Nuttin, 1987); and the Implicit Association Test (IAT: 
Greenwald et al., 1998).  
The range of measures above is commonly referred to as implicit 
methodologies, based on a working distinction between explicit and implicit 
cognition. Explicit cognition is considered to be subjective in nature and is assessed 
using direct self-report methodologies. In contrast, implicit cognition is thought to be 
unavailable to self-report and is instead considered to be objective in nature and 
assessed using indirect or implicit methodologies (Greenwald, 1990). The concept of 
implicit cognition naturally encompasses the assumption that these events are 
unconscious and perhaps automatic in nature (Greenwald et al., 1998). Because there 
is no clear distinction between implicit cognitions and implicit beliefs or attitudes, the 
term attitude is most commonly used, and Greenwald and Banaji (1995) defined an 
implicit attitude as:  
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience 
that mediate favourable or unfavourable feeling, thought, or action toward social 
objects” (p.8).   
 
The IAT is undoubtedly the most well established and widely used implicit 
methodology, with over 250 published articles since 1998 (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Sriram, 2006). This measure is considered to have better psychometric properties than 
any other latency-based measure in terms of split-half reliability, internal consistency 
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 and test-retest reliability (Greenwald, & Nosek, 2001; Schmukle, & Egloff, 2004). 
The measure also appears to be relatively insensitive to explicit faking (e.g. Banse, 
Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Fiedler, & Bluemke, 2005).  
The rationale behind the IAT is that it should be easier to map two concepts 
onto a single response when the concepts are familiar, rather than unfamiliar, in 
memory. In the seminal IAT study, Greenwald et al. (1998) presented participants 
with names of flowers (e.g. TULIP), names of insects (e.g. SPIDER), pleasant words 
(e.g. LOVE) and unpleasant words (e.g. UGLY). They naturally assumed that 
participants would respond more quickly to consistent associations such as pairing the 
concept “flower” with pleasant words and “insect” with unpleasant words, because 
both types of associations are consistent with the verbal culture. In contrast, they 
assumed it would take participants longer to make inconsistent associations such as 
pairing “flowers” with unpleasant words and “insects” with pleasant words. As a 
latency-based measure, the IAT assesses the strength of the target concept-attribute 
associations, with the assumption that consistent responding will be superior (i.e. 
faster) to inconsistent responding – known as the IAT effect. As expected, the results 
from Greenwald et al. supported this assumption.  
Of course, the success of the IAT extends much beyond simple associations 
such as pairing flowers with pleasant words and insects with unpleasant words. 
Indeed, IAT effects have been reported on a wide range of social and clinical 
phenomena, including aspects of: developmental psychology (Baron, & Banaji, 
2006); neuroscience (Cunningham et al., 2004); and health psychology (Teachman, 
Gapinski, Brownell, Rawlins, & Jeyaram, 2003) amongst others.    
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 Concordance between Implicit and Explicit Attitudes 
 There is mixed evidence in terms of published correlations between explicit 
and implicit measures. Across a series of studies, Nosek and Smyth (2007) measured 
implicit and explicit preferences for more than 50 evaluative domains and reported 
implicit-explicit correlations that ranged from weak and positive (<.2) to strong and 
positive (>.75), with an overall average positive correlation of .48. Other meta-
analyses of correlations, however, have reported weaker outputs. For example, Nosek 
(2005) reported correlations of .36 and others have reported correlations as low as .24 
(Hofman, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005).   
 A number of accounts have been offered in response to these discrepancies. 
(1) Some researchers have argued that the discrepancy results from problems 
associated with explicit measures, especially where the target attitudes are those 
which individuals would wish to conceal (e.g. Greenwald, & Banaji, 1995). (2) 
Considerable differences across the two types of methodology have also been 
highlighted. Specifically, implicit measures are completed under time pressure 
without opportunity to deliberate (Nosek, 2007). However, when motivation and 
opportunity to conceal are relatively high, explicit-implicit correlations will be low 
(Fazio, & Olsen, 2003). Hence, discrepancies are particularly large in the context of 
socially sensitivity or personally relevant attitudes. (3) Other researchers have argued 
that the two measures are unrelated and as such are not measuring the same events, 
but rather reflect the workings of a dual-processing model of human cognition, in 
which implicit and explicit cognitions are conceptualised as two distinct constructs 
(Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).   
 The discordance between explicit and implicit measures has also led 
researchers to question which, if any, is a better predictor of overt behaviour. 
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 Although there is some evidence that each predicts overt responding to some extent, it 
has also been suggested that the different measures correlate with different types of 
behaviour. Specifically, explicit attitudes are considered to predict deliberate 
behaviour, while implicit attitudes predict spontaneous behaviour (Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006; McConnell, & 
Leibold, 2001). 
 
The IAT as a Measure of Implicit Self Regard  
 Many of the issues discussed above are pertinent to the potential use of the 
IAT in clinical research. For example, would clinical interventions have a greater 
influence over explicit or implicit attitudes and which would be more closely 
associated with subsequent changes in overt behaviour? The personal and social 
sensitivities of clinical research also highlight the potential limitations of relying 
solely on explicit methodologies, but this very fact makes it difficult to determine 
what size of explicit-implicit correlations one would expect.  
One area of personally relevant events that is of clinical significance and that 
has attracted considerable IAT interest is in the study of attitudes to the self. In one 
such study of self-esteem, Greenwald and Farnham (2000) assessed automatic 
associations of the self with positive versus negative attributes and, as expected, 
reported strong implicit self-positivity for typically-developing undergraduate 
students (with average to high explicit self-esteem). Interestingly, explicit-implicit 
correlations here were positive but weak. Bosson, Swann and Pennebaker (2000) 
provided one of the most extensive investigations into implicit self-esteem. 
Specifically, the researchers investigated correlations between seven different implicit 
measures of self-esteem (including the IAT) and a series of well-established explicit 
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 (self-report) measures. Unexpectedly, none of the implicit measures correlated 
positively with each other and correlated only weakly with the explicit measures.  
 More recently, Karpinski (2004) used the IAT as a measure of implicit self-
esteem in two separate studies. In Study 1, the self was juxtaposed with others, where 
the latter was either unspecified or specified as ‘close’ (e.g. best friend, boyfriend, 
etc.). Unexpectedly, a different pattern of implicit self-esteem emerged across the two 
contexts of others, with the unspecified other IAT producing significantly higher 
implicit self-esteem. In Study 2, Karpinski further investigated this effect by altering 
the valence of the ‘other’ (i.e. the stimuli used as a comparison to the self). 
Specifically, in one IAT the self was compared to a positive other (Santa Claus) and 
in another, the self was compared to a negative other (Adolph Hitler). Once again, a 
different pattern of implicit self-esteem emerged across the two contexts, with higher 
levels of implicit self-esteem reported in the context of Adolph Hitler. Taken together, 
the results of these two studies suggest that the content of the stimulus used as a 
comparison to the self has a considerable influence on implicit self-esteem. 
As a result, even a core concept such as self-regard appears to be highly 
sensitive to context. This outcome highlights the potential difficulties inherent in 
using implicit methodologies to study personally relevant psychological content that 
might be of clinical significance.   
  
Problems with the IAT  
A number of researchers have pointed to the possibility that some of the 
difficulties noted above (e.g. weak explicit-implicit correlations and the context 
susceptibility of implicit attitudes to self) may in fact pertain to the IAT directly as an 
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 implicit measure (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Consider the following quotation from 
de Houwer (2002):  
Greenwald et al. (1998) designed the IAT to assess the strength of associations 
between concepts in memory. One can argue that beliefs involve more than just 
associations between concepts. First, beliefs reflect qualified associations. For 
instance, the belief “I am a bad person” implies a special type of association between 
the concept “self” and the concept “bad”, namely a directional association which 
specifies that “bad” is a property or characteristic of “self”. IAT effects do not reflect 
the nature or directionality of an association between concepts, they can reflect only 
strength of association. Second, many beliefs involve several associations and 
several concepts. For instance, conditional beliefs such as “If I do not perform well 
on a task, then I am an inferior person” involve rather complex structures of qualified 
associations between several concepts. The IAT cannot be used to directly capture 
such complex conditional beliefs (also see de Jong et al., 2001, p. 111) . . . In sum, 
the IAT does not provide a measure of beliefs, nor was it designed to do so. It can 
only provide an index of associations that are assumed to be involved in certain 
beliefs and thus indirect evidence for the presence of certain beliefs (pp.117-118, 
emphases added). 
 
 
According to de Houwer, therefore, although the IAT may be a robust measure of 
implicit associations, the procedure does not target the directionality of associations 
that would be needed for one to fully understand what is being measured. According 
to Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006), this lack of specificity in the target associations 
affects all existing implicit methodologies. 
 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
The IRAP is a relatively new methodology that primarily attempts to 
overcome the lack of specificity in the measurement of implicit attitudes, when 
measured by existing procedures such as the IAT. Although the new procedure bears 
a strong resemblance to the IAT, it hails from the behavioural tradition, not normally 
concerned with the study of implicit cognition. However, this all makes more sense 
when one understands that the IRAP is driven by concepts and procedures that fall 
under the rubric of Relational Frame Theory (RFT) -- a modern behavioural and 
functional account of human language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2001). The central 
 101
 postulate of RFT is that higher-cognitive functioning is composed of relational acts, 
hence the IRAP explicitly targets stimulus relations rather than associations.  
The primary difference between the IAT and the IRAP is that in the latter the 
format of all trials is identical. Consider an example from one of the first published 
studies (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). In this IRAP, four words were presented 
simultaneously on screen. These included: a sample stimulus (the word PLEASANT 
or UNPLEASANT); a target word easily evaluated as positive or negative (e.g. LOVE 
or DEATH); and two relational terms (SIMILAR or OPPOSITE) that constituted 
response options. In order to respond, participants simply selected the response option 
that best described the relationship between the sample and the target stimuli (e.g. 
selecting SIMILAR in the combined presence of PLEASANT and LOVE). Similar to 
the IAT, the IRAP is comprised of consistent and inconsistent trials, where the former 
contain pre-existing congruent relationships, while the latter do not. In this case, 
therefore, the researchers predicted that participants would produce shorter response 
latencies on consistent trials in which they were required to co-ordinate positive 
words with PLEASANT and negative words with UNPLEASANT (e.g. PLEASANT-
LOVE-SIMILAR; PLEASANT-CANCER-OPPOSITE; UNPLEASANT-HOLIDAY-
OPPOSITE; and UNPLEASANT-JAIL-SIMILAR). On inconsistent trials, the 
opposite patterns of responding were required (e.g. PLEASANT-LOVE-OPPOSITE, 
etc.). Similar to the IAT, the superiority of consistent over inconsistent responding is 
referred to as the IRAP effect and Barnes-Holmes et al. reported several examples of 
such effects. 
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 IRAP and Clinical Phenomena 
 Recent empirical research has begun to suggest the utility of the IRAP as a 
measure of implicit attitudes to self and other clinically relevant phenomena. In 
Experiment 3 of the original research reported by Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006), the 
IRAP was used to assess differences in professional attitudes towards normally-
developing children and children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Three 
groups of professionals who differed in their levels of experience with children with 
ASD were assessed. One group had several years experience with children with ASD, 
another group had months of experience and the third group had no experience in this 
regard at all. All completed both the IRAP and the explicit Challenging Behaviours 
Attribution Scale (CHABA; Hastings, 1997). During the IRAP, the phrases 
AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDER and NORMALLY-DEVELOPING were 
presented as sample stimuli; positive words (e.g. GOOD) and negative words (e.g. 
DIFFICULT) were the target stimuli; and SIMILAR and OPPOSITE were the 
response options. In this case, shorter response latencies were predicted on consistent 
trials in which participants were required to co-ordinate positive words with normally-
developing and negative words with ASD. On inconsistent trials, the opposite patterns 
of responding were required (i.e. co-ordinate negative words with normally-
developing children and positive words with ASD).  
The results of this experiment indicated that all three groups showed an 
implicit bias in favour of normally-developing children and against children with 
ASD on the IRAP and no differences were recorded between the groups on this 
measure. In contrast, the groups differed significantly on the CHABA, with the most 
experienced group showing significantly more positive attitudes to children with ASD 
 103
 than the least experienced. Based on this discrepancy therefore, it was hardly 
surprising that the researchers reported poor explicit-implicit correlations.  
In the only publicly available research to date using the IRAP as a measure of 
implicit self-regard, Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes and Stewart (in press) 
compared the IRAP performances of undergraduate students relative to two groups of 
prisoners. The latter groups were divided according to the part of the prison in which 
they currently resided (i.e. Open Area versus Main Block). It was predicted that these 
three groups would differ in relation to levels of self-esteem, with undergraduate 
students categorised as having normal to high self-regard; prisoners in the Open Area 
categorised as having self-regard that was probably lower than undergraduates but 
higher than prisoners in the Main Block; and prisoners in the Main Block categorised 
as having the lowest self-regard. All participants completed both the IRAP and the 
explicit Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scales (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). During the IRAP, 
the words SIMILAR and OPPOSITE were presented as sample stimuli; positive 
words (e.g. GOOD) and negative words (e.g. BAD) were the target stimuli; and 
PARTICIPANT’S NAME and NOT PARTICIPANT’S NAME were the response 
options. In this case, shorter response latencies were predicted on consistent trials in 
which participants were required to co-ordinate positive words as similar to their own 
name and negative words as similar to the other response option (i.e. not participant’s 
name). On inconsistent trials, the opposite patterns of responding were required (i.e. 
co-ordinate negative words with their own name and positive words with ‘not their 
own name’). 
The results indicated that, as predicted, the three groups of participants were 
differentiated according to explicit self-esteem with undergraduates reporting the 
highest levels of explicit self-esteem on the RSES and prisoners in the Main Block the 
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 lowest. Interestingly however, the IRAP differentiated the Privileged Area prisoners 
and undergraduates from the Main Block area, but did not differentiate the former 
from each other. Moderate positive correlations were reported between the implicit 
and explicit measures. These findings go some way towards suggesting the possible 
utility of the IRAP as a measure of socially and personally sensitive implicit attitudes.  
 
The Current Research (Experiments 3, 4 and 5)  
  The basic aim of this part of the research program was to begin to incorporate 
the use of implicit measures into the experimental study of defusion, in an attempt to 
supplement the previous work that had relied heavily on self-report measures. 
However, given the complexities of the concept of defusion itself, the fact that it had 
only a very limited history as the subject of experimental scrutiny and that there was 
no history of using the IRAP in this context, the three studies reported in the current 
chapter were exploratory. Their primary aim was to begin to create an IRAP that 
would tap into implicit self-relevant content in a manner that would subsequently 
allow us to manipulate these implicit attitudes through defusion. In other words, we 
wanted to construct an IRAP where self-esteem might be low, thus allowing for 
improvement through a defusion intervention.  
In all cases, participants were undergraduate students who presented with 
average to high self-regard. Across the three studies, the primary IRAP manipulation 
centred on the sample stimuli. In Experiment 3, the samples were I AM versus I AM 
NOT; in Experiment 4 the samples were I AM versus OTHERS ARE; and in 
Experiment 5 the samples were IAM versus I SHOULD BE. All participants were 
also presented with a range of relevant explicit measures. 
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 EXPERIMENT 3 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Sixteen participants (all female) aged between 18 and 21 years (M = 20) 
comprised the final sample of Experiment 3. All were undergraduate students, 
recruited through Faculty announcements at NUIM. All had a high level of fluency in 
English and had normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision. No incentives of any kind 
were offered for participation. In addition to the 16 participants who completed the 
experiment, three participants failed to reach the required criteria in either the training 
or test phases of the IRAP, hence their data was excluded from further analyses.    
 
Setting 
 Experiment 3 was conducted in the Computer Laboratory of the Psychology 
Department at NUIM. Noise and distraction were kept to a minimum throughout and 
the experimenter remained in the room during all aspects of the study. During IRAP 
practice blocks, the Experimenter remained in close proximity to participants, but 
moved to a more distant location during other parts of the procedure. Several 
participants may have been present in the Laboratory at the same time, but were 
positioned some distance apart and no two commenced at the same time.  
 
Apparatus and Materials 
Psychological Measures. Participants were required to complete three 
psychological measures, including the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; 
Lovidbond, & Lovibond, 1995 -- see Appendix G and Chapter 3); the Rosenberg Self-
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 Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965 -- see Appendix I); and the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2008 -- see Appendix J).  
The DASS-21 is comprised of three self-report scales designed to measure 
negative emotional states associated with depression, anxiety and stress (see Chapter 
3). 
 The RSES is one of the most widely used self-report measures of global self-
esteem. It is a 10-item scale on which participants rate their agreement with each 
statement along four points, ranging from “1” (strongly agree) to “4” (strongly 
disagree). The scales contain five negatively reversed items. Total scores range from 
10 to 40, with higher scores representing higher levels of self-esteem and lower scores 
representing lower levels of self-esteem. The RSES generally has high reliability test-
retest correlations are typically in the range of .82 to .88 (Blascovich, & Tomaka, 
19993) and Cronbach's alpha value of .88 (Greenberger, Chen, Dmitrieva, & 
Farruggia, 2003). 
 The AAQ-II is a revised version of the AAQ-49, often referred to generically 
as a measure of experiential avoidance and psychological flexibility. The measure 
consists of 10 items on which participants rate the level of truth associated with each 
statement on a 7-point scale, ranging from “1” (never true) to “7” (always true). The 
scale contains seven negatively reversed items. Total scores range from 10 to 70, with 
high scores representing high levels of acceptance/low levels of avoidance and low 
scores representing low levels of acceptance/high levels of avoidance. The mean 
scores for a sample of university students is 50.72 (SD = 9.19). The alpha value of the 
AAQ-II is strong at .83, while the scales also possess good test-retest reliability: .80 
(at 3 months) and .78 (at 12 months -- Bond et al., 2008).    
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 IRAP-Related Response Scales. Participants also completed four IRAP-related 
Response Scales, designed to assess their explicit attitudes to the self-relevant stimuli 
that would be presented during the IRAP. All four Likert rating scales, therefore, 
measured participants’ explicit attitudes to the twelve target words -- six positive 
(KIND, CONFIDENT, TRUSTING, HONEST, SECURE and POPULAR) and six 
negative words (SELFISH, SELF-CONSCIOUS, JEALOUS, FAKE, INSECURE and 
LONELY -- see Appendix K). The negative words were selected from Experiment 2 
as the six most frequently occurring uncomfortable words that had been generated by 
participants. The positive words were simply selected as opposites. One of the four 
scales assessed participants’ feelings towards each of the target words; a second 
assessed levels of discomfort associated with the words; a third assessed levels of 
believability associated with the words; and the fourth assessed levels of willingness 
in terms of thinking about the words. Each scale ranged from 1 (extremely negative, 
extremely uncomfortable, extremely believable and extremely unwilling) to 7 
(extremely positive, extremely comfortable, extremely unbelievable and extremely 
willing). Participants indicated their preferred choice by circling the corresponding 
number on each of the individual rating scales. 
IRAP. Participants completed all IRAP trials on a Dell personal computer with 
a colour monitor, Intel Pentium 4 processor and Windows XP operating system. The 
computer program was written in Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 and presented all 
instructions and stimuli relating to the IRAP trials, and recorded participant responses.  
The stimuli presented by the IRAP in Experiment 3 consisted entirely of 
groups of words. The sample stimuli consisted of two phrases: I AM and I AM NOT. 
The target stimuli were all single nouns. Six had positive connotations (KIND, 
CONFIDENT, TRUSTING, HONEST, SECURE and POPULAR) and six had 
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 negative connotations (SELFISH, SELF-CONSCIOUS, JEALOUS, FAKE, 
INSECURE and LONELY). The two response options consisted of the relational 
terms TRUE and FALSE. The stimulus arrangements for the IRAP are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 3 
Sample Stimulus 1 
I AM 
Sample Stimulus 2 
I AM NOT 
Response Option consistent with Sample 1 
TRUE 
Response Option consistent with Sample 2 
FALSE 
Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 1 Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 2 
KIND 
CONFIDENT 
TRUSTING 
HONEST 
SECURE 
POPULAR 
SELFISH 
SELF-CONSCIOUS 
JEALOUS 
FAKE 
INSECURE 
LONELY 
 
 
Experimental Overview   
 Each participant completed all three experimental phases in the same order. 
During Phase 1, they completed the three psychological measures (the DASS-21, the 
RSES and the AAQ-II), as well as the four IRAP-related Response Scales. Phase 2 
comprised of the IRAP. In Phase 3, participants received a second exposure to the 
IRAP-related Response Scales.  
 
Ethical Issues 
In order to conduct the study according to all of the appropriate ethical 
guidelines as identified by The Psychological Society of Ireland (2003), a number of 
specific measures were put in place. These were consistent with those outlined 
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 previously for Experiment 1, with only minor adjustments necessary to facilitate the 
change in methodologies to tailor instructions to the current experiment.   
 
Procedure  
Phase 1: Pre-Experimental Measures. Participants were individually 
presented with two questionnaire booklets in written format. The first booklet 
contained the DASS-21, the RSES and the AAQ-II. The second booklet contained the 
four IRAP-Related Response Scales.  
 Phase 2: The IRAP. The IRAP program commenced with a series of 
automated ethical guidelines and instructions as follows: 
Our research investigates cognitive processes that are used in decisions that 
involve memory. We are seeking to develop and test theories of cognitive 
processes that occur inside and outside of awareness in the routine use of 
memory.  
 
Stimuli will be presented on this display screen and your responses will be 
entered on the keyboard. 
 
The research assumes that you can read English fluently and that your vision is 
normal or corrected-to-normal. If you do not consider yourself fluent in English, 
or if your vision is not normal or corrected-to-normal and ESPECIALLY IF 
YOU ARE HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY READING THIS DESCRIPTION, 
please ask the Experimenter now whether or not you should continue.  
 
Your identity as a participant is confidential. Further, you are free to discontinue 
participation at any time, without penalty. In keeping with standard practice, 
your data may be retained for 5 years or so, during which time only the 
investigators on this or successor projects will have access to them.  
 
PLEASE NOW READ THE STATEMENT BELOW, WHERE YOU WILL BE 
ASKED TO RESPOND TO A STANDARD INFORMED CONSENT 
QUESTION.  
 
I have read the description of the procedure. I understand that the questions I 
may have about this research will be answered by Professor Barnes-Holmes or 
one of the other researchers working on this project. 
 
If you consent to participate in the research that has been described on the 
preceding display pages you should now read the Instructions for the sorting 
tasks below. 
 
[INSTRUCTION: If you wish to ask any questions first, alert the experimenter 
now. IF YOU WISH NOT TO PROCEED, you should inform the experimenter]. 
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 Once participants had read this information and consented to continue with 
the experiment, further instructions for task completion were presented with 
illustrated on-screen examples as follows: 
Shown below are illustrations of the four different types of task that will be 
presented repeatedly in this part of the experiment. To help you understand the 
tasks, each of the four illustrations is explained immediately underneath. Please 
examine each illustration and then read carefully the explanation attached to it. 
Please make sure that you understand each task before continuing with the 
experiment. 
 
IMPORTANT: From trial to trial the positioning of the response options 
(True and False) will vary randomly between left and right. NOTE: During 
the experiment a range of other words apart from “Kind” and “Selfish” will 
also be presented. 
 
REMEMBER: From trial to trial the positioning of the response options 
(True and False) will vary randomly between left and right. 
 
For illustrative purposes, one (of a possible four) on-screen examples is presented in 
Figure 3.  
 
I am 
 
 
kind 
 
 
Press ‘d’ for         Press ‘k’ for  
True                          False 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An example of the on-screen illustrations presented to participants in Experiment 3. 
 
An explanation accompanied each of the four illustrations in order to ensure that 
participants understood the appropriate responses that were required. For example, the 
explanation for the illustration shown in Figure 3 read as follows: 
If you select “True” by pressing the ‘D’ key, you are stating that “I am kind.” 
If you select “False” by pressing the ‘K’ key, you are stating that “I am NOT 
kind.” 
 
Thus, participants were required to determine whether the relationship between I AM 
and KIND is TRUE or FALSE and to select the correct response key accordingly (‘d’ 
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 for TRUE and ‘k’ for FALSE). Immediately after this, the following automated 
instructions were presented: 
During the experiment you will be asked to respond as quickly and 
accurately as you can across all trials.  
 
The relating tasks will be presented in short sessions that are separated by the 
appearance of instructions on the computer screen. You can take a short break if 
you like while the instructions are on on-screen.  
 
During each short session the relating task follows one general rule. An incorrect 
response on any trial is signalled by the appearance of a red ‘X’ in the centre of 
the screen.  To remove the red ‘X’ and move on to the next trial please press the 
correct response key quickly.  
 
After each session, further instructions will appear and they will tell you that the 
general rule that applied in the previous session is now completely reversed. 
Please pay close attention to these instructions and do your best to follow them. 
 
So, just to clarify, there will be only two general relating rules and so the first 
thing you should do at the beginning of each session is to discover the rule by 
using the feedback you get in the form of the red ‘X’. It is very important to 
understand that sometimes you will be required to respond to the tasks in a way 
that agrees with what you believe and at other times you will be required to 
respond in a way that disagrees with what you believe. This is part of the 
experiment. 
 
The first two sessions are for practice only and these are repeated until you 
respond accurately on at least 80% of the relating trials and respond faster, on 
average, than 3000 milliseconds (i.e. 3 seconds). When you complete the 
practice phase, the test-phase will then start. Remember, you should try to make 
your responses as accurately and quickly as possible.  
 
 
This point in the procedure marked the beginning of the automated practice 
IRAP trials. Each trial was presented as a single screen and the format of all trials was 
identical. On each trial, one sample stimulus, one target stimulus and the two response 
options were presented simultaneously on-screen. The sample (I AM or I AM NOT) 
appeared at the top of the screen, with the target stimulus in the centre below and the 
two relational terms at the bottom left- and right-hand corners (see Figure 3). On all 
trials, the response option on the left was accompanied by the instruction “Press ‘d’ 
for” and the response option on the right by the instruction “Press ‘k’ for”, so that the 
location of each matched the relevant keys on the left- and right-hand side of the 
keyboard. Although the response instructions always remained in the same locations 
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 on screen in order to match the keys on the keyboard, the relational terms (TRUE and 
FALSE) alternated in location between the trials in a random order (i.e. sometimes ‘d’ 
was associated with TRUE, other times with FALSE). 
Feedback. Throughout the IRAP, feedback on incorrect responding was 
presented in the form of a red ‘X’ that appeared in the centre of the screen under the 
target word. Participants were prevented from continuing to the next trial until they 
provided a correct response and the ‘X’ remained on-screen until this occurred. 
Correct responding was not consequated by feedback, but was followed by a clear 
screen for 400ms. before the next trial appeared.  
Consistent versus Inconsistent Responding. The IRAP systematically 
juxtaposes consistent versus inconsistent trials. In the case of this IRAP, trials denoted 
as consistent comprised of associating the self (I AM) with positive words and not-
the-self (I AM NOT) with negative words. During consistent trials, therefore, correct 
responding involved the following, for example: I AM-HONEST-TRUE; I AM-
SELFISH-FALSE; I AM NOT-SELFISH-TRUE; I AM NOT-HONEST-FALSE and 
incorrect responding involved I AM-SELFISH-TRUE, etc. In contrast, during the 
inconsistent trials, correct responding involved, for example, I AM-HONEST-
FALSE; I AM-SELFISH-TRUE; I AM NOT-SELFISH-FALSE; I AM NOT-
HONEST-TRUE and incorrect responding involved I AM-SELFISH-FALSE, etc.  
Trial-types. The current IRAP consisted of four basic trial-types: I AM-
Positive; I AM-Negative; I AM NOT-Positive; and I AM NOT-Negative (see Figure 
4). Within each block of 24 trials, the sample I AM was presented on 12 trials with I 
AM NOT presented on the other 12. The presentation of sample stimuli was 
randomised throughout each block. In the presence of each sample, each of the twelve 
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 target words (six positive and six negative) appeared twice. The locations of TRUE 
and FALSE were randomised across trials. 
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Figure 4. Examples of the four IRAP trial-types used in Experiment 3. The superimposed arrows with 
text boxes indicate the responses deemed consistent or inconsistent, but these boxes and arrows did not 
appear on screen during the experiment. 
 
 IRAP Sequence. The IRAP sequence consisted of a minimum of two 
practice blocks always followed by six test blocks. Practice and test blocks were 
identical in format but the short instruction that preceded a practice block was “This is 
a practice - errors are expected”, while the instruction “This is a test - go fast, 
making a few errors is ok” preceded test blocks. Each block consisted of either 
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 consistent or inconsistent trials only and the sequence always comprised of alternating 
blocks (consistent then inconsistent or vice versa). Thus, if a participant was exposed 
to a consistent block first, the next block was inconsistent, followed by a consistent 
block, and so on. In the current experiment, half of the participants were exposed to a 
consistent block first (referred to as consistent-first) and the other half were exposed 
to an inconsistent block first (referred to as inconsistent-first). 
 Practice Trials. All participants completed a minimum of two practice 
blocks (one consistent and one inconsistent). They were required to achieve an 
accuracy criterion of 80% correct and a response latency of 3000ms. -- failure to do 
so meant that the participant was immediately exposed to a second pair of practice 
blocks. Failure across four pairs of practice blocks resulted in termination of 
participation in the study. However, if criterion during the practice blocks was 
reached, participants continued to the test blocks. There were six test blocks in total 
(three of which were consistent trials and three were inconsistent trials). Participants 
were not made explicitly aware of the alternating block sequence or the terms 
“consistent” and “inconsistent”. They were, however, provided with a brief 
instruction at the beginning of each block which emphasised that the responding 
required for the pending block was opposite to that from the previous block:  
Important. During the next phase, the previously correct and incorrect answers are 
reversed. This is part of the experiment. Please try to make as few errors as 
possible. In other words, avoid the red X.   
  
At the end of each block of trials, participants were presented with a summary 
of their performances during the previous block in terms of accuracy percentage and 
mean response latency. Participants were permitted to pause between blocks and 
pressed the space bar when they were ready to proceed to the next block. Following 
completion of the last test block, participants were presented with the following 
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 instruction: “Thank you. This is the end of the sorting task. Please report to the 
experimenter.”  
Phase 3: Post-experimental Measures. Following completion of the IRAP, 
participants were presented with another questionnaire booklet in written format. This 
contained four IRAP-related Response Scales and was identical to that presented 
previously in Phase 1.  
Participants were thanked for their co-operation and time. They were then 
appropriately debriefed about the research and invited to ask any questions. Although 
made available to them, no participants opted for short breaks at any point. All 
participants completed the study in a single experimental session that lasted between 
20 and 30mins. in total. 
 
RESULTS 
 
IRAP Analysis  
The IRAP program automatically records accuracy levels and response 
latencies for all trials. Accuracy was defined in terms of the first response emitted on a 
trial (and thus incorporates a correction procedure for incorrect responding). Accuracy 
data were not incorporated into the analyses but were employed as a screening 
procedure to exclude participants who failed to achieve a criterion of 80% accuracy at 
any point. The data presented here represents sixteen females who successfully met 
the criteria outlined above.  
DIRAP–algorithm Data. The primary datum used in the current analyses was 
response latency defined as the time in milliseconds that elapsed between the onset of 
the trial and a correct response emitted by a participant. The response latency data for 
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 each participant were transformed into DIRAP scores (Cullen, & Barnes-Holmes, in 
press) using an adaptation of the Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003) D-algorithm. 
The steps involved in calculating the DIRAP scores were as follows: (1) only response 
latency data from the six test blocks were used; (2) latencies above 10,000ms. were 
removed from the dataset; (3) if the data from a participant contained more than 10% 
of test block trials with latencies less than 300ms. that participant was removed from 
the analyses; (4) twelve standard deviations for the four trial-types were calculated: 
four for the response-latencies from test blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies from 
test blocks 3 and 4 and a further four from test blocks 5 and 6; (5) 24 mean latencies 
were then calculated for the four trial-types in each test block; (6) difference scores 
for each of the four trial-types were calculated, for each pair of test blocks; (7) each 
difference score was then divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, 
yielding 12 DIRAP scores -- one score for each trial-type for each pair of test blocks; 
(8) four overall trial-type DIRAP scores were calculated by averaging the three scores 
for each trial-type across the three pairs of test blocks; (9) two D-IRAP scores, one for 
Pro-Me and one for Anti-Me, were then calculated by averaging the two I AM and 
then the two I AM NOT trial-type scores, respectively; (10) an overall DIRAP score 
was also calculated by averaging all 12 trial-type scores from step 7. 
The DIRAP-algorithm can be used without regard to trial-types to calculate a 
single DIRAP statistic for each participant as above, or alternatively it can be used with 
data segregated according to trial-type to produce two DIRAP statistics for each 
participant -- one for Pro-Me trial-types and one for Anti-Me trial-types. The section 
below contains analyses involving DIRAP-(trial-type) data, rather than a single D score. The 
latter, however, will be employed in subsequent comparisons between the implicit and 
explicit measures.  
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 Figure 5 presents the mean DIRAP scores on the pairs referred to as Pro-Me (I 
AM-Positive and I AM-Negative trial-types combined) and Anti-Me (I AM NOT-
Positive and I AM NOT-Negative). The data indicated that participants showed a 
strong implicit bias towards the self, with little or no opinion with regards to what 
they are not. 
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Figure 5.The mean DIRAP-(trial-type) scores and standard error bars for the sample stimuli in Experiment 3. 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a large significant main 
effect for trial-type [F (1, 15) = 17.04, p = .0009, p2 = .53], indicating a difference 
between the Pro-Me and the Anti-Me trial-types. Two one sample t-tests indicated 
that the I AM trial-types differed significantly from zero, t (31) = 3.68, p = .0009, 2 
= .47, but as expected I AM NOT was non-significant (p = .95). Overall therefore, the 
IRAP indicated that participants had strong positive implicit self-regard, but had no 
strong opinions with regard to what they were not. Put simply, the positive self-regard 
did not imply that they had to confirm that they were not negative. 
Explicit Measures  
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 Psychological Measures. The means scores for each of the DASS-21 sub-
scales fell within the normal range: Depression (M = 7.88, SD = 5.44; Norm < 9); 
Anxiety (M = 6.38, SD = 7.49; Norm < 7); Stress (M = 13.75, SD = 9.66; Norm < 14). 
As expected, participants also produced high RSES scores (M = 21.88, SD = 4.76), 
indicating high levels of self-esteem, as well as high AAQ-II scores (M = 49.75, SD = 
9.0; Norm = 50.72 (SD = 9.19), indicating high levels of psychological flexibility 
(high acceptance/low avoidance). 
Four IRAP-Related Response Scales. Mean scores (and standard deviations) 
for Pre- and Post-IRAP ratings for the positive and negative IRAP words are 
presented in Table 8. Participants overall rated the negative words as more negative, 
more uncomfortable and more unbelievable (i.e. less believable), and they were more 
unwilling to experience them, relative to the positive words. Although there were 
some apparent changes on these scales from Pre- to Post-IRAP, these appeared to be 
unsystematic. 
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 Table 8 
Mean Ratings (and Standard Deviations) for the Positive and Negative IRAP Words 
at Pre- and Post-IRAP in Experiment 3 
IRAP-Related Response Scale 
 
Pre-IRAP Post-IRAP 
Feeling    
Positive  5.90 (1.27) 6.20 (0.91) 
Negative  2.53 (1.47) 2.12 (0.93) 
 
Discomfort 
  
Positive  6.34 (0.95) 6.00 (1.28) 
Negative 2.36 (1.19) 2.74 (1.71) 
 
Believability 
  
Positive  2.92 (1.51) 2.93 (1.69) 
Negative 4.69 (1.73) 4.65 (1.78) 
 
Willingness 
  
Positive  6.01 (1.38) 5.97 (1.48) 
Negative 4.15 (1.59) 3.38 (1.84) 
Note .Higher scores indicate words were rated as more positive, more comfortable, less believable and 
participants were more willing to experience them. 
  
Four separate 2x2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted (one for each 
of the IRAP-related Likert Scales) with time (Pre-IRAP and Post-IRAP) and word 
type (positive and negative) as the within participant variables. The results from the 
Feeling Scale indicated a large significant main effect for word type [F (1, 30) = 
247.28, p < .0001, p2 = .89], but not for time (p = .67) and the interaction was also 
non-significant (p = .15). The results were identical for the Discomfort Scale -- word 
type [F (1, 30) = 166.94, p < .0001, p2 = .85], time and interaction effect (p’s = .46 
and .06, respectively). They were also the same for the Believability Scale -- word 
type [F (1, 30) = 15.47, p = .0005, p2 = .34], time and interaction (p’s = .94 and .10, 
respectively). And again, the results were the same for the Willingness Scale -- word 
type [F (1, 30) = 69.53, p < .0001, p2 = .70], time and interaction (p’s = .32 and .19, 
respectively).  
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 Taken together, these results suggest that participants rated the positive words 
as significantly more positive, more comfortable, more believable and easier to 
experience than the negative words. No differences were recorded between Pre- and 
Post-IRAP ratings on any of the four scales.   
 
Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
 Psychological Measures. Correlational analyses were conducted between the 
three implicit measures (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-I AM NOT 
score) and each of the psychological measures (depression, anxiety, stress, RSES and 
AAQ-II). The results indicated very weak correlations between the psychological 
measures and the IRAP scores (all r’s < .25).  
 Four IRAP-Related Response Scales. Correlational analyses were conducted 
between the implicit measures (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-I 
AM NOT score) and each of the four explicit IRAP-related Response Scales (Feeling, 
Discomfort, Believability and Willingness). Results indicated a weak pattern of 
correlation between the measures (all r’s < .27).   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from Experiment 3 indicated that participants had a strong positive 
implicit self-regard, but no strong opinions as to what they were not – thus indicating 
that their positive self-regard was dependent on confirming that they were positive 
and not negative, but was not dependent on disconfirming that they were negative and 
not positive. The results of the explicit measures indicated that participants overall 
scored within the normal range on each of the psychological measures. As expected, 
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 participants also rated the positive words as more positive, more comfortable, more 
believable and easier to experience than the negative words. Furthermore, these 
ratings did not change from Pre- to Post-IRAP. Finally, there were no correlations 
between the implicit measures and any of the explicit measures (psychological 
measures and IRAP-related Response Scales).    
 Although the results from the IRAP indicated that participants had a strong 
positive implicit self-regard, the verbal relation employed here (i.e. I AM versus I AM 
NOT) is only one of many that an individual may use to determine their self concept. 
It remained possible, therefore, that different results would be obtained if participants 
were asked to compare the self to other individuals, for example -- this was the focus 
of Experiment 4.   
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 EXPERIMENT 4 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (all female) aged between 18 and 26 years (M = 22) comprised 
the final sample of Experiment 4. All were undergraduate students, recruited through Faculty 
announcements at NUIM. All participants had a high level of fluency in English and normal, 
or corrected-to-normal, vision. There were no incentives for participation. All participants 
recruited for this experiment successfully completed all aspects of the experiment.    
 
Setting 
 All aspects of the setting for Experiment 4 were identical to the previous 
experiment.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Explicit Measures. The three psychological measures and the four IRAP-
related Response Scales used previously were employed again in Experiment 4. 
IRAP. The primary difference between the IRAP employed in Experiments 3 
and 4 is that the current experiment presented I AM and OTHERS ARE as sample 
stimuli. The target stimuli and response options remained the same. Naturally, this 
also necessitated some changes to the instructions provided to participants. The 
stimulus arrangements employed in Experiment 4 are presented in Table 9.  
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 Table 9 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 4 
Sample Stimulus 1 
I AM 
Sample Stimulus 2 
OTHERS ARE 
Response Option consistent with Sample 1 
TRUE 
Response Option consistent with Sample 2 
FALSE 
Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 1 Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 2 
KIND 
CONFIDENT 
TRUSTING 
HONEST 
SECURE 
POPULAR 
SELFISH 
SELF-CONSCIOUS 
JEALOUS 
FAKE 
INSECURE 
LONELY 
 
 
Procedure  
 
 All procedural aspects and ethical guidelines of Experiment 4 were identical to 
the previous study. 
 Phase 1: Pre-Experimental Measures. Participants first completed the DASS-
21, the RSES and the AAQ-II, as well as the four IRAP-related Response Scales.  
 Phase 2: The IRAP. The IRAP for Experiment 4 consisted of four basic trial-
types: I AM–Positive; I AM–Negative; OTHERS ARE–Positive; and OTHERS 
ARE–Negative (see Figure 6). Within each block of 24 trials, the sample stimulus I 
AM was presented on 12 trials, with OTHERS ARE presented on the other 12 trials. 
The presentation of sample stimuli was randomised throughout each block. In the 
presence of each sample, each of the twelve target words (six positive and six 
negative) appeared twice. The locations of TRUE and FALSE were randomised 
across trials.   
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Figure 6. Examples of the four IRAP trial-types from Experiment 4. The superimposed arrows with 
text boxes indicate the responses deemed consistent or inconsistent, but these boxes and arrows did not 
appear on screen during the experiment. 
 
 
 
 Consistent versus Inconsistent Responding. In the current IRAP, correct 
responses on consistent trials involved associating I AM with positive words and 
OTHERS ARE with negative words (e.g. I AM-HONEST-TRUE; I AM-SELFISH-
FALSE; OTHERS ARE-SELFISH-TRUE; OTHERS ARE-HONEST-FALSE and 
incorrect responding involved I AM-SELFISH-TRUE, etc.). In contrast, during the 
inconsistent trials, correct responding involved associating I AM with negative words 
and OTHERS with positive words (e.g. I AM-HONEST-FALSE; I AM-SELFISH-
 125
 TRUE; OTHERS ARE-SELFISH-FALSE; OTHERS ARE-HONEST-TRUE and 
incorrect responding involved I AM-SELFISH-FALSE, etc.).   
Phase 3: Post-experimental Measures. Following completion of the IRAP, 
participants completed a second exposure to the four IRAP-related Response Scales. 
All participants completed the entire experiment in a single session that lasted 
between 20 and 30mins. 
 
RESULTS 
 
DIRAP-(trial-type) Data.  Consistent with the analyses conducted on the D scores in 
Experiment 3, the DIRAP-(trial-type) scores were calculated for each participant in 
Experiment 4 on the two groups of IRAP trial-types that might be collectively 
referred to as Pro-Me (i.e. the I AM-Positive and I AM-Negative trial-types 
combined) and Pro-Others (i.e. the OTHERS ARE-Positive and OTHERS ARE-
Negative trial-types combined). This data is presented in Figure 7. The data indicated 
that participants showed a strong implicit bias towards the self, with little or no 
opinion with regards to how they saw others. 
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Figure 7.The mean DIRAP-(trial-type) scores and standard error bars for the sample stimuli in Experiment 4. 
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 A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a large significant main 
effect for trial-type [F (1, 15) = 26.53, p = .0001, p2 = .64]. Two one sample t-tests 
indicated that the I AM trial-type produced a large significant difference from zero, t 
(31) = 6.39, p < .0001, 2 = .73, but, as expected, OTHERS ARE was non-significant 
(p = .56). Overall therefore, the IRAP indicated that participants had strong positive 
implicit self-regard, but had no strong opinions about others. Put simply, the positive 
self-regard did not imply that they had to confirm that others were positive or 
negative. 
 
Explicit Measures 
Psychological Measures. The means scores for each of the DASS-21 sub-
scales fell within the normal range: Depression (M = 8.0, SD = 8.67; Norm < 9); 
Anxiety (M = 6.63, SD = 3.85; Norm < 7); and Stress (M = 13.13, SD = 6.73; Norm < 
14). As expected, participants also produced high RSES scores (M = 19.25; SD = 
4.19), indicating high levels of self-esteem, as well as high AAQ-II scores (M = 
47.94, SD = 9.98; Norm = 50.72, SD = 9.19), indicating high levels of psychological 
flexibility (high acceptance/low avoidance).  
Four IRAP-Related Response Scales. Mean scores (and standard deviations) 
for Pre- and Post-IRAP ratings for the positive and negative IRAP words are 
presented in Table 10. As expected, participants overall rated the negative words as 
more negative, more uncomfortable and more unbelievable (i.e. less believable) and 
harder to experience than the positive words. Although there were some apparent 
changes on these scales from Pre- to Post-IRAP, these were small. 
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 Table 10 
Mean Ratings (and Standard Deviations) for Groups of Positive and Negative Words 
at Pre- and Post-IRAP in Experiment 4 
IRAP-Related Response Scale 
 
Pre-IRAP Post-IRAP 
Feeling    
Positive  5.69 (1.31) 5.60 (1.29) 
Negative  2.39 (1.31) 2.32 (1.10) 
 
Discomfort 
  
Positive  5.94 (1.28) 5.83 (1.32) 
Negative 2.53 (1.33) 2.68 (1.31) 
 
Believability 
  
Positive  3.18 (1.37) 3.31 (1.52) 
Negative 4.71 (1.51) 4.44 (1.68) 
 
Willingness 
  
Positive  5.42 (1.28) 5.55 (1.27) 
Negative 2.96 (1.38) 3.14 (1.52) 
Note .Higher scores indicate words were rated as more positive, more comfortable, less believable and 
participants were more willing to experience them. 
  
Four separate 2x2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted (one for each 
of the IRAP-related Response Scales) with time (Pre-IRAP and Post-IRAP) and word 
type (positive and negative) as the within participant variables. The results from the 
scales were identical to the previous experiment. The Feeling Scale indicated a large 
significant main effect for word type [F (1, 30) = 126.64, p < .0001, p2 = .81], but not 
for time or the interaction (p’s = .65 and .97, respectively). This was also the case for 
the Discomfort Scale -- word type [F (1, 30) = 139.15, p < .0001, p2 = .82], time and 
interaction (p’s = .93 and .66, respectively); the Believability Scale -- word type [F (1, 
30) = 10.83, p = .003, p2 = .26], time and interaction (p’s = .64 and .62, respectively); 
and the Willingness Scale -- word type [F (1, 30) = 76.75, p < .0001, p2 = .72], time 
and interaction (p’s = .54 and .94, respectively).  
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 Similar to Experiment 3, participants in the current experiment rated the 
positive words as significantly more positive, more comfortable, more believable and 
easier to experience than the negative words. No differences were recorded between 
Pre- and Post-IRAP ratings on any of the four rating scales.   
 
Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
Psychological Measures. Correlational analyses were conducted between the 
three implicit measures (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-OTHERS 
ARE score) and each of the psychological measures (depression, anxiety, stress, 
RSES and AAQ-II). The results indicated weak correlations in the majority of cases 
(all r’s < .23). However, a significant large positive correlation was obtained between 
the RSES scale and the IRAP overall score (r = .63, n = 16, p = .007) and this effect 
was driven by responses to the I AM trial-types (r = .51, n = 16, p = .002). Taken 
together, the results indicated that higher levels of explicit self-esteem in this context 
were associated with a stronger I AM-Positive implicit bias.    
 Four IRAP-Related Response Scales. Correlational analyses were conducted 
between the implicit measures (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-
OTHERS ARE score) and each of the four explicit IRAP-related Response Scales 
(Feeling, Discomfort, Believability and Willingness). The results indicated weak to 
moderate correlations in the majority of cases (all r’s range between .02 and .43).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from Experiment 4 were very similar to those recorded in the 
previous study. On the IRAP, participants had a strong positive implicit self-regard, 
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 but no strong opinions as to how they viewed others -- thus indicating that their 
positive self-regard was dependent on confirming that they were positive and not 
negative, but was not dependent on confirming that others were negative or positive. 
On the explicit measures, participants rated the positive words as more positive, more 
comfortable, more believable and easier to experience these than the negative words, 
and these ratings did not change from Pre- to Post-IRAP. Again, participants scored 
within the normal range on each of the psychological measures. No correlations 
emerged between the implicit measures and any of the four IRAP-related Response 
Scales. However, a large significant correlation did emerge between the implicit 
measure and the RSES, indicating that higher self-reported levels of self-esteem were 
associated with higher implicit levels of positive self-regard.      
 The results from the current IRAP indicated once again that participants had a 
strong positive implicit self-regard, although they were as ambivalent about others as 
they had been about what they themselves were not. This strong positive bias led us to 
generate one further IRAP it which such a positive self-bias might not emerge. This 
was the focus of Experiment 5.   
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 EXPERIMENT 5 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (all female) aged between 18 and 24 years (M = 21) 
comprised the final sample of Experiment 5. All were undergraduate students, 
recruited through Faculty announcements at NUIM. All had a high level of fluency in 
English and had normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision. No incentives of any kind 
were offered for participation. In addition to the 16 participants who completed the 
experiment, four failed to reach the required criteria in either the training or test 
phases of the IRAP, hence their data was excluded from further analyses.    
 
Setting 
 All aspects of the setting for Experiment 5 were identical to the previous IRAP 
experiments.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Explicit Measures. The three psychological measures and the four IRAP-
related Response Scales used in the previous IRAPs were employed again in 
Experiment 5. 
IRAP. The primary difference between the IRAP employed in previous 
experiments and Experiment 5 is that the current program presented I AM and I 
SHOULD BE as sample stimuli. The target stimuli and response options remained the 
same. Naturally, this also necessitated some changes to the instructions provided to 
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 participants. The stimulus arrangements employed in Experiment 5 are presented in 
Table 11.  
 
Table 11 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 5 
Sample Stimulus 1 
I AM 
Sample Stimulus 2 
I SHOULD BE 
Response Option consistent with Sample 1 
TRUE 
Response Option consistent with Sample 2 
FALSE 
Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 1 Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 2 
KIND 
CONFIDENT 
TRUSTING 
HONEST 
SECURE 
POPULAR 
SELFISH 
SELF-CONSCIOUS 
JEALOUS 
FAKE 
INSECURE 
LONELY 
 
 
Procedure  
 
 All procedural aspects and ethical guidelines of Experiment 5 were identical to 
the previous studies. 
 Phase 1: Pre-Experimental Measures. Participants first completed the DASS-
21, the RSES and the AAQ-II, as well as the four IRAP-related Response Scales.  
 Phase 2: The IRAP. The IRAP for Experiment 5 consisted of four basic trial-
types: I AM–Positive; I AM–Negative; I SHOULD BE–Positive; and I SHOULD BE 
–Negative (see Figure 8). Within each block of 24 trials, the sample stimulus I AM 
was presented on 12 trials, with I SHOULD BE presented on the other 12 trials. The 
presentation of sample stimuli was randomised throughout each block. In the presence 
of each sample, each of the twelve target words (six positive and six negative) 
appeared twice. The locations of TRUE and FALSE were randomised across trials.   
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Figure 8. Examples of the four IRAP trial-types used in Experiment 5. The superimposed arrows with 
text boxes indicate the responses deemed consistent or inconsistent, but these boxes and arrows did not 
appear on screen during the experiment. 
 
 
 
 Consistent versus Inconsistent Responding. In the current IRAP, correct 
responses on consistent trials involved associating I AM with positive words and I 
SHOULD BE with negative words (e.g. I AM-HONEST-TRUE; I AM-SELFISH-
FALSE; I SHOULD BE-SELFISH-TRUE; I SHOULD BE-HONEST-FALSE and 
incorrect responding involved I AM-HONEST-FALSE, etc.). In contrast, during the 
inconsistent trials, correct responding involved associating I AM with negative words 
and I SHOULD BE with positive words (e.g. I AM-HONEST-FALSE; I AM-
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 SELFISH-TRUE; I SHOULD BE -SELFISH-FALSE; I SHOULD BE -HONEST-
TRUE and incorrect responding involved I AM-HONEST-TRUE, etc.).   
Phase 3: Post-experimental Measures. Following completion of the IRAP, 
participants completed a second exposure to the four IRAP-related Response Scales. 
All participants completed the entire experiment in a single session that lasted 
between 20 and 30mins.   
 
RESULTS 
 
DIRAP-(trial-type) Data.. Consistent with the analyses conducted on the D scores in 
the previous IRAPs, the DIRAP-(trial-type) scores were calculated for each participant in 
Experiment 5 on the two groups of IRAP trial-types referred to as Pro-Me (I AM-
Positive and I AM-Negative) and Pro-Should be (I SHOULD BE-Positive and I 
SHOULD BE-Negative). This data is presented in Figure 9. Again, participants 
showed a strong implicit positive bias towards the self. They also indicated that they 
should not be positive (i.e. that they should be negative), but this effect was relatively 
weak. 
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Figure 9.The mean DIRAP-(trial-type) scores and standard error bars for the sample stimuli in Experiment 5. 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
trial-type [F (1, 15) = 7.50, p = .02, p2 = .33]. Two one sample t-tests indicated that 
the I AM trial-type produced a small significant difference from zero, t (31) = 2.39, p 
< .02, 2 = .28, but I SHOULD BE was non-significant (p = .39). Overall, the IRAP 
indicated that participants were certain that they were positive and were less strong in 
their conviction that they should be negative (i.e. I should not be positive). Put 
simply, the positive self-regard did not imply that they had to confirm that they should 
be positive or negative. 
 
Explicit Measures 
Psychological Measures. The means scores for each of the DASS-21 sub-
scales fell within the normal range: Depression (M = 4.88, SD = 4.13; Norm < 9); 
Anxiety (M = 4.63, SD = 4.05; Norm < 7); and Stress (M = 11.63, SD = 7.31; Norm < 
14). As expected, participants also produced high RSES scores (M = 21.06; SD = 
4.14), indicating high levels of self-esteem, as well as high AAQ-II scores (M = 
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 50.81, SD = 6.97; Norm = 50.72, SD = 9.19), indicating high levels of psychological 
flexibility (high acceptance/low avoidance). 
Four IRAP-Related Response Scales. Mean scores (and standard deviations) 
for Pre- and Post-IRAP ratings for the positive and negative IRAP words are 
presented in Table 12. As expected, participants overall rated the negative words as 
more negative, more uncomfortable and more unbelievable (i.e. less believable) and 
easier to experience than the positive words. There were only minor differences Pre- 
to Post- IRAP. 
 
Table 12 
Mean Ratings (and Standard Deviations) for Groups of Positive and Negative Words 
at Pre- and Post-IRAP in Experiment 5 
IRAP-Related Response Scale 
 
Pre-IRAP Post-IRAP 
Feeling    
Positive  6.32 (.95) 6.38 (.95) 
Negative  2.24 (1.13) 2.12 (.99) 
 
Discomfort 
  
Positive  6.06 (1.04) 6.08 (1.01) 
Negative 2.25 (1.30) 2.40 (1.16) 
 
Believability 
  
Positive  2.39 (1.30) 2.37 (1.27) 
Negative 5.48 (1.26) 5.70 (1.03) 
 
Willingness 
  
Positive  6.26 (.79) 6.20 (1.02) 
Negative 3.38 (1.70) 3.14 (1.79) 
Note. Higher scores indicate words were rated as more positive, more comfortable, less believable and 
participants were more willing to experience them. 
 
 Four separate 2x2 repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted (one for each 
of the IRAP-related Likert Scales) with time (Pre-IRAP and Post-IRAP) and word 
type (positive and negative) as the within participant variables. The results were very 
similar to both previous experiments. The Feeling Scale indicated a large significant 
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 main effect for word type [F (1, 30) = 595.59, p < .0001, p2 = .95], but not for time 
or the interaction (p’s = .79 and .61, respectively). This was also the case for: the 
Discomfort Scale -- word type [F (1, 30) = 120.15, p < .0001, p2 = .80], time and 
interaction (p’s = .93 and .49, respectively); the Believability Scale -- word type [F (1, 
30) = 185.15, p < .0001, p2 = .86], time and interaction (p’s = .51 and .62, 
respectively); and the Willingness Scale -- word type [F (1, 30) = 118.71, p < .0001, 
p2 = .80], time and interaction (p’s = .66 and .75, respectively).  
Similar to the previous IRAPs, participants in Experiment 5 again rated the 
positive words as significantly more positive, more comfortable, more believable and 
easier to experience than the negative words. No differences were recorded between 
Pre- and Post-IRAP ratings.  
 
Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
Psychological Measures. Correlation analyses were conducted between the 
three implicit measures (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-I 
SHOULD BE score) and each of the psychological measures (depression, anxiety, 
stress, RSES and AAQ-II). Overall, the results indicated a pattern of medium to large 
correlations between the IRAP Overall score and each of the five psychological 
measures. Specifically, large negative correlations were obtained between the IRAP 
overall score and reported levels of stress (r = -.62, n = 16, p = .008) and between the 
IRAP overall score and reported levels of depression (r = -.54, n = 16, p = .03). These 
results indicate that the higher the IRAP overall score (i.e. higher implicit positive self 
regard), the lower the levels of stress and depression. All remaining r’s < .46).  
To further investigate the cause of the effects for the stress and depression 
scales, the correlations obtained between both psychological measures and the two 
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 groups of trial-types (IRAP-I AM and IRAP-I SHOULD BE) were examined. 
However, all correlations in this regard were weak (all r’s < -.28).  
Four IRAP-Related Response Scales. Correlational analyses were conducted 
between the implicit (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-I SHOULD 
BE score) and each of the four explicit IRAP-related Response Scales (Feeling, 
Discomfort, Believability and Willingness). The results indicate weak correlations in 
all cases (all r’s < .29).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from Experiment 5 indicated that participants had a strong positive 
implicit self-regard, but had no strong opinions on how they felt they should be -- 
indicating that their positive self-regard was dependent on confirming how they saw 
themselves as being, but was not dependent on how they felt they should be. The 
results of the explicit measures indicated that participants overall scored within the 
normal range on each of the psychological measures. As expected with the explicit 
measures, participants also rated the positive words as more positive, more 
comfortable, more believable and easier to experience than the negative words. The 
ratings did not change from Pre- to Post-IRAP. No correlations emerged between the 
implicit measures and any of the four IRAP-related Response Scales. However, large 
significant negative correlations did emerge between the implicit measure and self-
reported levels of stress and depression, indicating that higher levels of positive 
implicit self-regard was associated with significantly lower levels of stress and 
depression.    
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 EXPERIMENTS 3, 4 AND 5 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 
 
Implicit Measures. Across each of the three experiments, participants reported 
a strong implicit positive self-regard, as indicated by responses on the Pro-Me trial-
types. However, the strength of the effect for Pro-Me was different across the three 
experiments. The results of a one-way between groups ANOVA indicated that 
participants presented with the OTHERS ARE stimuli (Experiment 4) produced the 
largest effect size for the I AM trial-types and this was significantly larger than the 
effect for the I SHOULD BE stimuli (p = .05), which produced the smallest effect size 
(Experiment 5). However, those presented with the I AM NOT stimuli (Experiment 3) 
did not significantly differ from the other two (p’s > .16).  
 Psychological Measures. A series of one-way between groups ANOVAs (with 
experiment as the between groups variable) was conducted for each of the 
psychological measures. The results indicated no significant differences between the 
participants across the three experiments on any of the measures (all p’s >.90). Thus, 
the differences in the Pro-Me responses across all three experiments could not be 
attributed to differences on the explicit psychological measures.        
  Despite the groups providing a similar pattern of self-reported levels of 
depression, anxiety, stress, self-esteem and acceptance/avoidance, differences did 
emerge across the three experiments in terms of correlations between the implicit 
ratings and the psychological measures. Specifically, the implicit results recorded in 
Experiment 3 (I AM versus I AM NOT) produced no significant correlations with any 
of the psychological measures. In contrast, the results from Experiment 4 (I AM 
versus OTHERS ARE) indicated that higher levels of positive implicit self-regard 
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 were associated with higher levels of self-esteem. Different again was the pattern of 
correlations reported in Experiment 5 (I AM versus I SHOULD BE), with higher 
levels of positive implicit self-regard associated with lower levels of stress and 
depression. 
IRAP-Related Response Scales. Across all three experiments, participants 
rated the positive words as significantly more positive, more comfortable, more 
believable and easier to experience than the negative words. Across all three 
experiments, no changes were recorded between Pre- to Post-IRAP ratings. 
Furthermore, no correlations were reported between the implicit measure and the four 
scales in any of the three experiments.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The primary aim of Experiments 3, 4 and 5 was to create an IRAP that would 
tap into implicit self-relevant content in a manner that would subsequently allow us to 
manipulate these implicit attitudes through a brief defusion intervention. The results 
from Experiment 5 (I AM versus I SHOULD BE) produced the significantly weakest 
implicit positive self-regard, relative to the other two IRAPs. In addition, implicit 
responses produced in this context also correlated with explicit levels of stress and 
depression. On this basis, it was considered that the I SHOULD BE statements 
offered the best potential implicit measure for use with a defusion intervention.   
Across all three experiments, positive and negative words were utilised as the 
target stimuli. However, it is arguable that the use of more complete positive and 
negative statements may better reflect the types of thoughts experienced by clients 
within a therapeutic setting, and therefore would better represent the target of a 
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defusion intervention. Thus, the next phase of the current research program was 
twofold. (1) It was necessary to design an IRAP (using the I SHOULD BE stimuli) 
that incorporated positive and negative statements as opposed to simple positive and 
negative words. (2) It was necessary to determine whether or not the implicit 
measures were sensitive to a defusion manipulation. To this end, it was deemed 
necessary to compare IRAP performances for groups of individuals with more or less 
experience with defusion (i.e. a sample of students versus a sample of ACT 
therapists).   
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Chapter 5 
Experiments 6 and 7 
Using the IRAP to Measure Reactions to Self-Statements: 
Comparing Undergraduate Students with Therapists 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The results from the three IRAP experiments in Chapter 4 indicated that 
undergraduate participants showed strong implicit positive self-regard on all three 
types of self-IRAP presentation. Although these results were entirely as one would 
expect, we were somewhat surprised by the lack of ‘doubt’ in their responses overall. 
Although the presentation in Experiment 5 (I AM versus I SHOULD BE) was 
potentially the best of the three formats for subsequent use in the context of defusion, 
it remained the case that even here participants had little doubt about how positively 
they perceived themselves to be. One possible reason for these limited effects overall 
may concern the use of single words as target stimuli, which may not sufficiently tap 
into the complexities of one’s sense of self. As an analogy, one might consider that 
differences in reaction times are often recorded for IAT studies that use pictures rather 
than words as stimuli (e.g. Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). Hence, 
the presentation of self-statements on-screen might yield different IRAP effects from 
single words, especially as one thinks about oneself. For example, individuals may 
respond differently to “lonely” compared with “I am so alone that it hurts”. 
One of our primary aims in the studies thus far was to develop an IRAP that 
might be potentially sensitive to a defusion intervention and it was anticipated that the 
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results from the use of self-statements (rather than words) in Experiment 6 would 
bring us one step closer towards achieving this aim. However, the results from our 
earlier work in delivering defusion interventions clearly highlighted the complexities 
involved in doing this in an experimental context. Hence in Experiment 7, we turned 
our attention towards a group of participants who already had a long history of 
defusion. Specifically, prior to attempting to manipulate the IRAP outcomes with 
defusion interventions directly, we sampled a group of ACT therapists, whom we 
assumed had substantive histories of defusion with regard to clients, as well as their 
own psychological content. Although it was difficult in this context to predict 
precisely what type of outcomes ACT therapists would produce on a self-IRAP, we 
predicted that it would differ to some extent from undergraduates who had no 
extended history of defusion.   
 
The Current Research 
 The current chapter presents two separate experiments. Experiment 6 was 
designed to assess the impact of using positive and negative self-statements, rather 
than words, as target stimuli in the IRAP. In order to generate the target stimuli, the 
six positive and six negative words used previously were developed into fuller 
statements. To systematically compare the impact of words versus statements, 
Experiment 6 involved two groups of undergraduates -- one exposed to a Word-IRAP, 
the other exposed to a Statement-IRAP.  
Experiment 7 was designed to investigate the potential sensitivity of the IRAP 
to a defusion intervention. The primary manipulation here was the differential level of 
experience with defusion between undergraduate students and ACT therapists, when 
both were presented with self-statements in an IRAP.  
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EXPERIMENT 6 
METHOD  
 
Participants 
A total of 32 female participants (all female) aged between 18 and 28 (M = 22) 
comprised the final sample of Experiment 6. Half of these participants (n = 16) were 
presented with a Word-IRAP that was identical to the presentation in Experiment 5. 
The other half were presented with a Statement-IRAP developed from the words used 
in the previous study. All were undergraduate students, recruited through Faculty 
announcements at NUIM. All participants had a high level of fluency in English and 
normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision. There were no incentives for participation. In 
addition to the 32 participants who completed the experiment, nine participants (four 
of which were assigned to the Word-IRAP, with the remaining assigned to the 
Statement-IRAP) failed to reach the required criteria in either the training or test 
phases of the IRAP, hence their data was excluded from further analyses.    
 
Setting 
 All aspects of the setting for Experiment 6 were identical to the previous 
IRAPs. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
 Explicit Measures. All participants completed the DASS-21 (Lovibond, & 
Lovibond, 1995 -- see Appendix G and Chapter 3) and the RSES (Rosenberg, 1965 -- 
see Appendix I and Chapter 4), used in the previous studies.   
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IRAP. Two separate IRAP procedures were employed in Experiment 6, 
namely a Word-IRAP and a Statement-IRAP. The primary difference between these 
related to the target stimuli. The stimuli employed in the Word-IRAP were identical to 
Experiment 5 (see Table 11, Chapter 4). The stimuli employed in the Statement-IRAP 
are presented in Table 13. Naturally, the change in target stimuli also necessitated 
some changes to the instructions provided to participants.   
 
Table 13  
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in the Statement-IRAP in Experiment 6 
Sample Stimulus 1 
I AM 
Sample Stimulus 2 
I SHOULD BE 
Response Option consistent with Sample 1 
TRUE 
Response Option consistent with Sample 2 
FALSE 
Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 1 Target Stimuli consistent with Sample 2 
 
Warm-hearted in nature 
 
Happy-go-lucky 
 
Open to new relationships 
 
Comfortable with who I am 
 
Confident in my abilities 
 
Surrounded by people I love 
 
Unpleasant to be around 
 
Afraid to show who I really am 
 
Jealous of those around me 
 
Lying to myself and others 
 
Constantly seeking reassurance 
 
So alone that it hurts 
 
 
Procedure  
 
 All ethical guidelines for Experiment 6 were identical to the previous IRAPs. A 
number of minor modifications were made to the procedural aspects of the current 
experiment. Specifically, due to the different nature of the stimuli employed (i.e. 
words versus statements), participants were not presented with the IRAP-related 
Response Scales. As such, there were only two experimental phases.   
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 Phase 1: Pre-Experimental Measures. Participants first completed the DASS-21 
and the RSES.   
 Phase 2: The IRAP. The Word-IRAP for Experiment 6 consisted of four basic 
trial-types. These were identical to those outlined for Experiment 5. The Statement-
IRAP also consisted of four basic trial-types: I AM–Positive; I AM–Negative; I 
SHOULD BE–Positive; and I SHOULD BE –Negative (see Figure 10). Within each 
block of 24 trials, the sample stimulus I AM was presented on 12 trials, with I 
SHOULD BE presented on the other 12 trials. The presentation of sample stimuli was 
randomised throughout each block. In the presence of each sample, each of the twelve 
target statements (six positive and six negative) appeared twice. The locations of 
TRUE and FALSE were randomised across trials.   
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                                  I AM-Positive                                                                   I AM-Negative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            I SHOULD BE-Positive                                                    I SHOULD BE-Negative 
 
 
I should be 
 
confident in my abilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Press ‘d’ for                   Press ‘k’ for 
      True                               False
Inconsistent Consistent 
I should be 
 
unpleasant to be around 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 Press ‘d’ for                    Press ‘k’ for 
       True                             False 
Consistent Inconsistent 
I am 
 
confident in my abilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Press ‘d’ for                      Press ‘k’ for
      True                               False 
Consistent Inconsistent 
     I am  
 
unpleasant to be around 
 
       
 
 
 
Press ‘d’ for                     Press ‘k’ for 
        True                             False 
Inconsistent Consistent 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Examples of the four Statement-IRAP trial-types used in Experiment 6. The superimposed 
arrows with text boxes indicate the responses deemed consistent or inconsistent, but these boxes and 
arrows did not appear on screen during the experiment. 
 
 
 Consistent versus Inconsistent Responding. For the Word-IRAP, correct 
responses on consistent trials involved associating I AM with positive words and I 
SHOULD BE with negative words and inconsistent trials involved associating I AM 
with negative words and I SHOULD BE with positive words. This pattern of 
responding is identical to Experiment 5.  
 For the Statement-IRAP, correct responding on consistent trials involved 
associating I AM with positive statements and I SHOULD BE with negative 
statements (e.g. I AM-CONFIDENT IN MY ABILITIES-TRUE; I AM-
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UNPLEASANT TO BE AROUND-FALSE; I SHOULD BE-UNPLEASANT TO BE 
AROUND-TRUE; I SHOULD BE-CONFIDENT IN MY ABILITIES-FALSE and 
incorrect responding involved I AM-CONFIDENT IN MY ABILITIES-FALSE, etc.). 
In contrast, during the inconsistent trials, correct responding involved associating I 
AM with negative statements and I SHOULD BE with positive statements (e.g. I AM-
CONFIDENT IN MY ABILITIES-FALSE; I AM-UNPLEASANT TO BE 
AROUND-TRUE; I SHOULD BE-UNPLEASANT TO BE AROUND-FALSE; I 
SHOULD BE-CONFIDENT IN MY ABILITIES-TRUE and incorrect responding 
involved I AM-CONFIDENT IN MY ABILITIES-TRUE, etc.).    
 All participants completed the current experiment in a single session that 
lasted between 20 and 30mins.  
 
RESULTS 
 
DIRAP-(trial-type) Data.. Consistent with the analyses conducted on the D scores in 
the previous IRAPs, the DIRAP-(trial-type) scores were calculated for each participant in 
both the Word-IRAP and Statement-IRAP groups in Experiment 6. In both cases, the 
IRAP trial-types were referred to as Pro-Me (I AM-Positive and I AM-Negative) and 
Pro-Should be (I SHOULD BE-Positive and I SHOULD BE-Negative). This data is 
presented in Figure 11. Participants showed a strong implicit positive bias towards the 
self, with little or no opinion with regards to how they felt they should be. This was 
true for both Word- and Statement- IRAP groups.  
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Figure 11. The mean DIRAP-(trial-type) scores and standard error bars for the Word-IRAP and Statement-
IRAP in Experiment 6. 
IRAP Trial-Types 
Pro-Me 
 
Pro-Should be 
 
 
A 2x2 mixed-between-within AVOVA was conducted, with group (Word-
IRAP and Statement-IRAP) as the between participants variable and trial-type (I AM 
and I SHOULD BE) as the within participants variable. The results revealed a 
significant main effect for trial-type [F (1, 15) = 8.32, p = .007, p2 = .20], but not 
group and the interaction effect was also non-significant (p’s = .60 and .91, 
respectively.      
Four separate one sample t-tests indicated that the I AM trial-type produced a 
large significant difference from zero for both the Word-IRAP, t (31) = 2.39, p = .02, 
2 = .41 and Statement-IRAP, t (39) = 3.64, p = .0008, 2 = .28. As expected, the 
effect for the I SHOULD BE trial-type was non-significant for both the Word-IRAP 
(p = .39) and the Statement-IRAP (p = .61).    
Overall therefore, the results from both IRAPs indicated that participants had 
strong positive implicit self-regard. Participants were slightly less certain of this in the 
context of the Statement-IRAP than the Word-IRAP, however, these differences were 
non-significant. Participants had no strong opinions with regard to what they thought 
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they should be. Although participants were slightly more certain that they should be 
negative in the context of the Word-IRAP stimuli, the differences between groups 
were non-significant.   
 
Explicit Measures 
Psychological Measures. The means scores (and standard deviations) for each 
of the psychological measures for both the Word-IRAP and Statement-IRAP groups 
are presented in Table 14. Scores from both groups fell within the normal range for 
the depression, anxiety and stress sub-scales. As expected, both groups reported high 
levels of self-esteem.  
 
Table 14 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Each of the Psychological Measures for the 
Word-IRAP and Statement-IRAP Groups in Experiment 6 
Psychological Measure 
 
Norms Word-IRAP Statement-IRAP 
RSES - 19.25 (4.19) 22.60 (4.68) 
 
DASS 
   
Depression < 9 8.0 (8.67) 4.50 (6.08) 
Anxiety < 7 6.63 (3.85) 3.70 (6.33) 
Stress < 14 13.13 (6.73) 9.60 (5.99) 
Note. ‘-’ indicates that no normative data is available. 
 
A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted for each of the 
psychological measures (with IRAP group as the independent samples grouping 
variable). The results revealed no significant difference between scores for the Word-
IRAP group and the Statement-IRAP group for any of the psychological measures (all 
p’s > .31). Thus, the differences obtained in the D-scores for the I AM and I 
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SHOULD be trial-types and in the pattern of correlation between implicit and explicit 
measures could not be accounted for by differences in initial self-report ratings. 
 
Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
Correlation analyses were conducted between the three implicit measures 
(IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-I SHOULD BE score) and each of 
the psychological measures (depression, anxiety, stress and RSES). The results from 
the Word-IRAP indicated large negative correlations between the IRAP overall score 
and levels of stress (r = -.62, n = 16, p = .008), and between the IRAP overall score 
and levels of depression (r = -.54, n = 16, p = .03). These results indicate that the 
higher the IRAP overall score (i.e. higher implicit positive self regard), the lower the 
levels of stress and depression (all remaining r’s < .46). Separate correlational 
analyses were then conducted between the psychological measures and the two 
groups of trial-types (IRAP-I AM and IRAP-I SHOULD BE). However, all 
correlations were weak (all r’s < -.28). For the Statement-IRAP, only small to 
medium correlations were obtained between any of the implicit and psychological 
measures (all r’s < .32).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from Experiment 6 indicated that both words and statements 
revealed strong positive implicit self-regard from participants. However, subtle 
differences emerged between the two groups in terms of the strength of their reactions. 
Specifically, participants presented with the Statement-IRAP were slightly less certain 
that they were positive and were slightly less certain that they should be negative than 
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the reactions observed on the Word-IRAP. These differences could not be accounted 
for by differences in the explicit psychological measures.    
 The pattern of responding across the two groups suggests that the Statement-
IRAP created more uncertainty in terms of how certain participants were that they 
were indeed positive, as well as being less certain that they should not be positive. It 
was therefore considered to be the IRAP that would be most appropriate for use with 
a defusion intervention. Furthermore, it seemed likely that the whole statements better 
reflected the types of psychological content with which individuals struggle and as 
such was a better procedure to employ as a clinical analogue.   
 The next phase of the current research program was designed to determine if 
the Statement-IRAP would indeed be susceptible to changes as a result of defusion. 
An initial step in this process was to determine whether or not there would be any 
difference in IRAP performance between groups of individuals with more or less 
experience with defusion. This was the primary focus of Experiment 7. Specifically, 
we investigated performances on the Statement-IRAP of a group of undergraduate 
participants, compared to a group of ACT therapists. The former group were 
considered to have no experience of defusion, while the latter group were considered 
to have considerable experience with defusion, either personally or through 
therapeutic work with clients.    
 
 
 153
EXPERIMENT 7 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Non-ACT Group: Twenty participants (all female) aged between 22 and 29 (M 
= 24) comprised the final sample for the Non-ACT Group. All were undergraduate 
students, recruited through Faculty announcements at NUIM. All participants had a 
high level of fluency in English and normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision. There 
were no incentives for participation. In addition to the 20 participants that completed 
the study, five failed to reach the required criteria in either the training or test phases 
of the IRAP, hence their data was excluded from further analyses.    
 ACT Group. Eighteen participants (12 female) aged between 24 and 51 (M = 
33) comprised the final sample for the ACT Group. All were ACT therapists/trainee 
therapists, recruited through on an online advertisement placed on the official ACT 
email forum (acceptanceandcommitmenttherapy@yahoogroups.com). All participants 
had a high level of fluency in English and normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision. 
There were no incentives for participation. A total of 52 ACT members volunteered to 
participate. Of these, 28 did not attempt the IRAP experiment and did not contact the 
experimenter again. Of the participants that did attempt the experiment, six failed to 
reach the required criteria in either the training or testing phase of the IRAP.  
 
Setting 
 Non-ACT Group. Participants completed the experiment in one of the 
Experimental Cubicles in the Psychology Department at NUIM. Only one participant 
was present in a cubicle at any time. All individuals completed all aspects of the 
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experiment individually. The experimenter remained seated outside the cubicle at all 
times and only interacted with the participants during the first IRAP practice blocks.  
 ACT Group. Participants completed all aspects of the experiment 
electronically, with details passed between experimenter and participant via email 
(see Procedure for specific details). Participants were asked to complete the 
experiment in a single setting, in a quiet room that was free from any distraction.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Psychological Measures. All participants in both the ACT and Non-ACT 
Groups completed three psychological measures, namely the DASS-21 (Lovibond, & 
Lovibond, 1995 -- see Appendix G and Chapter 3), the RSES (Rosenberg, 1965 -- see 
Appendix I and Chapter 4) and the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scales (PHLMS; 
Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, in press -- Appendix L).  
The PHLMS is a 20-item inventory that provides a measure of current levels 
of mindfulness. It consists of two sub-scales (awareness and acceptance), each of 
which contains 10 questions. Individuals are asked to rate how often they had 
experienced each statement over the past week on a scale of 1 (never) to 5 (very 
often). The awareness sub-scale is comprised of all the odd numbered questions, none 
of which are negatively reversed. The acceptance sub-scale is comprised of all the 
even numbered items, all of which are negatively reversed. Total scores for each sub-
scale range from 10 to 50, with higher scores on each representing higher levels of 
awareness and higher levels of acceptance, respectively. Mean scores obtained with a 
non-clinical undergraduate sample are as follows: awareness: M = 36.65, SD = 4.93 
and acceptance: M = 30.19, SD = 5.84). Both scales indicate good psychometric 
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properties, with good reliability and internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha for 
awareness and acceptance sub-scales = .81 and .85, respectively).     
IRAP-Related Believability Scale. Participants in both groups completed an 
IRAP-related Believability Scale (see Appendix M). This scale was designed to assess 
participants’ explicit attitudes to the self-relevant stimuli that would be presented 
during the IRAP. The scale measured participants’ levels of believability associated 
with the 12 self-statements employed in the IRAP-- six positive statements and six 
negative statements. Response options ranged from -3 (extremely unbelievable) to +3 
(extremely believable). 
IRAP. The IRAP employed in Experiment 7 was identical to the Statement-
IRAP from Experiment 6 (see Table 13). Although the IRAP for the ACT Group was 
presented through an online website, all aspects of the IRAP program were identical 
to those presented to the undergraduate participants who completed the experiment at 
NUIM.  
 
Procedure  
 
 All procedural aspects and ethical guidelines of Experiment 7 were identical to 
previous experiments. 
 Non-ACT Group. Participants in this group completed three experimental phases, 
namely: (1) Pre-Experimental Measures (brief demographic questionnaire, 
psychological measures and IRAP-related Believability Scales); (2) the IRAP; and (3) 
Post-Experimental Measures (IRAP-related Believability Scales).  
  ACT Group. Participants in the ACT Group completed the three experimental 
phases as outlined above. However, it was necessary to provide participants with 
additional information and instructions in order to successfully execute an online 
version of the experiment. Specifically, once participants had volunteered to take part 
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(by responding to the advertisement placed on the ACT email forum), they were 
provided with an experimental guide containing necessary information to complete 
the experiment (see Appendix N). Contained in the experimental guide were a 
personalised identification number and password that were used to access a website, 
used previously for other types of experimental research studies 
(https://rft.ori.org/exper/webPresentation.php?opt=4).    
This guide was emailed to participants and the specific details for each of the 
four steps outlined in the guide were provided as four separate documents attached to 
the email. On completion of all four steps, participants were required to return the 
signed consent form as well as responses to the Pre- and Post-Experimental measures. 
The IRAP data was automatically recorded on the website and made available for 
collection immediately after each participant had completed the IRAP.   
Pre-Experimental Measures. Participants were required to electronically 
complete a brief demographic questionnaire to elicit information regarding: age; 
gender; previous experience with the IRAP and experience in ACT by simply typing 
their responses in spaces provided. In addition, participants completed the 
psychological measures and IRAP-related Believability Scales. In order to complete 
these scales electronically, a red X had been placed at the end of each questionnaire 
item. Participants were provided with the following instructions: 
In order to respond to each item on the rating scale, you must drag the and drop the 
X over the number that most accurately reflects your response to that particular item  
 
To drag and drop the X  
 
 Double click on the X relevant to the question you are responding to.  
 A shaded square should appear around the X. 
 Move the cursor so that it hovers over one of the sides of the square (and not the    
       corner of the square). 
 Hold down the left mouse button and drag the mouse to the number that     
       represents the response you want to make. 
 Release the left mouse button. 
 The X should now appear over the response that you wish to make. 
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Having completed these ratings, participants were then instructed to proceed 
immediately to the IRAP.  
IRAP. Participants in the ACT Group completed an identical IRAP to that 
outlined for the Statement-IRAP in Experiment 6. The IRAP procedure was accessed 
through an online web link provided at the end of the instruction manual 
(https://rft.ori.org/exper/webPresentation.php?opt=4). At this point, participants were 
required to enter their unique personalised identification number and password in 
order to proceed with the IRAP task. At the end of the IRAP, a message appeared 
indicating that the sorting tasks were complete and they were free to close down their 
internet connection. Only data from the test phase was saved on the internet site and 
was accessible online to the experimenter, who also had a unique identification 
number and password to access the website. 
Post-Experimental Measures. Participants were required to complete a second 
exposure to the IRAP-related Believability Scales in an identical manner as outlined 
above.   
Participants were then asked to save the changes they had made to the consent 
form, as well as the Pre- and Post-Experimental measures and to return these to the 
experimenter via email. 
 Upon receipt of these documents, the experimenter replied to each participant 
via email with a full debrief of the experimental procedure. Participants were also 
provided with the opportunity to ask any further questions at this time. No participants 
had any further questions, however, a number requested a copy of the overall results 
once all the data had been collected and written for publication.  
All participants completed the study in a single experimental session. 
Participants in the Non-ACT Group completed all aspects of the experiment between 
 158
20 and 30mins. in total. Participants in the ACT Group generally took longer to 
complete the experiment, averaging 45 to 55mins. to complete.   
 
RESULTS 
 
DIRAP-(trial- type) Data.. Consistent with the analyses conducted on the D scores in 
the previous experiments, the DIRAP-(trial-type) scores were calculated for each 
participant in Experiment 7 on the two groups of IRAP trial-types that might be 
collectively referred to as Pro-Me and Pro-Should be for both the ACT Group and the 
Non-ACT Group. This data is presented in Figure 12. Both groups of participants 
showed a strong implicit positive bias towards the self, with little or no opinion on 
how they felt they should be. Interestingly, participants in the ACT Group appeared 
more certain that they were positive than those in the Non-ACT Group. 
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Figure 12. The mean DIRAP-(trial-type) scores and standard error bars for the sample stimuli for the Non-
ACT and ACT groups in Experiment 7. 
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A 2x2 mixed-between-within AVOVA was conducted, with group (ACT and 
Non-ACT) as the between participants variables and trial-type (I AM and I SHOULD 
BE) as the within participants variable. The results revealed a significant main effect 
for trial-type [F (1, 36) = 13.94, p = .007, p2 = .28]. However, the main effect for 
group and the interaction effect were both non-significant (p’s = .28 and .32, 
respectively).      
 Four separate one sample t-tests indicated that the I AM trial-type produced a 
large significant difference from zero for both the ACT Group, t (35) = 4.938, p 
< .0001, 2 = .59 and Non-ACT Group, t (39) = 3.64, p = .0008, 2 = .47. As expected, 
the effect for the I SHOULD BE trial-type was non-significant for both the ACT 
Group (p = .54) and the Non-ACT Group (p = .61).    
 Overall therefore, the results indicated that both groups had a strong positive 
implicit self-regard, although participants in the ACT Group were slightly more 
certain of this. Both groups reacted similarly to the I SHOULD BE statements, with 
no strong opinions being shown in this regard.    
 
Explicit Measures 
Psychological Measures. The means scores (and standard deviations) for each 
of the psychological measures are presented in Table 15. Scores from both groups fell 
within the normal range for the depression, anxiety and stress sub-scales. As expected, 
both groups reported high levels of self-esteem, as measured by the RSES. Both 
groups also reported high levels of awareness and acceptance on the mindfulness 
measure. 
 
 
 160
Table 15 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Each of the Psychological Measures for the 
ACT and Non-ACT Groups in Experiment 7 
Psychological Measure 
 
Norms ACT Group Non-ACT Group 
RSES - 25.29 (4.06) 22.60 (4.68) 
 
DASS 
   
Depression < 9 4.59 (4.17) 4.50 (6.08) 
Anxiety < 7 1.29 (1.57) 3.70 (6.33) 
Stress <14 9.65 (5.67) 9.60 (5.97) 
 
PHLMS 
   
Awareness 36.65 (4.93) 39.53 (7.20) 32.50 (5.01) 
Acceptance 30.19 (5.84) 40.94 (4.59) 32.75 (4.27) 
Note. ‘-’ indicates that no normative data is available. 
 
A series of separate unpaired samples t-tests were conducted to determine 
whether there was any difference between the two groups in terms of their 
performance on the psychological measures. Results indicated a significant difference 
between the two groups in terms of levels of awareness, t (35) = 3.49, p = .001, 2 
= .25, and acceptance, t (35) = 5.62, p < .0001, 2 = .47. As expected, participants in 
the ACT Group produced higher scores on both measures. Differences between the 
two groups on the remaining psychological measures were non-significant (all p’s 
>.07).  
IRAP-Related Believability Scale. Mean scores (and standard deviations) for 
responses to the IRAP-related Believability Scale for both the ACT and Non-ACT 
groups are presented in Table 16. As expected, participants in both groups rated the 
positive statements as more believable than the negative statements. Although there 
were some apparent changes on these scales from Pre- to Post-IRAP for both groups, 
these differences were small.  
 
 161
Table 16 
Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) for Believability Ratings of Positive and 
Negative Statements at Pre- and Post-IRAP for ACT and Non-ACT Groups  in 
Experiment 7 
Believability Scale Pre-IRAP 
 
Post-IRAP 
 ACT Non-ACT ACT Non-ACT 
 
Positive  1.80 (1.28) 1.82 (1.02) 1.78 (1.66) 2.03 (.755) 
Negative  -1.32 (1.76) -1.38 (1.61) -1.50 (1.85) -1.37 (1.72) 
Note. Higher scores indicate statements were rated as more believable.  
 
A 2x2x2 mixed-between-within repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, 
with group (ACT versus Non-ACT) as the between participant variable and statement 
type (positive and negative) and time (Pre-IRAP and Post-IRAP) as the within 
participant variables. The results indicated a large significant main effect for 
statement type [F (3, 102) = 86.11, p < .0001, p2 = .72]. All other effects were non-
significant (all p’s > .59).  
Thus, participants rated the positive statements as significantly more 
believable than the negative words. However, no differences were recorded between 
Pre- and Post-IRAP ratings and this effect held for both the ACT and Non-ACT 
Groups.   
 
Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
Psychological Measures. Separate correlation analyses were conducted 
between the three implicit measures (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM score and 
IRAP-I SHOULD BE score) and each of the psychological measures (depression, 
anxiety, stress, RSES, awareness and acceptance) for both groups. Results from the 
ACT Group revealed small to medium correlations between the psychological 
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measures and the IRAP scores (all r’s < -.32). Correlational analyses from the Non-
ACT Group also revealed small to medium correlations (all r’s < -.40).   
 IRAP-Related Believability Scale. Separate correlation analyses were 
conducted between the three implicit measures (IRAP-Overall score, IRAP-I AM 
score and IRAP-I SHOULD BE score) and the believability IRAP-related 
Believability Scale for both groups. Results from the ACT Group revealed small 
correlations between the believability ratings and the IRAP scores (all r’s < .22). 
Correlational analyses from the Non-ACT Group also revealed small correlations (all 
r’s < .08).   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from Experiment 7 indicated that participants in both the ACT and 
Non-ACT Groups had a strong positive implicit self-regard. However, subtle 
differences emerged between the two groups in terms of the strength of their reactions. 
Specifically, participants in the ACT Group were more certain that they were positive 
than the Non-ACT Group. Participants in both groups indicated no strong reaction 
towards the I SHOULD BE statements. Interestingly, the ACT Group also had 
significantly higher levels of awareness and acceptance on the PHLMS. However, 
neither measure correlated with any of the implicit measures. Correlations between 
the implicit measures and the explicit believability ratings of the positive and negative 
statements were also non-significant.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Experiment 6 was designed to investigate the relative impact of words versus 
statements in a sample of undergraduate students. Overall, the statements appeared to 
be associated with greater uncertainty in terms of positive implicit self-regard, as well 
as in terms of how participants felt they should be. It was therefore considered that the 
statements would be more beneficial than words for use with a defusion intervention.  
 Experiment 7 was designed as a preliminary investigation into the impact of 
defusion on an individual’s implicit self-regard. Specifically, participants with a 
history of experience with defusion (ACT Group) were compared to those with no 
such experience (Non-ACT Group). The results indicated subtle differences between 
the two groups in terms of implicit positive self-regard and explicit levels of 
awareness and acceptance, with the ACT group scoring higher in both contexts. 
Overall, the pattern of responding in Experiment 7 suggested that those participants 
with a greater history of defusion were more certain that they were positive and not 
negative at an implicit level. However, there are a number of other potential variables 
that could influence this pattern of responding. For example, although participants in 
the ACT Group had a greater history of defusion techniques, they were also familiar 
with a range of other ACT techniques and were professionals (as opposed to 
undergraduates), thus, making it difficult to decipher the specific contribution of 
defusion history to these results.  
 The next and final phase of the current research program was designed to 
investigate the impact of a simple defusion intervention on implicit ratings of the self 
in a sample of individuals with no prior experience of defusion. This would also 
afford an investigation into the specific contribution of defusion to the different 
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pattern of responding obtained for the ACT and Non-ACT Groups in Experiment 7. 
This was the primary focus of Experiment 8, the final experiment of the current thesis.  
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Chapter 6 
Experiment 8 
Using the IRAP to Measure Reactions to Positive and 
Negative Self-Statements Following a Cognitive Defusion 
Intervention 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 Experiment 7 provided a preliminary investigation into the impact of defusion 
on implicit reactions to positive and negative self-statements. The results of this 
experiment revealed a different pattern of responding in individuals with a greater 
history of defusion than those with no history of defusion, with the former reporting 
stronger implicit positive self-regard. With this in mind, the current experiment was 
designed to investigate the impact of defusion on implicit self-regard in a sample of 
individuals with no history of defusion, where there remained some potential room for 
improvement in implicit self-esteem.  
 
Implicit Cognitions and Clinical Interventions 
 Implicit measures have a limited history of use in measuring the impact of 
clinical interventions and little evidence exists of their utility in this regard. 
Nevertheless, research investigating the impact of clinical interventions on implicit 
cognitions is warranted, particularly given the argument that various 
psychopathologies may comprise of dysfunctional implicit beliefs that may not be 
consciously available and yet may still influence clinically relevant behaviours (Beck, 
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Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; de Houwer, 2002). For example, research has identified 
the role of implicit cognitions in a number of clinically relevant areas including: 
anxiety-related behaviours (Egloff, & Schmuckle, 2002); suicidal behaviour (Nock, & 
Banaji, 2007) and substance abuse (e.g. cocaine: Wiers, Houben, & de Kraker, 2007; 
marijuana: Ames et al., 2007; and alcohol: Thush, & Wiers, 2007). In many cases, 
implicit measures have predicted these behaviours over and above explicit measures. 
As such, implicit measures provide an important method of assessing clinically 
relevant thoughts that may otherwise remain untreated (de Jong et al., 2001; Robinson, 
Meier, Zetocha, & McCaul, 2005).  
As a result, researchers have begun to investigate the impact of clinical 
interventions on implicit cognitions. One of the first investigations into the utility of 
implicit procedures as a measure of the impact of clinical intervention was reported 
by Teachman and Woody (2003). Specifically, the authors investigated the impact of 
a group-based exposure treatment on implicit spider associations in a sample of spider 
phobic individuals. The results from four separate IATs indicated significant 
decreases in associations between spiders/disgusting and spiders/afraid from Pre- to 
Post-Intervention and these effects remained at a two-month follow-up. However, the 
associations between spiders/bad and spiders/dangerous did not change following the 
intervention. Importantly, no changes in IAT scores were recorded for the No 
Intervention control group at either post-test or follow-up.  
More recently, researchers have begun to investigate the impact of a specific 
pain intervention on implicit self-pain associations as well as on implicit self-esteem 
(Grumm, Erbe, von Collani, & Nestler, 2008). Specifically, patients with chronic pain 
were exposed to an intensive pain treatment every day over a four week period. The 
results indicated a decrease in implicit associations between pain and the self for the 
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chronic pain group, whereas no such decrease was reported in the group of healthy 
controls (none of which were exposed to any intervention). Interestingly, participants 
in the pain group reported significantly lower levels of implicit self-esteem at Pre-
Intervention relative to the control group. Post-Intervention scores indicated no 
change in implicit self-esteem for the pain group. Unexpectedly, a significant 
decrease in implicit self-esteem was reported for the control group. Similar positive 
results have also been reported in the context of social anxiety, with reductions 
reported on an anxiety-related IAT in a sample of socially anxious individuals at Post-
intervention ratings (Gamer, Schmukle, Luka-Krausgrill, & Egloff, in press). 
 
The Current Study 
 Experiment 8 was focused on measuring the specific impact of cognitive 
defusion on implicit responses to a range of positive and negative self-statements and 
as such, was designed to determine whether implicit measures may offer a 
supplemented measure of defusion to explicit self-reports. The primary manipulation 
in this experiment was exposure to a defusion intervention or exposure to a placebo 
condition. Specifically, IRAP performance was measured before and after exposure to 
one of the conditions in a sample of university students (undergraduates and 
postgraduates). Once again, as in the previous IRAPs, Experiment 8 was purely 
exploratory, and as such we made no firm predictions regarding the outcomes.   
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METHOD 
 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants (10 males) aged between 22 and 30 years (M = 26) 
comprised the final sample of Experiment 8. Half of these participants (n = 12) were 
randomly assigned to the Defusion Group, with the other half assigned to the Placebo 
Group (5 males and 7 females in each group). Participants were either undergraduates 
or postgraduate students, recruited through Faculty announcements at NUIM. All 
participants had a high level of fluency in English and normal, or corrected-to-normal, 
vision. There were no incentives for participation. In addition to the 24 participants 
who completed the experiment, seven failed to reach the required criteria in either the 
training or test phases of the IRAP. Hence, their data was excluded from further 
analyses.  
   
Setting  
The study was conducted in the experimental cubicles in the Psychology 
Department at NUIM. Noise and distraction were kept to a minimum throughout the 
experiment. Each participant completed all aspects of the experiment individually and 
in an individual cubicle. The experimenter remained seated outside the cubicle for the 
duration of the study.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Explicit Measures. Participants completed the DASS-21 (Lovibond, & 
Lovibond, 1995 -- see Appendix G and Chapter 3), the RSES (Rosenberg, 1965 -- see 
Appendix I and Chapter 4) and the PHLMS (Cardaciotto et al., in press -- see 
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Appendix L and Chapter 5), as well as the IRAP-related Believability Scale employed 
in Experiment 7 (see Appendix M and Chapter 5).   
IRAP. Two identical IRAPs were used in the current experiment, one at Pre-
Intervention and one at Post-Intervention. Both IRAPs were identical to the 
Statement-IRAP outlined in Experiments 6 and 7 (see Chapter 5).    
Therapeutic Scripts. The therapeutic scripts for the Defusion and Placebo 
Conditions employed here were identical to those used in Experiment 2. Specifically, 
the Defusion Group here was identical to the Defusion/Defusion Condition in 
Experiment 2. Participants in the Defusion Group, therefore, were exposed to both a 
defusion rationale and defusion exercise. The Placebo Group was identical to the 
Placebo/Placebo Condition in Experiment 2. Participants assigned to this group were 
exposed to both a placebo rationale and a placebo exercise. 
In addition, participants were also presented with a stopwatch and tape 
recorder, which were essential to the completion of these experimental exercises.   
 
Ethical Issues 
Experiment 8 followed the same ethical guidelines as the previous IRAP 
experiments and the earlier experiments involving defusion interventions.   
 
Procedure 
 Experiment 8 contained ten experimental phases, always completed in the 
same order. The ten phases are summarised in Table 17.  
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Table 17 
An Outline of the Ten Experimental Phases employed in Experiment 8 
Experimental Phase Description 
 
Phase 1 Pre-Experimental psychological measures (DASS-21, RSES, and PHLMS) and 
IRAP-related Believability Scale 
 
Phase 2 Pre-Intervention Statement-IRAP 
 
 
Phase 3 Pre-Intervention ratings on the IRAP-related Believability Scale 
 
 
Phase 4 Generating a personally relevant uncomfortable thought and restating this 
thought as a single word 
 
Phase 5 Pre-Intervention ratings of personally relevant thought for levels of discomfort, 
believability and willingness  
 
Phase 6 Participants were exposed to either the Defusion rationale and exercise or the 
Placebo rationale and exercise  
 
Phase 7 Post-Intervention ratings of personally relevant thought for levels of 
discomfort, believability and willingness 
 
Phase 8 Post-Intervention adherence ratings assessing honesty in responding and level 
of difficulty associated with instructions 
 
Phase 9 Post-Intervention Statement-IRAP 
 
 
Phase 10 Post-Intervention ratings on the IRAP-related Believability Scale  
 
 
 
Participants were thanked for their co-operation and time. They were then 
appropriately debriefed about the nature of the experiment and invited to ask any 
questions. Although made available to them, no participants opted for short breaks at 
any point. All participants completed the study in a single session that lasted between 
75 and 90mins.    
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RESULTS 
 
 DIRAP-(trial-type) Data. Consistent with the analyses conducted on the D scores in 
previous experiments, the DIRAP-(trial-type) scores were calculated for each participant in 
Experiment 8 for the Pro-ME and the Pro-Should be trial-types for both the Defusion 
Group and the Placebo Group at both Pre- and Post-Intervention intervals. This data is 
presented in Figure 13. For the I AM trials, both groups produced identical Pre-
Intervention ratings indicating a strong positive implicit self-regard. However, the 
groups produced different Post-Intervention scores for the I AM trial-types. Although 
both groups became more certain that they were positive, those assigned to the 
Defusion Group produced a larger effect. Although both groups indicated that they 
should be positive, Pre-Intervention scores in this regard were very small. Post-
Intervention scores for this trial-type suggested that those assigned to the Placebo 
Group became more certain that they should be positive than those assigned to the 
Defusion Group.   
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Figure 13. The mean DIRAP-(trial-type) scores and standard error bars for the pre- and post-intervention 
IRAPs for the Defusion and Placebo groups in Experiment 8.  
  
 A 2x2x2 mixed-between-within repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, 
with group (Defusion and Placebo) as the between participants variable and trial-type 
(I AM and I SHOULD BE) and time (Pre- and Post-Intervention) as the within 
participant variables. The results revealed a significant main effect for trial-type [F (1, 
44) = 38.63, p < .0001, p2 = .48]. However, the main effect for group and time were 
both non-significant (p’s = .26 and .65, respectively), as were the interaction effects 
(all p’s < .23).   
 A series of separate one sample t-tests indicated that the I AM trial-type 
produced a large significant for both groups at both Pre- and Post-Intervention 
(Defusion Group: Pre-Intervention = t (23) = 4.03, p = .0005, 2  = .60; Post-
Intervention = t (23) = 4.79, p < .0001, 2  = .68 and Placebo Group: Pre-Intervention 
= t (23) = 3.22, p = .004, 2  = .49; Post-Intervention = t (23) = .2.64, p = .02, 2 
= .58). As expected, all effects for the I SHOULD BE trial-type were non-significant 
(all p’s > .06).      
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 Overall therefore, the results indicate that both groups had a strong positive 
implicit self-regard prior to, and following, exposure to the intervention. Both groups 
generally reported no strong opinions towards the I SHOULD BE statements, 
although Post-Intervention ratings for the Placebo group approached significance -- 
this effect was not obtained for the Defusion Group.   
 
Explicit Measures 
 Psychological Measures. The mean scores (and standard deviations) for each 
of the psychological measures are presented in Table 18. Scores from both groups fell 
within the normal to moderate range for the depression and stress sub-scales. 
Furthermore, participants in the Defusion Group reported moderate levels of anxiety, 
while those in the Placebo Groups reported normal levels. Despite these differences, 
participants in both groups reported high levels of self-esteem, as measured by the 
RSES. Both groups also reported high levels of awareness and acceptance on the 
mindfulness measure.  
 
Table 18 
Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) for Each of the Psychological Measures for 
the Defusion and Placebo Conditions in Experiment 8 
Psychological Measure 
 
Norms Defusion Placebo 
RSES - 21.50 (3.40) 22.33 (5.98) 
 
DASS 
   
Depression < 9 7.67 (6.76) 6.6 (5.73) 
Anxiety < 7 11.33 (6.63) 5.83 (7.46) 
Stress <14 13.83 (8.29) 9.83 (6.95) 
 
PHLMS 
   
Awareness 36.65 (4.93) 36.50 (4.62) 34.25 (5.99) 
Acceptance 30.19 (5.84) 29.60 (6.84) 36.25 (6.18) 
Note. ‘-’ indicates that no normative data is available. 
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A series of separate independent samples t-test were conducted to determine 
whether there was any difference between the two groups in terms of their 
performance on the psychological measures. Results indicated a significant difference 
between the two groups in terms of levels of acceptance, t (22) = -2.54, p = .02, 2  
= .23, with participants in the Defusion Group producing significantly lower scores on 
the acceptance scales. Differences between the two groups on the remaining 
psychological measures were non-significant (all p’s > .07).  
 IRAP-Related Believability Scale. Mean scores (and standard deviations) for 
responses to the IRAP-related Believability Scale for both the Defusion and Placebo 
Groups across the three time periods are presented in Table 19. 
 
Table 19 
Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) for Believability Ratings of Positive and 
Negative Statements at Times 1, 2 and 3 for Defusion and Placebo Groups in 
Experiment 8 
Believability Scale Time 1 
(Pre-Experimental) 
Time 2 
(Pre-Intervention) 
 
Time 3 
(Post-Intervention) 
 Defusion Placebo 
 
Defusion Placebo 
 
Defusion Placebo 
 
Positive  1.68 (1.17) 1.85 (1.40) 1.64 (1.36) 2.18 (.91) 1.81 (1.11) 2.12 (1.21) 
Negative  -1.04 (1.61) -1.46 (1.76) -1.03 (1.58) -1.57  (1.67) -1.28 (1.70) -1.68 (1.53) 
Note. Higher scores indicate statements were rated as more believable.  
 
 A 2x2x3 mixed-between-within repeated measures AVOVA was conducted, 
with group (Defusion and Placebo) as the between participant variable and statement 
type (positive and negative) and time (Pre-Experimental, Pre-Intervention and Post-
Intervention) as the within participant variables. The results indicated a large 
significant main effect for statement type [F (1, 63) = 144.91, p < .0001, p2 = .70]. 
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All other effects were non-significant (all p’s > .29). Thus, participants rated the 
positive statements as significantly more believable than the negative statements. 
However, believability ratings did not change across the three time periods and this 
effect held for both the Defusion and Placebo Groups.  
 
Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Measures 
 Psychological Measures. Separate correlation analyses were conducted 
between the three implicit measures (IRAP-Overall scores, IRAP-I AM score and 
IRAP-I SHOULD BE score) and each of the psychological measures (depression, 
anxiety, stress, RSES, awareness and acceptance) for both groups. Results from the 
Defusion group at the Pre-Intervention IRAP indicated small to medium correlations 
(all r’s < .32). Interestingly, Post-Intervention correlations revealed a number large 
correlations emerged between the Post-Intervention IRAP-Overall score and some of 
the psychological measures. Specifically, the Post-Intervention IRAP-Overall score 
produced large negative correlations with levels of anxiety (r = -.82, n = 12, p = .0006) 
and depression (r = -.76, n = 12, p = .003), as well as a large positive correlation with 
levels of self-esteem (r = .68, n = 12, p = .01). 
 Results from the Placebo Group at Pre-Intervention IRAP overall indicated 
small to medium correlations (all r’s < -.44), with the exception of the large negative 
correlation obtained between the IRAP-Overall score and levels of acceptance (r = -
.57, n = 12, p = .05). Interestingly, this correlation did not hold at Post-Intervention (r 
= .009). All remaining correlations between Post-Intervention IRAP scores and 
psychological measures were small to medium in size (all r’s < .47).   
 Taken together, therefore, the results indicated a different pattern of 
correlation for both groups at Pre- and Post-Intervention ratings, suggesting a change 
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in pattern of implicit responding following exposure to either Defusion or Placebo 
instructions.  
IRAP-Related Believability Scale. Separate correlation analyses were 
conducted between the three Pre-Intervention implicit measures (IRAP-Overall scores, 
IRAP-I AM score and IRAP-I SHOULD BE score) and the IRAP-related 
Believability Scale for both groups. Results from the Defusion Group revealed a large 
negative correlation between the believability ratings of the positive statements and 
implicit responses to the I SHOULD BE trial-types (r = -.57, n = 12, p = .003). That is, 
participants with high explicit rating of believability of positive were less likely to 
implicitly indicate that they should be positive. All remaining correlations were small 
to medium (all r’s < .41).  Correlational analyses from the Placebo Group revealed 
only small to medium correlations (all r’s < .41).   
Explicit Ratings of Self-Generated Thought. Consistent with the analysis in 
Experiment 2, a series of analyses were conducted on self-reported levels of 
discomfort, believability and willingness associated with the self-generated 
uncomfortable thought at Pre- and Post-Intervention.   
 Discomfort. The mean discomfort ratings at Pre- and Post-Intervention 
intervals for the Defusion and Placebo Groups are presented in Table 20. Participants’ 
Pre-Intervention scores ranged between 65 and 75 on the scale, where 100 represented 
maximum discomfort. In both cases, discomfort decreased from Pre- to Post-
Intervention.  
A 2x2 mixed-between-within repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on 
the discomfort data, with group (Defusion and Placebo) as the between participant 
variable and time (Pre- and Post-Intervention) as the within participant variable. 
Results indicated a significant main effect for time [F (1, 22) = 19.67, p = .0002, p2 
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= .47], but not for group (p = .72). The interaction effect was also non-significant (p 
= .33). Mean scores from both Defusion and Placebo indicated that self-report levels 
of discomfort associated with the negative self-referential thought decreased from 
Pre- to Post-Intervention.    
 
Table 20  
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Discomfort, Believability and Willingness 
Ratings at Pre- and Post-Intervention in Experiment 8 
Condition  
 
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention 
Discomfort Ratings   
Defusion 72.50 (17.12) 47.50 (22.61) 
Placebo 65.00 (24.68) 49.17 (25.75) 
 
Believability Ratings 
  
Defusion 66.67 (23.48) 50.00 (31.04) 
Placebo 72.50 (23.01) 45.83 (25.75) 
 
Willingness Ratings 
  
Defusion 39.17 (21.57) 45.83 (27.78) 
Placebo 45.00 (30.30) 60.00 (22.16) 
 
Believability. The mean believability ratings suggested an overall decrease in 
levels of believability from Pre- to Post-Intervention (see Table 20). Participants’ Pre-
Intervention scores ranged between 65 and 75 on the scale, where 100 represented 
maximum believability. The 2x2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time 
[F (1, 22) = 12.31, p = .002, p2 = .57], with group and interaction effects non-
significant (p = .92 and .43, respectively). Mean scores indicated that self-reported 
levels of believability decreased from Pre- to Post-Intervention for both groups.  
Willingness. The mean willingness ratings suggested an overall increase in 
levels of willingness from Pre- to Post-Intervention (see Table 20). Participants’ Pre-
Intervention scores ranged between 35 and 45 on the scale, where 100 represented 
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maximum willingness. The 2x2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time 
[F (1, 22) = 6.48, p = .02, p2 = .23], with group and interaction effects non-
significant (p = .31 and .34, respectively). Mean scores indicated that self-reported 
levels of willingness increased from Pre- to Post-Intervention for both groups.  
 
Adherence Measures 
Honesty. Results indicated that both groups responded very honestly when 
rating their self-generated negative thought (Defusion: M = 90.83, SD = 10.84 and 
Placebo: M = 93.33, SD = 6.51, where 100 represents maximum honesty). 
Unsurprisingly, the results of an independent t-test confirmed that the two groups did 
not differ significantly from each other in this regard (p = .50).  
Difficulty Ratings. Overall, participants did not find the Defusion or Placebo 
instructions difficult to follow (Defusion: M = 29.17, SD = 24.66 and Placebo: M = 
32.50, SD = 33.61, where 100 represents maximum difficulty). Once again, the results 
of an independent t-test revealed no significant difference between the two groups in 
this regard (p = .78).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Experiment 8 investigated the impact of a simple defusion intervention on 
implicit ratings of the self in a sample of individuals with no prior experience of 
defusion. The results indicated that participants in both the Defusion and Placebo 
Groups had a strong implicit positive self-regard prior to exposure to the intervention. 
However, subtle differences emerged between the two groups at Post-intervention 
with participants in the Defusion Group becoming slightly more certain that they were 
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positive than the Placebo Group. Participants in both groups indicated no strong 
reactions towards the I SHOULD BE statements at Pre-Intervention. However, once 
again, subtle differences emerged between the two groups at Post-intervention. 
Specifically, participants in the Placebo Group became more certain that they should 
be positive than those assigned to the Defusion Group.  
 The results obtained here for the Defusion Group were consistent with those 
obtained in Experiment 7 in terms of an increased positive implicit self-regard 
associated with defusion. Despite this, subtle differences emerged elsewhere between 
the results obtained in the current study and those reported previously. First 
differences emerged between the results obtained here and those obtained in 
Experiment 2 in terms of explicit ratings of the self-generated personally relevant 
thought. Specifically, participants in the Defusion Group here reported increased 
willingness to experience their negative thought, however, no changes in willingness 
were recorded in Experiment 2. Furthermore, participants in the Placebo Group 
reported significantly decreased explicit discomfort and believability and increased 
willingness, however, no such changes were obtained for the Placebo/Placebo 
condition in Experiment 2. 
 Second, a large negative correlation emerged between the believability ratings 
of the positive statements and the I SHOULD BE implicit scores produced by the 
Defusion Group. Similar correlations were not previously reported. Third, a different 
pattern of correlations emerged between the implicit and explicit psychological 
measures at Pre- and Post-Intervention. Specifically, the Defusion Group did not 
produce any correlations at Pre-Intervention. However, Post-Intervention produced 
large negative correlations with anxiety and depression and large positive correlations 
with explicit self-esteem. In contrast, the Placebo Group produced large negative 
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correlations between the implicit measure and acceptance at Pre-Intervention. 
However, the Post-Intervention IRAP for this group was not correlated with any 
psychological measures. This pattern of correlations was again different to that 
obtained previously.    
Experiment 8 marks the end of the experimental work for the current thesis. 
The next chapter (Chapter 7) presents a summary of the work conducted, as well as a 
general discussion of the findings of all studies in the current thesis. Chapter 7 also 
presents suggestions for future research emanating from the current work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
General Discussion 
Chapter 7  
General Discussion  
 
Research suggests that acceptance, rather than avoidance, of troublesome 
psychological content is associated with positive psychological health and well-being. 
Yet their remains limited knowledge on the processes through which acceptance-
based strategies work. In the current thesis, we have argued that cognitive defusion is 
one core strategy that facilitates psychological acceptance of thoughts, feelings and 
emotions. The primary focus of the present experimental work, therefore, was to 
explore the conditions under which defusion works best and to investigate the 
underlying processes associated with it.  
 
Summary of Findings from Part I: Chapters 2 and 3  
 Part I of the current thesis was designed to investigate the impact of cognitive 
defusion on different types of psychological content, as well as to determine the 
conditions that best facilitate this process. Specifically, the experimental work 
presented in Part I of the thesis investigated the self-reported emotional impact of 
cognitive defusion across a range of different experimental conditions.  
 Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) had three main aims: (1) to investigate the impact of 
placing the defusion prefix “I am having the thought that” in front of a series of self-
statements, and as such offer an insight into the impact of an alternative defusion 
strategy than had previously been employed by Masuda et al. (2004); (2) to 
investigate the impact of simple defusion-related instructions; and (3) to investigate 
the relative impact of defusion on positive and negative self-statements.  
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The results of Experiment 1 indicated that: (1) The defusion prefix “I am 
having the thought that” significantly reduced levels of discomfort associated with the 
negative self-statements. This finding was consistent with the word repetition 
defusion strategy employed by Masuda et al. (2004). Unexpectedly, Experiment 1 
also indicated that defusion increased the believability of the negative self-statements. 
This was inconsistent with Masuda et al. who reported that defusion decreased 
believability. Experiment 1 also reported that defusion increased willingness to 
experience the negative self-statements. This was the first empirical evidence of such 
an effect. (2) The results suggested the greater utility of a defusion exercise over 
defusion-related instructions, with the latter showing little or no impact on the 
emotional ratings of the negative self-statement. Again, this is consistent with the 
Masuda study. (3) The results indicated differences between the impact of defusion on 
positive relative to negative self-statements. Specifically, defusion had little impact on 
the former relative to the latter. Once again, this was the first manipulation of its kind.    
 Experiment 2 was designed to account for some of the discrepancies that arose 
between Experiment 1 and the previously published study by Masuda et al. (2004) 
(e.g. the believability ratings). It was also designed to account for possible 
shortcomings that arose from the design of Experiment 1. For example, unlike 
Masuda, we had not employed personally relevant stimuli. In addition, both the 
instructions and intervention employed here were brief. In response to these issues, 
Experiment 2 had three main aims: (1) to investigate the impact of defusion on 
personally generated negative self-relevant thoughts, as opposed to generic self-
statements; (2) to investigate the impact of more extensive defusion-related 
instruction and exercise (i.e. word repetition) as opposed to the simple instructions 
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and brief exercise used previously; and (3) to investigate the relative impact of 
Defusion versus Thought Control and Placebo conditions.  
 The results from Experiment 2 indicated that: (1) similar to the previous 
research, defusion decreased discomfort. In addition, defusion in this context also 
decreased believability associated with the negative self-referent. Interestingly, 
defusion here had no impact on levels of willingness to experience negative thoughts. 
(2) Once again, the results overall suggested the slight superiority of experiential 
exercise over instructions, although instructions alone did impact ratings in certain 
conditions. (3) Participants exposed to some element of defusion (i.e. either defusion 
rationale and/or exercise) reported the largest decreases in discomfort and 
believability relative to both Thought Control and Placebo conditions.   
 
Theoretical Issues from Part I: Chapters 2 and 3  
The Emotional Impact of Defusion 
Discomfort. Both Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that defusion was associated 
with a significant decrease in the level of discomfort associated with negative 
thoughts about the self. This is consistent with the results obtained in the previous 
published research by Masuda et al. (2004), who also reported a decrease in 
discomfort ratings. Taken together, the results suggest that irrespective of which 
defusion exercise is employed, experientially engaging with defusion reduces 
discomfort of negative thoughts. From an ACT perspective, therapists do not attempt 
to alter the discomfort generated by thoughts and feelings and as such, we made no 
initial predictions regarding the impact of defusion on discomfort. Hence, we were 
initially surprised that defusion decreased discomfort. Nevertheless, consider now a 
context that also involved decreased believability and increased willingness. 
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Specifically, when one’s perspective changes from focusing on the outcome of 
language to focusing on the process of language (i.e. from a perspective in which one 
is their thoughts to one in which they have their thoughts), then it is perhaps 
unsurprising that discomfort begins to dissipate.  
Believability. Discrepancies emerged across studies in terms of the impact of 
defusion on levels of believability associated with the thoughts. Specifically, both 
Experiment 2 and the Masuda et al. (2004) study reported that defusion decreased 
levels of believability associated with the negative self-referents. In contrast, 
Experiment 1 reported that defusion increased believability. Perhaps, this was simply 
because personally-relevant content was not targeted in Experiment 1, but was in the 
other two studies. Or, it may be because different defusion techniques were employed. 
Alternatively, one might even argue that a defusion effect did not occur in Experiment 
1. However, consider first that participants were required to respond to the discomfort 
and willingness scales by responding to the whole defusion statement (e.g. how 
uncomfortable does the statement “I am having the thought that I am a bad person” 
make you feel?). It seems likely, therefore, that participants responded to the 
believability of the statements in the same way (e.g. how believable is it that you are 
having the thought that you are a bad person?). In effect, the increased believability 
ratings for the defused statements indicated that participants believed that they were 
indeed having that thought, rather than the thought being true. In this sense, therefore, 
the increased believability ratings could be seen as evidence for a defusion effect as 
specified by ACT, especially when taken in the context of decreased discomfort and 
increased willingness for the same set of statements. Of course, we can only speculate 
about whether participants here were responding to the self-statement per se or to the 
fully defused statement. 
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Willingness. Discrepancies also emerged in relation to the impact of defusion 
on willingness to experience the negative self-referents. Specifically, Experiment 1 
reported an increase in levels of willingness, where as in Experiment 2 willingness 
remained unaffected (Masuda et al. did not include a measure of willingness in their 
study). Again, it is possible that the difference emerged as a result of the different 
defusion exercises used across both studies. Or again, it is equally plausible that the 
differences emerged due to the type of psychological content targeted. Specifically, in 
Experiment 1, participants were presented with generic negative statements about the 
self, while in Experiment 2 they generated their own. So there are three generic 
possibilities. First in Experiment 1, participants were forced to experience painful 
statements and the defusion prefix helped with this. As a result, willingness went from 
low to high. The possibility that had the participants not been forced to use these 
statements and could instead choose others (as in Experiment 2), explains why there 
was an increase in willingness in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. Second, it is 
simply possible that the fact that participants in Experiment 2 started out with 
relatively high willingness and thus outcomes on this measure could not really be 
expected to increase (i.e. a type of ceiling effect). Third, the content targeted in 
Experiment 1 was not personal, so it might be argued that it was easy for the defusion 
technique to make this content easier to bear. In contrast, the content of Experiment 2 
was hard to bear and thus it makes sense that perhaps participants in the latter case 
would not get more willing to bear this.  
 
Instructions versus Exercise 
 Defusion. The experimental work in Part I of the current thesis adds to the 
debate regarding the most effective delivery of defusion techniques (i.e. instructions 
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versus exercises). The results from Experiment 1 suggested the superiority of a 
defusion exercise and indicated that instructions had no impact on discomfort, 
believability or willingness for negative self-statements. These results were consistent 
with those obtained by Masuda et al. (2004) who reported no impact with a defusion 
rationale alone. Nevertheless, there were a number of experimental shortcomings 
associated with each of these attempts to assess the relative impact of instructions 
versus exercise. Specifically, in Experiment 1, the defusion-related instructions were 
very brief. Furthermore, adherence to these instructions was low. In the rationale 
alone condition in the Masuda et al. study, participants were instructed to apply the 
rationale to their negative thought but at no point did they practice the exercise with 
their target content. As a result, it is difficult to determine what participants actually 
did following the defusion instructions – for example some participants may have 
been able to successfully apply the strategy to their thoughts, whereas others may not. 
Experiment 2 of the current thesis was designed to account for these shortcomings by 
systematically comparing instructions versus exercises, whilst using a more complete 
set of defusion-related instructions. In this context, defusion decreased discomfort for 
both instructions and exercise when presented together or when either was presented 
with a placebo component. With believability, the defusion exercise was superior to 
instructions.  
Thought Control. Experiment 2 also compared the impact of instructions 
versus exercises in the context of Though Control. The results indicated that when 
presented alone (i.e. with Placebo), neither component impacted on discomfort, 
believability or willingness ratings. Once again, these results were different from 
those obtained by Masuda et al. (2004), who reported that thought control instructions 
decreased believability of negative self-referents. In part, this discrepancy may have 
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arisen from differences between the two studies. Specifically, Masuda et al. presented 
participants with a number of different control strategies (e.g. breathing, positive 
imagery and positive self-talk) compared to the single strategy (i.e. word replacement) 
presented in Experiment 2.           
Taken together, the data suggest that defusion and thought control operate in 
different ways from each other in terms of the relative efficacy of instructions versus 
exercises. Furthermore, the impact of instructions and exercises depends on the 
outcome measurement. That is, instructions and exercises have different impacts in 
different areas. One is better for discomfort, the other for believability. In any case, it 
is almost an impossible question to answer because it is nearly impossible to have an 
exercise without some levels of instructions. Nevertheless, it seems to be the case that 
instructions alone without an exercise are likely less effective than with one.    
 
The Psychological Content with which Defusion Works Best 
 One of the main aims of the current thesis was to determine the conditions 
under which defusion works best. To this extent, the experimental data presented in 
Part I contributes to this knowledge. The results from Experiment 1 suggested that 
defusion works best with negative psychological content, but has little impact on 
positive content. However, it might be argued that if individuals are fully defused 
from their psychological content, then they would be defused from both their negative 
and their positive thoughts. For example, if a client was ‘fully defused’ s/he would not 
only not believe negative thoughts, but would also not need to believe positive 
thoughts. On the contrary, one might equally argue that if defusion is viewed as a 
prophylactic against negative or troublesome psychological content, then it is not 
surprising that it should have little impact on positive content, because the latter does 
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not pose the same level of difficulty. The data here lend general support to the latter 
assumption. 
 The experimental work presented in Part I also explored the impact of 
defusion on material that varied in personal relevance. Specifically, Experiment 1 
employed generic self-statements, while Experiment 2 employed self-generated 
statements. It remains difficult to determine the effect of this variable on the data. For 
example, some of the negative self-statements employed in Experiment 1 could have 
been highly personally relevant for some individuals, whereas other statements may 
have been less so. Nevertheless, the results overall suggest that defusion operates 
equally well with all types of negative psychological content in terms of decreases in 
discomfort and believability, although further research is necessary.  
 
Defusion in Relation to Thought Control and Placebo 
 Similar to the experiments reported by Masuda et al. (2004), Experiment 2 of 
the current thesis investigated the impact of defusion relative to other strategies, 
primarily thought control. Overall, both of these studies reported broadly similar 
results. Specifically, both reported reductions in the emotional impact of negative 
self-referents following defusion and thought control, but defusion produced the 
largest reductions overall. In spite of the similar outcomes, participants in the Masuda 
Thought Control Condition were presented with a number of possible methods to 
control their thoughts (e.g. positive self-talk, abdominal breathing, positive imagery). 
In contrast, all participants in Experiment 2 were presented with a single word 
replacement exercise. This latter manipulation was included to provide better 
experimental control, in the event of the possibility that no one thought control 
strategy had been employed by participants in the original research. While the latter 
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manipulation in Experiment 2 was probably better, the concordance of data suggests 
that participants in the Masuda study were all engaging in thought control but may 
simply have been doing so in different ways.  
 Despite the similarities in outcomes for thought control, differences emerged 
across studies in terms of the Placebo Conditions. In Experiment 2, Placebo involved 
neutral reading content unrelated to the research. In contrast, Masuda et al. employed 
Placebo as part of their Distraction Condition. However, participants in the latter 
study were not explicitly instructed to try to distract themselves from any features of 
the experiment, rather they were simply instructed to read neutral content. 
Furthermore, Masuda’s Distraction Condition may or may not have been preceded by 
Defusion (due to the nature of the alternating treatment design). And in Experiment 2, 
Placebo may or may not have been combined with Defusion. The former study 
reported that distraction decreased discomfort and believability, while the latter 
reported a decrease in believability for Placebo instructions, only when combined 
with a Defusion exercise. More importantly, the double placebo condition 
(Placebo/Placebo) did not produce any significant decreases in levels of discomfort or 
believability, thus suggesting that the previous effect was a result of the Defusion 
exercise and not the Placebo instructions. The use of an independent groups design in 
Experiment 2 afforded direct comparison between conditions, whereas the alternating 
treatment designs employed by Masuda et al. highlighted differences from one 
treatment design to another. Thus, the choice of design employed in Experiment 2 
allowed for a more accurate account of the impact of Placebo. And the data were 
relatively clear, Placebo was not associated with changes in the emotional impact of 
the negative self-referents.      
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Adherence Measures  
 Part I of the current thesis highlights the importance of including adherence 
measures in clinical analogue studies. Adherence to experimental instructions and 
strategy is a complex issue and is often hard to balance against other simple 
experimental concerns such as, how easily participants can interpret what they have to 
do and how long they are willing to spend doing the experiment. Addressing 
adherence is no simple matter because it immediately raises questions about what 
adherence should be detected. For example, if you check early on that participants 
understood instructions, you probably have to check again later to see if they are 
following the designated strategy. It is also almost impossible to determine precisely 
what they did and if they did this in the way that they were advised to do it. 
Experiment 1 and 2 in particular, attempted to examine adherence as a core feature of 
the experimental design. Participants in both Experiments 1 and 2 reported high levels 
of honesty in their responding. Experiment 1 also included a measure of control by 
defusion-related instruction, to determine the impact of the instruction on participants’ 
emotional ratings of the self-statements. The low adherence ratings for the defusion-
related instructions were entirely consistent with their lack of impact on the ratings. If 
participants in all three groups had not attended well to the information regarding 
defusion, it is unlikely that they would have been influenced by this subsequently. 
However, it was not the case that participants did not understand these instructions, 
because on the instruction booklet, they had been asked to tick a box to indicate that 
they had fully understood and all participants had done so. It also remains possible 
that participants interpreted the adherence question (presented at the end of the 
experiment) as a reference to their adherence to the main instructions regarding the 
presentations of the statements and the ratings. However, this seems unlikely because 
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the strong changes in ratings suggested no lack of adherence during this part of the 
experiment, whereas the limited impact of the defusion instructions does imply lack 
of adherence at that earlier point. Although it is difficult to provide instructions that 
encourage participants to attend fully to them, while at the same time avoiding them 
doing any experiential exercises, the current study, at the very least, highlights the 
importance of including adherence measures. 
 Experiment 2 included two further adherence measures -- difficulty of 
instructions and daily use strategy. Differences emerged across conditions in terms of 
their ratings of difficulty in following the instructions. Participants in Thought 
Control/Thought Control rated their instructions as the most difficult (mean of 50, 
where 100 equals extremely difficult). In contrast, participants presented with either a 
Thought Control rationale or Thought Control exercise combined with some other 
element (e.g. defusion or placebo) did not report exceptionally higher ratings in this 
regard. The data suggest therefore, that participants did not benefit from the intended 
internal consistency between instructions and exercises in terms of thought control. In 
contrast, internal consistency did work for defusion. It is possible that these results 
emerged in part, from individuals’ pervious history with thought control. For example, 
although the instructions may have been consistent with what participants already do, 
the exercise may not have been. Thus, the intended internal consistency may not have 
aided participants in this context. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to determine what 
effect, if any, the higher difficulty ratings had overall on the experimental results.  
 Differences also emerged in Experiment 2 on reported levels of daily use of 
the strategy employed. Generally, participants presented with the Thought Control 
strategy were significantly more likely to have used this strategy on a daily basis than 
those presented with the Defusion strategy. Although this may suggest that the 
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positive effects for the Defusion strategy emerged due to the novelty of the exercise, it 
should be emphasised that overall, across all nine conditions, the use of defusion as a 
strategy was relatively low. Even if one argued that the positive effects of defusion 
were due to the novelty of the exercise, this in and of itself is not necessarily 
problematic as defusion strategies are designed to help clients who have been 
engaging in unworkable strategies. Thus, encouraging participants to do something 
different appears to have a positive impact on one’s reactions to their negative self 
content. In any case, it is entirely consistent with ACT that the general use of defusion 
is considerably lower than the use of thought control.   
 
Summary of Findings from Part II: Chapters 4, 5 and 6  
 Part II of the current thesis attempted to explain the conflicting evidence 
obtained across studies in terms of the self-reported ratings of the impact of defusion 
on discomfort, believability and willingness associated with negative thoughts. 
Specifically, the experimental work in the second half of the thesis was designed to 
assess the emotional impact of defusion on implicit measures of self-regard in an 
attempt to circumvent the problems associated with self-report measures.  
 Chapter 4 presented three exploratory experiments, the primary aim of which 
was to begin to create an IRAP that would tap into implicit self-relevant content (e.g. 
low self-esteem) in a manner that would subsequently allow us to manipulate these 
implicit attitudes through defusion. All three experiments were identical in terms of 
the positive and negative words presented to participants as target stimuli. However, 
each experiment differed in terms of the type of sample stimuli presented. Specifically, 
Experiment 3 presented I AM versus I AM NOT, Experiment 4 presented I AM 
versus OTHERS ARE, while Experiment 5 presented I AM versus I SHOULD BE. 
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Across all three experiments, the results indicated that participants had a strong 
implicit positive self-regard, with little or no reaction to the comparison sample 
stimulus in each case. Nevertheless, the results from Experiment 5 (I AM versus I 
SHOULD BE) indicated the overall weakest levels of implicit positive self-regard, 
relative to the other two experiments.         
 Experiment 6 (Chapter 5) considered whether positive and negative statements 
(e.g. ‘I am so alone that it hurts’) would better reflect the type of thoughts that people 
experience as opposed to simple positive and negative words (e.g. ‘I am lonely’). The 
former, therefore, may be more susceptible to a defusion intervention in the context of 
‘I AM versus I SHOULD BE’ IRAP. The results confirmed this hypothesis, with 
participants relatively less certain that they were positive when presented with whole 
statements as target stimuli relative to words.  
 Experiment 7 (Chapter 5) was designed as a preliminary exploration to 
determine if the Statement-IRAP would be susceptible to defusion-related changes 
with groups of individuals with different levels of experience with defusion. 
Specifically, responses were compared between a group of undergraduates 
(considered to have no experience with defusion) and a group of ACT therapists 
(considered to have considerable experience with defusion, either personally or 
through therapeutic work with clients). Once again, the results indicated that both 
groups reported a strong implicit positive self-regard. However, the ACT Group 
produced a relatively stronger implicit positive self-regard than the Non-ACT Group.  
 Experiment 8 (Chapter 6) was designed to determine the impact of a defusion 
intervention on implicit self-regard in a sample of individuals with no prior history of 
defusion. Specifically, the experiment compared Pre- and Post-Intervention IRAP 
responses from a group of individuals assigned to a Defusion Condition versus a 
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Placebo Condition. Consistent with previous experiments, the Pre-Intervention scores 
indicated that both groups reported a strong implicit positive self-regard, with strong 
reactions to the I AM statements, but relatively weak reactions to the I SHOULD BE 
statements. However, Post-intervention ratings suggested that those assigned to the 
Defusion Group reported a larger increase in implicit positive self-regard than the 
Placebo Group with respect to the I AM statements. Furthermore, participants 
assigned to Placebo also became more certain that they should be positive than those 
assigned to Defusion. Finally, both groups reported decreases in the emotional impact 
of their self-generated negative thought in terms of explicit ratings of levels of 
discomfort, believability and willingness.  
 
Theoretical Issues from Part II: Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
The Difficulty in Generating Appropriate Stimuli 
 One of the primary aims of Part II of the current research was to determine if 
the IRAP would provide a supplemented measure of defusion to the self-report 
measures previously employed. Thus, the research presented here was designed to 
begin to identify the types of implicit cognitions that would be most relevant for use 
with a defusion manipulation. Specifically, we attempted to generate an implicit task 
in which self-esteem was the low, so that defusion may be effective. To this extent, 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 manipulated the type of sample stimuli that acted as a 
comparison to the I AM stimuli presented during the IRAP. The results indicated that 
the I AM versus I SHOULD BE manipulation (Experiment 5) produced the 
significantly smallest positive implicit self-regard, while the I AM versus OTHERS 
ARE manipulation (Experiment 4) produced the significantly largest positive implicit 
self-regard. The later effect is perhaps unsurprising given that previous research with 
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the self-esteem IAT indicated that when the ‘other’ remains unspecified, individuals 
may automatically evaluate the other as negative. This allows for an inflated positive 
self-regard relative to when the ‘other’ is specified as being positive and suggests the 
role of a context effect (Karpinski, 2004). Thus in the current research, asking 
participants to respond to how they viewed themselves in the context of ‘others’ may 
not have created as much uncertainty for implicit self-regard as responding in the 
context of the ‘ideal self’ (i.e. I SHOULD BE).   
Despite these differences, it remains the case that across all IRAP experiments 
presented here participants reported a strong implicit positive self-regard. Perhaps this 
is not surprising given the nature of the population employed in the current studies 
(university students and ACT therapists) and the high ratings obtained on the explicit 
measure of self-esteem. Indeed, the effects obtained here are entirely consistent with 
those reported elsewhere in the literature, which has established that the majority of 
people usually demonstrate high self-esteem when required to provide self-
evaluations -- a finding that has been observed when using both explicit and implicit 
measures (Greenwald et al., 2002; Greenwald, & Farnham, 2000; Koole, Dijksterhuis, 
& von Kippenberg, 2001). Research has even indicated high levels of positive implicit 
self-esteem in formally depressed patients (both before and after negative mood 
induction), as well as, currently depressed patients (de Raedt, Schacht, Franck, & de 
Houwer, 2006; Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001).  
Despite the strong reaction produced in response to the I AM trial-types, 
participants produced little reaction to the comparison stimuli across the three 
experiments. Although we attempted to circumvent this problem by replacing the 
positive and negative words with whole statements (Experiment 6), it remained 
difficult to elicit a strong reaction to the comparison stimuli. It is not clear at this point 
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why participants produced such weak responses in this regard. Some researchers have 
argued that an inflated positive implicit self-regard may simply reflect the context of 
the comparison stimuli (e.g. Karpinski, 2004), and as such, the stimuli employed here 
may not have been the most effective comparison stimuli for use in an IRAP designed 
to assess self-regard. It is equally plausible that the results may simply reflect the 
nature of the population employed. For example, an entirely different response set 
may be obtained in the context of personally relevant target stimuli (e.g. Houben, & 
Wiers, 2007). In any case, the research presented in Part II of the current thesis 
highlights a number of difficulties associated with generating appropriate stimuli for 
use with defusion interventions and implicit measures.  
 
The Impact of Defusion on Implicit Cognition  
 In spite of the difficulties noted above, the results of Experiments 7 and 8 
suggest that defusion impacts on implicit self-regard. Consider the different patterns 
that emerged between the ACT and Non-ACT Groups (Experiment 7), as well as 
differences between the Defusion and Placebo Groups (Experiment 8). Perhaps 
surprisingly, defusion appeared to increase participants’ overall positive implicit self-
regard. That is, participants with a history of defusion reported stronger implicit 
reactions to the I AM-Positive trial-types, than those with no such history 
(Experiment 7). Furthermore, participants exposed to a defusion intervention reported 
a larger increase in Post-intervention ratings to these trial-types relative to a Placebo 
Condition (Experiment 8). This effect is perhaps surprising given that within 
therapeutic contexts, the primary target for defusion exercises is problematic 
psychological content, which is what we had intended with the I SHOULD BE 
statements. The increase in positive self-regard was perhaps unexpected, given that it 
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is commonly thought that for defusion to work, one must become ‘fully defused’ from 
both positive, as well as, negative psychological content. Based on this assumption, 
one might expect positive self-regard to decrease, to indicate a decrease in 
believability of these thoughts.  In hindsight, the increased positive self-regard 
obtained with the I AM trial-types is perhaps not that surprising. If defusion is viewed 
as promoting psychological well-being, then there is no reason to argue that one 
should defuse from psychological content that does not impact negatively on the 
individual. Viewed in this way, the results obtained here lend some support to Wilson 
and Murrell’s (2004) definition that defusion is relevant in the context in which 
psychological content interferes with an individual behaving in the direction of their 
personal values. In other words, it appears that it is necessary to defuse only from 
problematic psychological content and, as such, is consistent with the effects of 
defusion obtained for the explicit ratings of positive and negative self-statements in 
Experiment 1.  
 Differences in the strength of effect for Pre- to Post-Intervention ratings for 
the I SHOULD BE trial-types were less distinct. Little difference emerged between 
the ACT and Non-ACT Groups in Experiment 7. The results obtained for Experiment 
8 indicated that participants in both groups became more certain that they should be 
positive, with a larger increase in the strength of this effect for the Placebo Group. 
Again, this effect was unexpected, if defusion is seen as breaking the natural verbal 
processes and promoting psychological health. Perhaps these results can be explained 
by the small effect sizes obtained for these trial-types at baseline ratings, suggesting 
that participants had little or no opinion on these statements. Thus, future research 
should determine the impact of defusion in the context of stimuli that elicit stronger 
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effects to the I SHOULD BE statements and should further explore the use of 
alternative sample stimuli.  
 
The Relationship between Implicit and Explicit Measures of Defusion  
 The results outlined above suggest that defusion strategies promote 
psychological health in terms of increasing one’s positive implicit self-regard. These 
contrast with those reported in Experiment 1 which indicated that although defusion 
decreased the emotional impact for explicit ratings of the negative self-statements, it 
had little impact on the positive self-statements. It is difficult to determine the root of 
this discrepancy in the data. However, the discrepancy between the impact of an 
intervention on implicit versus explicit measures is consistent with existing research. 
For example, Grumm et al. (2008) reported significant Post-intervention increases in 
explicit self-esteem in clients with chronic pain. However, no such changes were 
recorded for implicit measures.   
It remains difficult to determine whether the results presented here reflect a 
dual processing system where implicit and explicit attitudes are separate systems (e.g. 
Fazio, & Olsen, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000). It is also possible that the discrepancy 
simply reflect procedural differences between the two types of task (Karpinski, 2004). 
Indeed, research suggests that increasing the similarity between implicit and explicit 
test formats increases the correlations between the two measures (Payne, Burkley, & 
Stokes, 2008).  
 
The Relationship between Implicit Cognition and Psychological Measures  
 The current research obtained mixed results in terms of the relationship 
between the implicit and explicit measures. Overall, there were only weak to 
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moderate correlations between the two. Specifically, no significant correlations 
emerged between the implicit and explicit measures in Experiment 3, while a positive 
correlation was obtained between the IRAP and the RSES in Experiment 4. 
 A different pattern of results emerged for the experiments that employed I AM 
versus I SHOULD BE as the sample stimuli, depending on the nature of the target 
stimuli employed (words versus statements) and the level of participants’ experience 
with defusion. Specifically, in the context of positive and negative words (Experiment 
5), large negative correlations emerged between the IRAP and both the stress and 
depression sub-scales. However, all correlations that emerged between measures in 
the context of positive and negative statements were weak (Experiment 6), and this 
pattern was not affected by one’s history with defusion techniques (Experiment 7). 
Despite differences in explicit levels of awareness and acceptance between the ACT 
and Non-ACT Groups, no differences were reported between the groups in the 
correlational analysis.     
 Yet another pattern of results emerged in Experiment 8 and this further 
depended on the time frame involved (i.e. Pre- or Post-Intervention). Overall, Pre-
Intervention scores indicated only weak to moderate correlations between the two 
measures, with the exception of a large negative correlation between the implicit 
measure and acceptance for the Placebo Group (no correlations emerged for the 
Defusion Group at Pre-Intervention). Post-intervention ratings produced a different 
pattern again, with large negative correlations between the implicit measure and both 
anxiety and depression sub-scales, while a positive correlation emerged with explicit 
self-esteem. Interestingly, no correlations emerged for the Placebo Group at Post-
Intervention).     
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 Taken together, these results indicated no clear pattern to the relationship 
between implicit and explicit measures of self-regard. This is entirely consistent with 
findings elsewhere in the literature. For example, a large-scale study investigating 
implicit and explicit self-esteem reported poor correlations between the two measures 
(e.g. Bosson et al., 2000). As is the case with the discrepancies between implicit and 
explicit measures of defusion, further research is necessary to determine if the 
differences are driven by dual-processing systems or are attributable to procedural 
issues.  
     
Explicit Measures  
 Part II of the current thesis incorporated a number of explicit measures across 
all five studies. First, participants completed a number of pre-experimental 
psychological measures. The results from Experiment 7 indicated between group 
differences in this regard. As expected, the ACT Group reported significantly higher 
levels of acceptance and awareness relative to the Non-ACT Group. Unexpectedly, 
however, differences were also reported between the Defusion and Placebo Groups in 
Experiment 8, with those assigned to the Placebo Group reporting significantly higher 
levels of acceptance. It is difficult to determine the impact of these between group 
differences on the implicit ratings of self-regard, given the overall lack of relationship 
between the two measures. Nevertheless, for issues of experimental control, future 
studies should attempt to match groups of participants across the full range of 
measures.    
 Participants also completed a number of IRAP-related Response Scales 
designed to determine their explicit reactions to the positive and negative stimuli 
employed in the IRAP. Experiments 3, 4 and 5 simply asked participants to rate the 
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relevant words for levels of positivity/negativity, discomfort, believability and 
willingness. Nevertheless, it remained the case the participants were simply 
responding to the valence of each word, as opposed to relating the word to the self. 
Thus, Experiments 7 and 8 modified the format in which the stimuli were presented. 
Specifically, each item was prefixed with the phrase “I am” to indicate the specific 
context to which participants were required to respond to. As expected, across all 
experiments participants rated the positive stimuli as positive and negative stimuli as 
negative, thus their opinions are consistent with the experimental views of the stimuli. 
Furthermore, participants rated the positive stimuli as more comfortable, more 
believable and were more willing to experience these words relative to the negative 
ones. No between group differences emerged in responses on these scales. 
Furthermore, no correlations emerged between any of these measures and the implicit 
measure (with the exception of one correlation in Experiment 8 which produced a 
large negative correlation between explicit believability of positive statements and 
implicit ratings of the I SHOULD BE trial-types for the Defusion Group only).  
 Third, participants in Experiment 8 were required to provide explicit 
(discomfort, believability and willingness) ratings of their personalised self-generated 
thought. This format was similar to Experiment 2, except that the intervention in 8 
was presented between Pre- and Post-IRAP. Interestingly, the explicit outcomes were 
not consistent across the two studies. In Experiment 8, Defusion and Placebo 
significantly decreased discomfort and believability and increased willingness. But, in 
Experiment 2 willingness remained unchanged in all cases. Furthermore, Defusion 
decreased discomfort and believability, but Placebo did not. Interestingly, the former 
relationship between Placebo and discomfort/believability was consistent with the 
findings reported originally by Masuda et al. (2004). These variations in outcomes, 
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therefore, lend some support to the view that explicit measures may or may not be 
reliable for studying this type of psychological content. 
 Fourth, participants in Experiment 8 also provided explicit ratings on two 
adherence measures: (1) honesty in providing ratings and (2) difficulty in following 
instructions. Consistent with Experiment 2, all participants reported high levels of 
honesty and low levels of difficulty associated with following the intervention 
instructions. Importantly, no between group differences were reported in this regard.  
 
The Utility of the IRAP in the Context of Defusion  
 One of the primary aims of the Part II of the current thesis was to determine 
the utility of the IRAP in the context of defusion. The results presented in 
Experiments 7 and 8 suggest that defusion does impact on implicit self-regard. 
Nevertheless, the differences obtained between groups across these experiments did 
not reach statistical significance. Although significant post-treatment changes were 
reported elsewhere for the IAT (Grumm et al., 2008; Teachman, & Woody, 2003), 
these changes followed more complete treatment regimes with clinical populations. 
Thus, it is difficult to determine the size of the effect that one would expect from 
defusion here, particularly given that no previous IRAP research exists in this area.  
 The lack of a significant effect here may, in part, be explained by the small 
effect size obtained for the I SHOULD BE trial-types. It may therefore be of 
significant merit to investigate the impact of defusion in sub-clinical and clinical 
populations who may react differently to the stimuli presented here. At the very least, 
the current work offers an important initial step into developing a defusion-relevant 
IRAP and suggests that future development in this area is of value. Furthermore, it is 
the first IRAP study to investigate Pre- to Post-Intervention changes and as such, 
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provides an important contribution to the literature.  Specifically, the inclusion of an 
implicit IRAP measure begins to present a fuller picture of the internal and external 
events that coincide with mental health. It is not about whether one measure is better 
than the other. It is more about getting a sense of both and determining their 
relationship and their impact on emotion and behaviour. Ultimately, we will likely 
need both to determine whether therapeutic interventions are helpful.   
 
Concluding Comments 
 The main aims of the current thesis were: (1) to develop an understanding of 
the underlying processes associated with defusion and (2) to identify the contexts in 
which defusion works best. To this extent, the results from Part I of the thesis suggest 
that defusion works best when experienced in exercise format as opposed to simply 
receiving defusion instructions. Furthermore, defusion appears to work in a similar 
means irrespective of whether participants are engaging with personally selected self-
relevant thoughts or self-statements generated for experimental purposes. Specifically, 
in all contexts participants reported a decrease in the emotional impact of negative 
statements – that is, decreased discomfort and believability. However, mixed results 
were reported with participants’ willingness to experience the statements.  
 In addition, the results from Part II of the thesis suggest that defusion operates 
in different ways, depending on the type of measure used. Specifically, explicit 
ratings suggested that defusion decreases the emotional impact of negative self-
statements, but had relatively little impact on positive statements. In contrast, implicit 
ratings suggested that defusion increases participant’s positive self-regard but had 
relatively little effect on views of how they should be. With respect to the latter effect, 
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however, there were a number of procedural difficulties that should be addressed 
before firm conclusions can be made.  
The work presented here provides a valuable contribution to the limited 
existing literature in the area of cognitive defusion. Specifically, it is the first to offer 
an account of the impact of defusion on both explicit and implicit measures. The data 
also provide the first account of the sensitivity of the IRAP to therapeutic 
interventions. Furthermore, the research demonstrates the importance of experimental 
control in the absence of the experimenter. Taken together, the results provide one of 
the first comprehensive experimental analyses of the underlying psychological 
processes associated with cognitive defusion. Overall, the research highlights the 
positive emotional benefits of engaging in defusion strategies. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-35) 
 
Below you will find a list of statements.  Please rate the truth of each statement as it 
applies to you.  Use the following scale to make your choice.   
 
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5----------------6----------------7     
never        very seldom              seldom           sometimes            frequently          almost always          always 
 true             true               true  true   true                true   true 
 
1. Thoughts can be dangerous. 
 
Reverse 
2.  I do not try to change my unhappy, or fearful, thoughts. 
 
 
3.  I can’t do things, if I am unhappy. 
 
Reverse 
4.  It is more important to move towards my goals, than to feel good. 
 
 
5.  My thoughts and feelings can get in the way of my success. 
 
Reverse 
6.  There is nothing wrong with having unhappy thoughts and  
     feelings. 
 
 
7. I try to achieve my goals, even if I am uncertain that I can. 
 
 
8. If I feel fearful, then there is really something to be fearful about. 
 
Reverse 
9. If I feel unhappy, then I should determine the reason for my   
    unhappiness. 
 
Reverse 
10. If I value something, I’ll work for it, even if I disappoint people  
      by doing so. 
 
 
11. I choose to get on with my life, rather than struggle with my   
       worries or unhappiness. 
 
 
12. The greater my worries or anxieties become, the more concerned  
      I get for myself. 
 
Reverse 
13. Even if I fear I may get it wrong, I can still take action on a        
      problem. 
 
 
14. I should act according to my feelings at the time. 
 
Reverse 
15. I try to suppress thoughts and feelings that  
      I don’t like by just not thinking about them. 
 
Reverse 
16.  It’s OK to feel depressed or anxious. 
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1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5----------------6----------------7     
never        very seldom              seldom           sometimes            frequently          almost always          always 
 true             true               true  true   true                true   true 
 
 
17. Despite doubts, I feel as though I can set a course in my life  
      and then stick to it.  
 
 
18.  If I could magically remove all the painful  
       experiences I’ve had in my life, I would do so. 
 
Reverse 
19.  I worry about not being able to control my anxieties,  
       worries, and feelings. 
 
Reverse 
20.  Anxiety is bad. 
 
Reverse 
21.  I’m not afraid of my feelings. 
 
 
22.  I am in control of my life. 
 
 
23.  If I get bored of a task, I can still complete it. 
 
 
24.  Worries can get in the way of my success. 
 
Reverse 
25.  I am able to take action on a problem even  
       if I am uncertain what is the right thing to do. 
 
 
26.  If I promised to do something,  
       I’ll do it, even if I later don’t feel like it. 
 
 
27.  When I feel depressed or anxious,  
       I am unable to take care of my responsibilities. 
 
Reverse 
28.  I try hard to avoid feeling depressed or anxious. 
 
Reverse 
29. I often catch myself daydreaming about things I’ve done and  
      what I would do differently next time. 
 
Reverse 
30. I rarely worry about getting my anxieties, worries, and feelings  
      under control. 
 
  
31. When I evaluate something negatively, I usually recognize that  
      this is just a reaction, not an objective fact. 
 
 
32. When I compare myself to other people, it seems that most of  
      them are handling their lives better than I do. 
 
Reverse 
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1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5----------------6----------------7     
never        very seldom              seldom           sometimes            frequently          almost always          always 
 true             true               true  true   true                true           true 
 
33. I am able to take action on a problem even if I am uncertain  
      what is the right thing to do. 
 
 
34. It’s unnecessary for me to learn to control my feelings, in order to  
      handle my life well. 
 
 
35. In order for me to do something important, I have to have all my   
      doubts worked out. 
 
Reverse 
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The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
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Appendix C 
 
The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI Form Y-2) 
 
 
 
 
Note: Scores on items 21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36 and 39 are reversed 
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Appendix D 
 
Mean Ratings of the Forty Self-statements (Twenty Positive and Twenty 
Negative) used in Experiment 1  
* indicates that self-statement was actually employed in the experiment 
 Self-Statement Mean Rating 
 
1* I love life   18.65 
2* I know that I am loved 17.79 
3* I am happy with who I am 17.77 
4* There is so much that I can do with my life 17.48 
5* There is so much for me to be happy about 17.41 
6* I am part of a beautiful world 17.35 
7* When things go wrong I know that I will always have friends 16.92 
8* I have no problems that can’t be solved 16.73 
9* I am proud of myself 16.68 
10* I am whole 16.37 
11  I can be whatever I want 16.32 
12 I can turn my failure into success 16.18 
13 Inside I am a good person    15.72 
14 I have strength in my beliefs 15.66 
15 People like me  15.53 
16 I have good qualities   15.40 
17 I am lucky  15.39 
18 There are things about me that I like 15.13 
19 There is always hope for my life 15.13 
20 My heart is in the right place 14.44 
21 There are things about me I can never say 7.84 
22 I have problems people don’t know about 7.66 
23 I thought I would be better than this 6.92 
24 I am not as good as people think 6.48 
25 I can’t help feeling lonely  5.85 
26 No one really understands me 5.10 
27 People don’t really like me  4.26 
28 I am ashamed of myself  3.81 
29 Sometimes I feel worthless  3.27 
30* Deep down there is something wrong with me 3.25 
31* No one will ever love me  3.23 
32* Sometimes I wish I wasn’t me  3.21 
33* I am helpless   3.07 
34* I am ugly   2.85 
35* I am broken   2.71 
36* I make a mess of everything 2.69 
37* I am a bad person   2.66 
38* I am stupid   2.54 
39* My life is pointless   2.39 
40* I am a failure    1.45 
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Appendix E  
 
Consent Form Employed in Experiment 1 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
In agreeing to participate in this research I understand the following: 
 
This research is being conducted by CLAIRE KEOGH, a Ph.D. student at the 
Department of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUIM).  
 
 I understand that it is Ms. Keogh’s responsibility to adhere to ethical 
guidelines in her dealings with participants and in the collection and handling 
of data. 
 
  I also understand that the activities of Ms. Keogh in this regard are supervised 
by her doctoral supervisor.   
 
 I have been informed as to the general nature of the study and agree 
voluntarily to participate.  
 
 I understand that some of the questionnaires contain questions that I may find 
personal and/or distressing. To this end, I understand that: (1) I may refuse to 
answer any of the questions without penalty; (2) there are no correct answers 
to the questions and (3) the questionnaires are simply included to assist the 
experimenter in interpreting the data. I understand that I may be provided with 
my overall scores on each of these scales (without interpretation). However, I 
will not be provided with the scores from any other participant. 
 
 I understand that as part of the experimental procedure, I will be exposed to a 
number of positive and negative self-statements, some of which I may find 
distressing.    
 
 In accordance with research guidelines, all data will be kept on file at the 
Psychology Department in NUIM for approximately 5 years. I give my 
permission for this.  
 
 I have been made aware that all data from the study will be treated 
confidentially and that participants will not be identified by name at any stage 
of the data collection, analysis or write-up (code numbers will be used instead). 
However, in exceptional circumstances, I understand that my data may be 
disclosed to Ms. Keogh’s doctoral supervisor. 
 
 I understand that I will not be given the full rationale behind the study before 
my participation, for reasons of best practice. However, it has been made clear 
that at the conclusion of my participation, any questions or concerns I have 
will be fully addressed.   
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Appendix E (continued) 
 
 
 I understand that if any psychological problems arise directly from the 
research, I can contact Ms. Keogh’s doctoral supervisor, Dr. Yvonne Barnes-
Holmes, free of charge, to discuss these issues with a Chartered Psychologist. 
 
 
 I understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time, and may 
withdraw my data at the conclusion of my participation if I still have concern.  
 
 
I agree to take part in the above research study. 
 
 
 
Participant’s Name (PRINT):    Researcher’s Name (PRINT): 
 
___________________________   __________________________ 
 
 
 
Participant’s Name (Signed):     Researcher’s Name (PRINT): 
  
 
___________________________   __________________________ 
 
 
 
Date:                  Date: 
 
___________________________   ___________________________ 
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Appendix F 
 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-49) 
 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you 
by circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost always 
true 
always  
true 
       
1. My thoughts can be dangerous. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. It is normal to sometimes feel unhappy.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I can do things that are important to me even when I’m feeling 
unhappy.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I can move towards important goals, even if I don’t feel good about 
myself.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My thoughts and feelings get in the way of my success. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. If I have mean or nasty thoughts, then I am a mean or nasty person. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I try to achieve my goals, even if I am uncertain that I can.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I try hard not to have bad feelings. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I work towards things I value, even though at times I feel 
uncomfortable or uncertain.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. The greater my worries or anxieties become, the more concerned I 
get for my well-being. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I take action on a problem, even when I fear I may get it wrong.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. The way I feel in a situation usually determines the actions that I take. 
R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. It’s OK for me to have thoughts and feelings that I don’t like.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I am not very aware of what occurs around me. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I can set a course in my life and stick to it, even if I have doubts.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Anxiety is bad. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Never 
 True 
Very seldom 
true 
Seldom  
True 
Sometimes  
True 
Frequently  
True 
Almost always 
true 
Always  
True 
       
17. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a 
life that I would value. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I often catch myself daydreaming about things I’ve done and what I 
would do differently next time. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. I am in control of my life.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. If I get bored of a task, I can still complete it.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Worries get in the way of my success. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. If I feel uncertain, I can still make a choice and take action.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. If I promised to do something, I’ll do it, even if I later don’t feel like it.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. I stop taking care of my responsibilities when I feel anxious or 
uncomfortable. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. I try hard to avoid feeling anxious or jittery. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. In order to achieve my goals, I will not avoid people or places that may 
upset me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Having some worries will not prevent me from living a fulfilling life.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. I should not always believe my reactions and judgments.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. I need to control my feelings in order to handle my life well. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. In order for me to do something important, I first have to have all my 
doubts worked out. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I want to live my 
life.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. I can’t stand feeling sad or guilty. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost always 
true 
always  
true 
       
34. It’s OK if I remember something unpleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. If an unpleasant memory comes into my head, I try to get rid of 
it.R  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. I try to avoid thoughts and feelings that cause difficulty in my 
daily life. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37. I try hard to control the physical reactions that I experience in my 
body (e.g., heart racing, sweating). R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38. I would rather achieve my goals than avoid unpleasant thoughts 
and feelings.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. Emotions cause problems in my life. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40. I’m afraid of my feelings. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42. When I feel uneasy, I do whatever I can to get rid of those 
feelings. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43. I do not have to control my thoughts and feelings to be 
successful. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44. I don’t avoid situations that make me feel jittery.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45. I don’t have to get rid of scary or unhappy images that come to 
my mind.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46. If I notice myself breathing quickly, then something is wrong. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47. My mind is often on “automatic pilot”, not fully involved in what I 
am doing in the moment. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
49. It’s OK to feel sad or anxious. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Note. R indicates that scoring on this item is reversed.  
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Appendix G 
 
The Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21) 
 
Note. DASS: Depression = items 3, 5, 10, 13, 16,17 and 21; Anxiety =  items 2, 4, 7, 9, 15, 19, 20; and  
Sress = 1, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 18.   
DAS S 21 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the statement applied 
to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any 
statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
1 
I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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Appendix H 
 
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, enter a number beside each statement to indicate 
how much you AGREE with it for you: 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
NOT                                       SOMEWHAT or                                      VERY 
           TRUE                                         SOMETIMES                                       TRUE 
 
1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right 
 
 
2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
 
 
3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
 
 
4. I have not always been honest with myself. 
 
 
5. I always know why I like things. 
 
 
6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
 
 
7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom 
change my opinion. 
 
8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
 
 
9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
 
 
10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
 
 
11. I never regret my decisions. 
 
 
12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my  
     mind soon enough. 
 
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a 
difference. 
 
14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
 
 
15. I am a completely rational person. 
 
 
16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
 
 
17. I am very confident of my judgments. 
 
 
18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
 
 
19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
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Appendix H (continued) 
 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
NOT                                        SOMEWHAT or                                 VERY 
      TRUE                                             SOMETIMES                                        TRUE 
Note. Odd numbered items comprise the self-deception scales, while even numbered items comprise 
the impression management scales. 
20. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
 
 
21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
 
 
22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
 
 
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of  
      someone. 
 
24. I never swear. 
 
 
25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
 
 
26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
 
 
27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her  
      back. 
 
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
 
 
29. I have received too much change from a salesperson  
      whithout telling him or her. 
 
30. I always declare everything at customs. 
 
 
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
 
 
32. I have never dropped litter on the street. 
 
 
33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
 
 
34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
 
 
35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
 
 
36. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
 
 
37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I  
      wasn’t really sick. 
 
38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise  
      without reporting it. 
 
39. I have some pretty awful habits. 
_________________________________________________________ 
40. I don’t gossip about other people’s business 
 
_____________
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Appendix I 
 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) 
 
 
Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about 
yourself. If you strongly agree, circle SA. If you agree with the statement, circle A. If you 
disagree, circle D. If you strongly disagree, circle SD.  
 
1.  On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself.  
SA  A  D  SD  
2.*  At times, I think I am no good at all.  
 
SA  A  D  SD  
3.  I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities.  
SA  A  D  SD  
4.  I am able to do things as well as 
most other people.  
SA  A  D  SD  
5.*  I feel I do not have much to be proud 
of.  
SA  A  D  SD  
6.*  I certainly feel useless at times.  
 
SA  A  D  SD  
7.  I feel that I’m a person of worth, at 
least on an equal plane with others.  
SA  A  D  SD  
8.*  I wish I could have more respect for 
myself.  
SA  A  D  SD  
9.*  All in all, I am inclined to feel that I 
am a failure.  
SA  A  D  SD  
10.  I take a positive attitude toward 
myself.  
SA  A  D  SD  
 
* indicates that item is negatively reversed.
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Appendix J 
 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II) 
 
 
AAQ-II 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost 
always true 
always  
true 
       
1. Its OK if I remember something unpleasant. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live 
a life that I would value. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I’m afraid of my feelings. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am in control of my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Emotions cause problems in my life. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Worries get in the way of my success. R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I want to live 
my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Note. R indicates that scoring on this item is reversed.  
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Appendix K 
 
An Example of an IRAP-Related Response Scale for Experiments 3, 4 and 5 
 
 
Q1. Circle the number on the scales below that most accurately represents your 
feelings towards each of these self-relevant words.  
 
 
 
                                          Extremely                                                    Extremely  
                                           Negative                                                       Positive 
 
Kind     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Confident    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Trusting    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Honest    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Secure    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Popular    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Selfish    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Self-conscious   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Jealous    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Fake     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Insecure    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Lonely    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scales (PHLMS) 
 
 
PHLMS© 
Instructions: Please circle how often you experienced each of the following statements within the past 
week. 
 
 
1. I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
2. I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions.  
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
3. When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and body expressions. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
4. There are aspects of myself I don’t want to think about. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
5. When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
6. I try to stay busy to keep thoughts or feelings from coming to mind. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
7. When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
8. I wish I could control my emotions more easily. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
9. When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
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Appendix L (continued) 
 
10. I tell myself that I shouldn’t have certain thoughts. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
11. When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
12. There are things I try not to think about. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
13. I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
14. I tell myself that I shouldn’t feel sad. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
15. I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles getting tense. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
16. If there is something I don’t want to think about, I’ll try many things to get it out of my 
mind. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
17. Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5  
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
18. I try to put my problems out of mind. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
 
19. When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
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20. When I have a bad memory, I try to distract myself to make it go away. 
 
     1                       2                            3                          4                            5 
Never                Rarely                Sometimes                Often                Very Often 
Appendix M 
 
Some Examples from the IRAP-Related Believability Scale for Experiments 7 
and 8 
 
 
Below you will see a number of rating scales that ask you to rate how you feel about a number of 
different statements. 
 
Imagine each statement said something about who you are as a person.  
 
How BELIEVABLE do you think each statement is in relation to how you see yourself right now? 
(i.e. How true do you think they are about you right now?) 
 
Please take a moment to read each statement to yourself before circling your choice for that statement 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
“I am unpleasant to be around” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 
Extremely 
Unbelievable 
Extremely 
Believable 
 
Neutral 
3 
 
“I am afraid to show who I really am”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extremely 
Unbelievable 
 
Extremely 
Believable Neutral 
 
 
-3 -2 -1  0 1 2 3 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
“I am jealous of those around me” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extremely 
Unbelievable 
Extremely 
Believable Neutral 
 
 
-3 -2 -1  
 
0 1 2 3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix N 
 
Experimental Guide to Complete the Online IRAP in Experiment 7 
 
 
 
Many thanks for agreeing to take part in this research.  
 
Before beginning these tasks please make sure that you are on a computer that has 
software that can properly read Microsoft word files. 
 
Please ensure that you complete this experiment in a quiet room, free from distraction. 
In addition, please ensure that you complete all aspects of the experiment in one 
sitting. 
 
 
Your unique I.D. and password is presented below. This I.D. and password is just for 
you, and as such must not be used by any other individuals completing this 
experiment. You will only be required to use the I.D. and password during Step 3 of 
the experiment (see below). 
 
ID: 
PASSWORD: 
 
 
There are four important steps to completing this experiment: 
 
Step 1: Informed consent 
Step 2: Background questionnaire, psychological measures and believability  
  ratings  
Step 3: IRAP task  
Step 4: Final rating scales  
 
These documents are attached to this email in the order outlined above. Please 
download each of the documents (for example, to your desktop etc.) and save any 
changes you make to the documents before returning them to me via email 
(claire.keogh@gmail.com). 
 
Step 1: Please take a moment to read and sign the attached informed consent form. 
This consent form must be read carefully and signed before you proceed with the 
experiment.  
 
Following this, if you are happy to proceed, please complete each of the following 
experimental steps.  
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Step 2: This phase requires you to complete a number of brief questions to determine 
your experience with both ACT and the IRAP. In addition, you will be asked to 
complete three brief psychological measures, namely the Depression, Anxiety and 
Stress Scales (DASS21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995 or see 
www.psy.unsw.edu.au/dass/), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (RSES;  
Appendix N (continued) 
 
 
Rosenberg, 1965) and the The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scales (PHLMS; Cardaciotto, 
Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, in press). Finally, you will be asked to rate the 
believability of twelve individual statements. Further instructions about completing 
these measures are provided at the start of the document entitled ‘Step 2’.    
 
 
Step 3: This phase requires you to complete the IRAP computer task. You will need 
your unique I.D. and password to complete this phase. Detailed instructions as to how 
to complete the IRAP are provided in the document entitled ‘Step 3’. Even if you are 
familiar with the IRAP, it might be beneficial to have a brief look over the 
instructions provided here. This document also provides the link that will take you 
to the online IRAP website, where you will complete the IRAP task. 
 
Step 4: Having completed the IRAP computer task, the final step in this experiment 
requires you to complete a number of brief rating scales. It is important that you 
complete this section immediately after completing the IRAP task.    
   
Always bear in mind that you are free to discontinue your participation (irrespective 
of number of steps you have completed) without having to provide an explanation.  
 
Having completed all experimental phases, please return all completed forms (Step 1, 
Step 2 and Step 4) to me via email at claire.keogh@gmail.com.  
 
If you have any further questions regarding the experiment, or the instructions 
provided, please do not hesitate to email me at claire.keogh@gmail.com.   
 
Once again, thank you for taking the time to take part in this study, 
 
Warm Regards,  
Claire  
 
